George Washington law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why, whether Donald Trump wins or loses the presidency, constitutional democracy in the United States is seriously threatened. Buchanan argues that Trump’s stated plans for the country would effectively destroy our constitutional democracy, but even a Republican-caused gridlocked Congress under a President Hillary Clinton could cause a debt crisis and economic collapse.

Cornell University law professor Joseph Margulies explains how two front-end criminal justice reforms—demanding moral consistency in policing and taking addiction seriously—would significantly shrink the carceral state and make it more just.

Cardozo Law professor Marci Hamilton explains what is really behind a Catholic bishop’s letter urging Catholics to oppose Pennsylvania HB 1947—a significant bill that would reform statutes of limitations for victims of child abuse and incest thereby giving them greater access to justice.

Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses a recent unanimous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that illustrates the lasting impact Justice Scalia had on the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation. Dorf describes the shift from purposivism to textually constrained purposivism over the past half century, and explains how they differ from the textualism Justice Scalia espoused.

Chapman University law professor Ronald Rotunda describes some significant changes in the law that could result from the next Supreme Court justice being appointed by a Democratic president. Rotunda looks at a number of seminal cases that were decided 5-4 that seem likely be overturned in such an event.

Dean and law professor at Illinois Law, Vikram David Amar describes some of the takeaway points from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions on legislative districting, particularly that in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Amar points out that the unexpected death of Justice Scalia in the middle of the term affects at least the reasoning—and perhaps the outcome—of this and many other cases.

In this first of a two-part series of columns, George Washington law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan considers whether the constitutional democracy in the United States is near its demise. Buchanan compares and contrasts the responses to issues faced by middle-class America given by Democratic presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton with those given by Republican nominee apparent Donald Trump.

Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on an Oklahoma abortion restriction law that the governor vetoed last month. Colb argues that this law more authentically reflects the pro-life perspective on abortion than other laws that have passed in other states but explains why it makes more sense to pass legislation that stands a chance of surviving judicial scrutiny, even if it does not authentically capture a proponent’s genuine view of the issue at stake.

Hofstra University law professor Joanna Grossman critiques a recent decision by a New York trial court holding that a woman who was allegedly fired by a male boss because she was “too cute” and causing the boss’s wife to be jealous had not alleged facts amounting to unlawful sex discrimination. Grossman explains why the ruling is based on unsound reasoning and misunderstands sex discrimination law.

Cornell University law professor Joseph Margulies comments on last week’s decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Foster v. Chatman, in which the Court considered whether a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove all eligible black jurors constituted impermissible race discrimination. Margulies argues that true criminal justice reform requires us to acknowledge the pervasiveness of implicit bias in society and let go of the idea that the behavior is an individual wrong by one person against another, and reconceive it as a social wrong by a person against the community.

Hofstra University law professors Joanna L. Grossman and Grant M. Hayden explain how recent controversies over same-sex marriage, transgender use of bathroom, and differentiated high school graduation attire for males and females reflect a collective unwillingness to blur gender lines. Grossman and Hayden further describe how these controversies are really simply part of a larger game of gender oppression.

Chapman University law professor Ronald Rotunda comments on a practice by federal prosecutors of settling some cases by requiring defendants to pay money to specific charities—organizations that tend to support the present administration. Rotunda explains why this practice is ethically unsound and calls for an end to it.

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar discusses a challenge to the Affordable Care Act (popularly known as Obamacare) that recently succeeded in a lower federal court. That challenge, brought by the U.S. House of Representatives, raises the threshold issue whether the House can sue the president to vindicate their legislative powers. Amar explains the few notable times the Supreme Court has considered whether legislators or legislatures could sue the executive branch, and he compares and contrasts those cases with the present challenge.

Cardozo Law professor Marci Hamilton comments on the recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, in which the Court via a per curiam opinion declined to interpret the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to the Affordable Care Act. Hamilton also describes the Do No Harm Act, which is a bill proposed this week that attempts to carve out of RFRA some of its worst incentives and inclinations. While Hamilton argues that RFRA should be repealed outright, she acknowledges that the Do No Harm Act is absolutely a step in the right direction.

Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, in which the Court unremarkably affirmed its position that a plaintiff in federal court must have suffered (or be in danger of imminently suffering) a “concrete and particularized injury.” Dorf explains why, in cases such as Spokeo that involve one private party suing another, the Court should abandon the concreteness requirement of judicial standing.

Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court, in which the Court will decide whether evidence located during a search incident to arrest after an unlawful stop will be admissible in evidence against the arrestee. Colb discusses this and also the broader question of the future role of the exclusionary rule in the law of the Fourth Amendment.

Cornell University Law professor Joe Margulies reflects on the life and accomplishments of his friend and colleague Michael Ratner, who passed away last week as a result of complications from cancer. As Margulies points out, Ratner recognized that dignity withheld from some is denied to all, and he suffered greatly for the great work he did.

Cardozo Law professor Marci Hamilton explains how the Sandusky scandal at Penn State revealed that ignoring and covering up child sex abuse over an extended period of time is not unique to the Catholic church. Hamilton argues that Joe Paterno knew of the child sex abuse long before it came to public light but that he chose to keep Sandusky because doing so served his own ends.

George Washington law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains how Donald Trump’s recent comments about the federal debt reveal that he is even more irresponsible—though only slightly—than the Republican establishment on this issue. Buchanan describes the problems with repudiating the debt as Trump suggests the government do.

Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on a case on which the the U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral argument that presents the question whether a state law may, absent a search warrant, attach criminal penalties to a DUI suspect’s refusal to undergo a chemical test of the suspect’s blood, urine, or breath to determine alcohol concentration. Colb predicts that the Court will decide that any test of a person’s internal state—whether through a blood draw, a breathalyzer, or a urine sample—requires a search warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances.