Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a recent school speech case from Missouri in which twin brothers, both high-school juniors, created a blog that derogated fellow students in racist and sexist ways. Hilden argues that it’s no surprise that the brothers were suspended from their school and required to continue their studies elsewhere, given that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist. allows students to be punished when substantial disruption foreseeably results from speech that they directed at their school. She also notes that it is unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court would grant review in a case like this one, and describes the kind of school-speech case that might, conversely, be a good candidate for the Court’s review.
Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar comments on developments relating to the National Popular Vote (NPV) movement and other election reform proposals. The essential idea of NPV is to get various states to sign an agreement requiring each signatory state to cast its electoral college votes not for the candidate who garnered a plurality of popular votes in that state, but rather for the candidate who won the most popular votes nationally. This system, with enough signatories, would ensure that the winner of the Presidential contest would always be the person who had won the largest number of votes from individual voters nationwide. It would thus solve the problem of candidates’ focusing almost exclusively on “battleground states” in their campaigns, and would ensure that each American’s vote truly had equal weight in presidential elections. The importance of the issue is underlined by the fact that Gore won more votes in 2000, but lost the election, and this year, Romney may do the same.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan argues that the GOP leadership’s current stances are—as Nicholas Kristof also characterized them recently in The New York Times—sociopathic. Buchanan cites examples including the position that illegal aliens should be made so miserable that they will “self-deport,” even though their children too will suffer; and the position that aid to America’s poor should be sharply curtailed, even though that, too, would harm innocent children, with even children’s nutrition programs on the list to be cut. Buchanan takes issue, too, with proposed Romney/Ryan programs that would, he argues, only intensify social inequality, including ones targeting healthcare for the elderly.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on a recent decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, throwing out the conviction of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni who was captured in Afghanistan in 2001. Dorf chronicles Hamdan’s long legal journey, and the repercussions that it has had for U.S. law. Dorf also explains that while the most recent decision regarding Hamdan is narrow, it nevertheless carries symbolic significance, casting doubt on the Bush Administration’s and the Obama Administration’s respective, and similar, detainee policies.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on a recent court decision in which two African-American men challenged what they alleged was differential treatment in their auditions for the reality show The Bachelor. With neither The Bachelor nor its sister show, The Bachelorette, ever having had an African-American lead, the plaintiffs saw evidence of racial discrimination when the show, they allege, gave them shorter interviews than other would-be contestants received, and did not ultimately select them to join the show’s cast. Ramasastry explains why the plaintiffs lost in court: the First Amendment protects casting decisions, whether by dramas, comedies, or reality shows. She notes, though, that the lack of court relief here doesn't mean the men were wrong on the merits, but only that they will now need to find another avenue, such as protesting and/or continuing to speak out, in order to make their point.
Justia guest columnist and Touro Law Center professor Rodger Citron comments on the recent Supreme Court argument in an important case centering on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). As Citron explains, the ATS, enacted by the first Congress in 1789, authorizes federal courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the laws of nations or a treaty of the United States.” But can the ATS be applied to conduct based outside the U.S.? As Citron explains, that is the issue that the conservative Justices brought up at oral argument. Citron predicts, however, that in the end the Court will not limit the ATS’s reach to conduct that occurs within the United States, but that the Court will affirm the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ case.
