Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a case the U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to review that presents the question whether a provision of the Delaware Constitution that requires the state’s judiciary be nearly equally balanced between Democrats and Republicans is constitutional. Dorf argues in favor of the provision, explaining that the provision takes into consideration partisan affiliation as means of limiting the role of politics in judicial appointments and judging.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a lawsuit in which New York State and other plaintiffs are suing the federal government over an immigration policy of arresting undocumented immigrants when they appear in state court on unrelated matters. Dorf explains why the federal judge hearing the case should reject the government’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on Argentina’s national elections last month, in which the country elected as Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who had previously served as President of Argentina from 2007 to 2015. Dorf considers why Kirchner, and indeed anyone, would accept a lower position than what she has previously held. Dorf argues that due to the Peter Principle—which states that workers in a hierarchical organization tend to rise to their level of incompetence—we would do well as a society to abandon the whole concept of a demotion.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf explains why Democratic presidential hopeful Pete Buttigieg and his critics are both wrong about the U.S. Supreme Court having become especially political. Dorf points out that since the Court’s 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison the Court has been highly political, and the true problem lies with the unprecedented polarization of the political parties—not with the Court or the appointments process.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf explains why U.S. Supreme Court cases—confusingly, Nixon v. United States and United States v. Nixon—together should foreclose any legal arguments that might have supported President Trump’s strategy to fight impeachment. Dorf explains each of the precedents and their bearing on today’s situation.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent unanimous decision by the U.K. Supreme Court ruling that Prime Minister Boris Johnson acted unlawfully in asking the Queen to prorogue Parliament. Dorf explains how that ruling highlights the error of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Court declined to intervene in a political gerrymandering case, citing the so-called political question doctrine.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a memorandum recently issued by Andrew Wheeler, the administrator of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), that announced directives to substantially reduce government funding for and mandating of animal testing of chemicals to which humans might be exposed. Dorf acknowledges that Wheeler’s motivation might be the deregulation of industries that produce chemical products (a legitimate concern expressed by some public health and environmental groups), but Dorf argues that the policy is win-win-win: better for the animals spared experimentation; less costly to the public fisc; and better for human health.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether a possible Supreme Court ruling in a “faithless elector” case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could end the National Popular Vote (NPV) movement, which attempts to circumvent the Electoral College by interstate compact. Dorf provides a short background of NPV and the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and he explains why a decision by the Court decides to affirm the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning would threaten NPV.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf offers some advice to new law students, highlighting the importance of being able to distinguish among different types of legal questions—easy questions, complicated questions, and indeterminate questions. Dorf explains what he means by each type of question and concludes with a caveat and a warning.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf offers some thoughts on a comment by Golden State Warriors head coach Steve Kerr that moves by NBA stars like Kawhi Leonard and Anthony Davis are “bad for the league.” Dorf explains that while the concept—and legal acceptability—of efficient breach in contract law demonstrate that the law does not impose an obligation to carry out one’s end of a bargain, one could understand Kerr’s statement more accurately to mean that because the legal remedies for enforcing sports contracts are inadequate, the NBA and its fans must rely on the consciences of individual players to honor the obligation of good faith.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that the Trump administration’s new rule that would bar asylum applications from asylum-seekers who did not apply for asylum in at least one country en route to the United States is illegal, cruel, and counterproductive. Dorf explains why federal statutory law precludes such a rule and points out that while the Trump administration is not entirely responsible for the current immigration crisis, it has taken various steps to exacerbate the problem.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent back-and-forth involving the Department of Justice seeking to place a new legal team on the Trump administration’s effort to justify the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census. Dorf points out that whoever ends up representing the administration, this attempted withdrawal may shed light on the merits of the case and the lengths to which the President and those who serve him are willing to go for the citizenship question.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a decision the U.S. Supreme Court issued this week invalidating a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibited registration of “immoral” and “scandalous” trademarks. Dorf provides a brief history of the legal protection for profane speech and considers the implications of a more precisely worded statute regulating profanity for trademark registration purposes.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf explains why President Trump’s threat to escalate tariffs on all Mexican goods if Mexico had not stopped the flow of Central American Migrants erroneously presumes a win-lose situation where none exists. Dorf also explains the fallacy of the criticism that immigration and trade ought to be always kept separate in negotiations.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether two New York bills—one that requires state and local officials to provide congressional committees with the President’s state and local tax records upon request, and the other that would permit the state to prosecute an individual for conduct that was presidentially pardoned—set a dangerous precedent for state interference with federal action. Dorf argues that these bills provide a permissible form of diagonal checks and balances between the branches of the state and federal government and do not raise constitutional concerns.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, in which the conservative majority departed sharply from the brand of originalism that Justice Clarence Thomas (who authored the opinion) and his fellow conservatives purport to favor. Dorf points out the inconsistency of the Court’s conservative bloc criticizing liberal-leaning doctrine based on broad text in rights cases while simultaneously (as here) fashioning right-leaning doctrine from the murky materials of structure and history rather than text.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on three cases in which the US Supreme Court recently granted review that together present the question whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Dorf points out that the cases pose a test for the Court’s conservative majority—whether they will keep faith with their textualist commitment and rule for the plaintiffs or instead follow their conservative social views and rule for the defendant employers.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the practice by federal courts of dismissing investigations into complaints of judicial misconduct if the judge retires from the bench or is elevated to justice status. Dorf argues that a full investigation of someone who is no longer a judge (or no longer a judge on a covered court) may still have implications for judges who continue to serve and thus that judicial councils should not construe their statutory mandate as narrowly as they did in the recent investigations of then-Judges Maryanne Trump Barry, Alex Kozinski, and Brett Kavanaugh.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that the question Justice Clarence Thomas asked during oral argument in Flowers v. Mississippi potentially reflects a view inconsistent with one he and other conservative justices have strongly endorsed in the past. Dorf points out that Justice Thomas’s question, regarding the race of jurors struck by the defense counsel, suggests that discrimination against one group can cancel out discrimination against another, which is directly at odds with his expressed view that the Constitution forbids all government consideration of race.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf points out that, taken to its logical conclusion, the originalism philosophy espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas should mean that the Constitution places stricter limits on states than it does on the federal government. As Dorf explains, the “original meaning” of the Bill of Rights as it applies to the states should refer to its meaning in 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted) rather than 1791 (when the Bill of Rights itself was adopted) because the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Dorf describes several key differences between the understanding of the Bill of Rights in 1868 and 1791 and considers whether one of the originalist justices will follow where the logic of their philosophy leads.