In response to a recent episode of the podcast Radiolab that relates the story of a juror who was prosecuted for attempting jury nullification, Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers how we ought to think about the power of jurors to acquit for any reason. Colb explains what jury nullification is and describes some situations in which it is most clearly appropriate and some in which it is problematic. She also proposes a solution to address bias in all phases of the criminal process, rather than just prosecution and trial.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on “stealthing,” a practice in which men surreptitiously remove their condoms while having intercourse. Colb considers whether the practice is best characterized as sexual assault, as some have argued, or whether it is a different kind of harm that should be addressed through a different set of legal processes.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a Texas bill currently under consideration that would eliminate the “wrongful birth” cause of action. Colb defines wrongful birth and points out that while its opponents argue that it encourages abortion, it actually encourages forthrightness and honesty among physicians, which should already be the standard of conduct. In fact, Colb argues, it is not the availability of a lawsuit that “encourages” abortion so much as the fact of the severe disability and the toll that this could take on their lives as well as on the life of the child whose birth is under consideration.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers one recent instance in which the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed a standard because it was factually more accurate than a prior standard, and several other instances in which the Court has done the opposite. Colb points out that, unfortunately, the law often seeks facts that facilitate a desired outcome rather than facts a more just or correct outcome.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a juror’s use of racial stereotypes to vote for conviction may be used to invalidate the verdict, despite evidentiary rules that otherwise prohibit the use of juror testimony to challenge a verdict. Colb argues that the Supreme Court should have either extended the Sixth Amendment exception to cover other types of juror misconduct, or repealed the rule that prohibits the use of post-verdict juror testimony to impeach a verdict.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb examines the how ineffective assistance of counsel and equal protection interact in cases involving race to produce results different from what might result from similar cases not involving race. Specifically, Colb looks at whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel in Buck v. Davis would have been different if the issue of race had not been involved.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a bill currently under consideration by the Oklahoma legislature that would require a woman who wants to have an abortion to first obtain the written consent of the father of the pregnancy. Colb argues that not only is the bill plainly unconstitutional, but it is also outright misogynistic.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent antitrust lawsuit by an animal advocacy organization against a dairy organization. Colb argues that the public message of the suit will likely be detrimental to the interests of dairy cattle rather than raising consciousness in a positive way.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb discusses a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the issue whether a defendant whose conviction has been reversed may be required—without violating due process—to bring a separate civil action to prove her innocence in order to get a refund of the costs and fees imposed from her original conviction. Colb points out that the crux of the issue is whether the money sought to be returned is characterized as a refund or as compensation.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb critiques a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that it was reasonable for police officers to kill two dogs in a home they searched. Colb first explains the facts behind the case and then argues that the police should have asked the dogs’ owner to subdue the dogs prior to the search, and that not doing so was unreasonable and led to the unnecessary killing of the dogs.
Writing from the perspective of a pro-life activist, Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the merits of a Texas rule that would require hospitals and clinics to bury or cremate the remains of embryos and fetuses resulting from terminations or miscarriages that take place in their facilities. From this perspective, Colb acknowledges that the rule might reasonably be interpreted to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent; she writes from her true (pro-choice) perspective in an accompanying blog post.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent situation in which a Tennessee woman was charged with attempted murder for trying unsuccessfully to terminate her pregnancy with a coat hanger at 24 weeks. Colb explains why attempted murder doesn’t seem to be an appropriate charge in this situation, and she explains the role that policies put forth abortion opponents might have played in forcing the woman to attempt an abortion in this manner.
Cornell University professor Sherry F. Colb discusses California’s Proposition 60, a ballot initiative that recently failed in that state that would have required male actors in pornographic movies to wear condoms during performances. Colb considers both a First Amendment challenge to the ballot initiative, as well as a possible response to that challenge, and she argues the law would likely pass muster under the First Amendment.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb addresses the argument that nonhuman animals’ lack of moral agency justifies our denying them the right to live free of our violence. Colb contends that the notion that we owe duties only to those who can repay us actually reflects an impoverished morality.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the idea of a sexual advance directive—a proposed legal device that could provide consent or designate an agent to provide consent in advance of an anticipated persistent period of legal incompetence. Colb explains how a sexual advance directive purports to work, describes some limitations of it, and proposes an alternative solution that addresses those limitations.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the arguments on both sides of a difficult question currently before the Supreme Court—whether a defendant is entitled to use juror testimony to impeach a verdict based on racial bias, notwithstanding a contrary rule of evidence. Colb describes the facts leading up to the case and discusses the jurisprudence that will most likely affect the justices’ ultimate decision.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent decision by the Arizona Supreme Court holding that a state statute properly created an affirmative defense to sexual abuse or child molestation when it placed the burden of proving no sexual motive on the defendant. Colb describes the court’s reasoning and explains why the U.S. Supreme Court should revisit its jurisprudence affirmative defenses to crimes and hold that some conduct may simply not be classified as an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant in a criminal case.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on a recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Indiana, holding that police violated their suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights by acquiring, without a warrant, the suspect’s cell site information from his cell phone provider. Colb explains the Indiana court’s reasoning and discusses the evolving law regarding people’s privacy expectations in information their cell phones store and transmit.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent decision by New York’s highest court expanding the definition of parental status to include same-sex partners intending to parent. Colb explains the court’s ruling and discusses a U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding the rights of non-parents that might stand in the New York court’s way.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers whether the termination of Zika pregnancies might affect our thinking about abortion. Specifically, Colb asks (1) whether it is right to end a pregnancy because the baby would be severely disabled if brought to term, and (2) whether it is right at all to take the life of a fetus late in pregnancy, given that birth defects caused by Zika are not detectable by ultrasound until late in pregnancy.