Justia columnist and attorney David Kemp comments on the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines marriage, for federal purposes, as being between a man and a woman. Kemp discusses why the Second Circuit held that the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause required the application of intermediate scrutiny. Kemp also notes that the Second Circuit was the first court facing this issue not to also analyze the issue using a lower level of scrutiny. In addition, he discusses a number of other cases decided by courts across the country, that have confronted the issue of what level of scrutiny is proper for classifications based on sexual orientation—and why such cases may well lead to eventual Supreme Court review.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean notes that Mitt Romney attended both law school and business school, and contends that Romney forgot to think like a lawyer at the recent Hofstra debate. Before commenting specifically on Romney, Dean addresses the controversy about whether lawyers think differently than other people. One position is that thinking like a lawyer is simply thinking clearly and critically; the other position is that thinking like a lawyer is a unique skill that only those who have learned that skill in law school possess, in part because lawyers are taught to follow past precedent, even if they think it is wrongly decided—which is not the case in other professions. Dean notes that lawyers must also meet the requirements of the bar, and follow the jurisdiction’s Rules of Professional Conduct. While Romney is an attorney, Dean argues, he is much more of a businessman, and Dean notes that GOP businessmen have, over history, fared poorly in the Oval Office, and cites both Herbert Hoover and George W. Bush as examples.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton comments on an incident in Pakistan in which a 14-year young woman was shot by the Taliban because she voiced her view that girls should be educated; and an incident here in the U.S. where the American Family Association—which is characterized by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate group—has essentially come out in favor of the bullying of homosexual children on Mix It Up at Lunch Day, which is meant to break up cliques, even if just for one day. Hamilton argues that the first incident shows the need for the international recognition of civil rights, and of the rule of law, and the second incident involves a particularly repellent form of homophobia that has no place in our public schools. Each incident is made all the worse, Hamilton suggests, because children are the victims. Hamilton reminds us, too, that we are fortunate here in the U.S. to have the benefit of the First Amendment's Establishment and Speech Clauses.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman comments on the second presidential debate, and especially on Mitt Romney’s now-famous comment about “binders full of women,” which has now become an Internet meme. Grossman argues that the comment reveals Romney’s dated and uninformed view of women in the workplace. She also notes that Romney, while avoiding the question about pay inequity that led to the “binders” comment, revealed that he believes that the only workers who need flexible schedules are women, apparently due to the assumptions that all women have children, and that only women perform child care.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf explains the origin and meaning of the concept of having a “critical mass” of minority students in the affirmative action context, and the role that this concept played in a recent Supreme Court oral argument relating to affirmative action at the University of Texas. Without a critical mass of minority students, it has been argued, such students will feel isolated in class and on campus, and there may be little diversity within the group of minority students itself. For these reasons, the University of Texas gives such students a special “plus factor” in admissions. Dorf explains how both conservatives and liberals on the Court have come to place what he argues is excessive weight on the “critical mass” concept, when it comes to affirmative action in education. He also summarizes the conservative Justices’ critique of the concept, but contends that that critique is itself flawed.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses the law relating to paternity fraud—that is, to instances when women falsely claim that one man has fathered their child, when in fact, the child's father was another man. Grossman focuses on a Tennessee case that fits that very scenario. There, the man who was falsely led to believe that a child was his, and who consequently paid child support for that child, sued his ex-wife for damages, and won on his claim for intentional misrepresentation of paternity. As Grossman notes, a few other states take approaches similar to Tennessee's. Grossman also covers the approach that the Uniform Parenthood Act (UPA) takes to this issue.
Justia guest columnist and Cornell Law Visiting Fellow Antonio Haynes comments on a recent controversy in which parents of two public school students did not object to their daughters undergoing corporal punishment (specifically, paddling), but did object to the punishment being carried out by men, rather than women. Haynes points out that, upon closer examination, the issue here is not actually about sex, but about sexual orientation; the parents assumed the males conducting the spankings were straight and thus thought that they might find performing the spankings erotic. Noting that corporal punishment in the schools has not been ruled by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional, and that 19 states still allow it, Haynes suggests that issues like who may administer a spanking tend to distract us from asking deeper questions such as why we still accept corporal punishment in our schools, and why—if we trust school officials to paddle students—we do not also trust them not to harbor erotic motives while doing so.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on the recent controversy over a Philadelphia public school geometry teacher's deriding student Samantha Pawlucy for wearing a Romney/Ryan T-shirt. The incident blew up into a full-blown controversy, with Romney personally calling the girl and speaking with her parents. Hilden parallels the incident to the key 1969 Supreme Court student-speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., in which students near Pawlucy's age wore black armbands in school in order to protest the Vietnam War. Hilden also argues that Pawlucy’s is an easy case, and that she would have a much harder First Amendment case, had the incident occurred in a History or Social Studies class. Finally, Hilden questions whether this was a case of teacher/student bullying, and suggests that teachers and students alike should be required to learn basic school-speech First Amendment tenets.
Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram Amar takes strong issue with Justice Scalia’s recent remark that certain constitutional questions are “easy”—including questions relating to the constitutionality of the death penalty, laws restricting abortions, and limits on the rights of gays and lesbians to engage in homosexual activity. Amar argues that even if one uses Scalia’s own interpretive method of originalism, the answers to such constitutional questions are far less easy than Scalia claims them to be; and Amar cites a number of interesting examples to prove his case. Amar also contends that a full approach of originalism would go much further than the examples Scalia gives, would destroy important and basic contemporary Court precedents, and thus would seriously disrupt constitutional law as we know it. Finally, Amar contends that the counterarguments that Scalia might make to the objections that could be raised regarding his views would only get him into deeper trouble analytically.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on why President Obama was widely perceived as losing the first presidential debate. Buchanan, who himself has a long history as a debater and debate coach, contends that one important problem for Obama was that Romney frequently said things that were outright false, and yet, Obama could not call him a liar, for that would run afoul of Americans’ tendency to believe what other say, and their aversion to call a person on falsehoods, because it seems so rude to do so. Buchanan thus contends that Romney’s debate tactics preyed on Americans’ deep-seated tendency to believe the best of others—and argues that Ryan uses similar argumentative strategies as well. In the first debate, Buchanan notes, Obama opted not to say “You’re lying, Governor,” as some commentators thought he should have, in retrospect. That raises an interesting question: Will he do so in the next Presidential debate?
In Part Two in a two-part series of columns on an interesting set of Fourth Amendment issues, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues to address the question whether law enforcement may constitutionally, without a warrant or probable cause, use global positioning technology to track a suspect’s whereabouts through his cellular phone. Specifically, here in Part Two, Colb considers the two possible ways in which the Supreme Court uses the phrase “reasonable expectations of privacy” in practice in Fourth Amendment cases. In the phrase, Colb notes, “reasonable” may mean “empirically realistic,” but it also may mean “morally justifiable.” Colb gives examples of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases in which the phrase is used in these two different ways. In addition, she examines the exclusionary rule’s role here—noting that the rule, which forbids evidence from being admitted in court if it was obtained unconstitutionally, may in concrete cases seem to simply help out criminals, but at a more abstract theoretical level, protects us all from police misconduct. Colb also predicts that the Supreme Court will need to revisit these issues sooner, rather than later, to ensure that the law is clear.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on the use of biometrics in school lunch lines and elsewhere in schools. More specifically, she notes, schools are using an infrared scanner that identifies children’s unique palm and hand vein patterns, and converts these patterns into an algorithm through which the child can be recognized quickly and uniquely by a hand scan. Ramasastry raises privacy concerns about this kind of scanning: Could it lead kids to see other compromises of their privacy as commonplace? Will the databases that contain the scans be used for other purposes—even when the kids become adults? Might law enforcement attempt to use the databases of the hand scans? And what about parents with religious objections to schools’ using the hand scans on their children? At the very least, Ramasastry suggests, the scanning system should be “opt in” and not “opt out,” so that parents can think carefully about allowing their children to become part of the scanning system, and thus part of the related database.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on an important recent First Amendment ruling by a Chicago judge, Thomas More Donnelly. Judge Donnelly ruled in favor of Occupy Chicago protesters who broke the 11:00 p.m.-to-6 a.m. curfew for Grant Park, and were consequently arrested. Significant in Judge Donnelly's decision were the Illinois Constitution’s especially broad right of assembly; the fact that, in 2008, Obama rally participants were allowed to break the curfew in Grant Park without suffering arrest or other consequences; and the poor treatment that the Occupy Chicago protesters had earlier endured from the Chicago police, before the Grant Park arrests. Hilden argues that Judge Donnelly was correct to rule for the protesters.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean argues that Mitt Romney’s win in the first presidential debate will prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, which will also help the Democrats. Dean discusses presidential debates from their very beginning, with Kennedy versus Nixon in 1960, up to the present. In commenting on the first Obama/Romney debate, Dean describes the “incumbent’s trap,” which he defines as the ability of the challenger to force the incumbent to defend his record—for even a strong record can be criticized, and as Americans, we can be unrealistic about what we expect our presidents to accomplish while in office. Meanwhile, the challenger can promise voters the moon. Numerous incumbents, Dean notes, have fallen into this very trap, though in Clinton/Dole, Clinton managed to avoid it by dominating the debate. Dean then analyzes the Obama/Romney debate—arguing that it needed much more moderation and fewer open-ended topics. Ultimately, though, Dean contends that Obama’s loss there will have a silver lining: Post-debate, the Obama team can now correct the many instances where Romney stretched or outright ignored the truth, and Democratic voters will be reminded that an Obama win is far from a foregone conclusion.