GW law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan continues his series of columns discussing how the establishment left, particularly the media, is treating the policy and politics of Senator Bernie Sanders (and others) irresponsibly and superficially as “extreme left,” reinforcing false equivalence and “bothsidesism.” Buchanan provides additional support for his thesis across these columns that the supposedly extreme ideas of Sanders and others are actually hugely popular and not at all radical.
Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies reflects on a class he taught in a prison last Election Day that presents questions of elections and fear in an age of tribalism. Margulies describes the heightened state of fear in the United States, defines tribalism, and explains why true freedom requires an open—rather than closed—mind.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar explains why President Trump’s proposal that detained immigrants be relocated to sanctuary cities violates the Supreme Court’s precedent interpreting relevant constitutional provisions. Amar argues that even a conservative Supreme Court that defers to the Executive branch in matters of foreign affairs would likely not permit such action.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar describes recent developments in the reform movement known as the National Popular Vote (NPV) interstate compact plan and explains how those hesitant to get on board (particularly elected Republican legislators) can address their concerns with the plan. Specifically, Amar proposes that states should adopt the NPV interstate compact but delay implementation until 2032—a time in the future at which no one today can anticipate which party (if either) the compact would benefit.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the practice by federal courts of dismissing investigations into complaints of judicial misconduct if the judge retires from the bench or is elevated to justice status. Dorf argues that a full investigation of someone who is no longer a judge (or no longer a judge on a covered court) may still have implications for judges who continue to serve and thus that judicial councils should not construe their statutory mandate as narrowly as they did in the recent investigations of then-Judges Maryanne Trump Barry, Alex Kozinski, and Brett Kavanaugh.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a bill under consideration by the Texas legislature that would require appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent an unborn child during a judicial bypass proceeding for an abortion for a pregnant minor. Grossman describes the legal background and explains why the bill is both unconstitutional and unwise.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb describes two different attitudes toward patient autonomy using anecdotes—one of a cancer doctor and another of an abortion provider. Colb considers why the two attitudes differ and explain how the former can learn from the latter about patient empowerment.
GW law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that Democrats’ supposedly unpopular extreme-left policy proposals are actually both moderate and popular. Buchanan points out that polls show that Americans overwhelmingly embrace policies that are mischaracterized as extreme left.
Marci A. Hamilton, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and CEO of CHILD USA, and Kathryn Robb, executive director of CHILD USAdvocacy, describe the latest trick by Catholic bishops in Maryland to successfully lobby for a statute of repose to be included in a bill, undermining its ability to provide meaningful justice to abuse victims. Hamilton and Robb call upon legislators to stop cooperating with Catholic bishops, as doing so leads only to continued secrecy, suffering, and pedophile empowerment.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that the question Justice Clarence Thomas asked during oral argument in Flowers v. Mississippi potentially reflects a view inconsistent with one he and other conservative justices have strongly endorsed in the past. Dorf points out that Justice Thomas’s question, regarding the race of jurors struck by the defense counsel, suggests that discrimination against one group can cancel out discrimination against another, which is directly at odds with his expressed view that the Constitution forbids all government consideration of race.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case in which the US Supreme Court recently granted review, Ramos v. Louisiana, which presents the question whether states may permit conviction of an accused criminal on less than a unanimous jury voting “guilty.” Colb explains the doctrine of incorporation—by which most provisions of the Bill of Rights are held to be applicable as against the states as well as the federal government through the Fourteenth Amendment—and explains the possible significance of a unanimous jury verdict.
BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel comments on the renewed importance of the repealed Glass-Steagall Act which Congress passed after the failure of the financial system in the 1920s. Frankel argues that the alarming path of Wells Fargo Bank supports imposing regulations on banks similar to those levied by the Glass-Steagall Act.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher comments on a recent decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that purports to interpret the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) based on a textualist approach. Estreicher argues that the interpretation erroneously ignores the clear purpose of ADEA and constitutes a highly abstract interpretive venture that departs significantly from the legislators’ manifest intent.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf points out that, taken to its logical conclusion, the originalism philosophy espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas should mean that the Constitution places stricter limits on states than it does on the federal government. As Dorf explains, the “original meaning” of the Bill of Rights as it applies to the states should refer to its meaning in 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted) rather than 1791 (when the Bill of Rights itself was adopted) because the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Dorf describes several key differences between the understanding of the Bill of Rights in 1868 and 1791 and considers whether one of the originalist justices will follow where the logic of their philosophy leads.
John W. Dean, former White House counsel under President Nixon, and Bob Altemeyer, a retired professor of psychology at the University of Manitoba, explain the social science that explains not only Donald Trump and his brand of leadership but also his loyal followers who would continue to support him even if he shot someone on 5th Avenue. Dean and Altemeyer argue that the dangers they pose are far graver than those presented by the Nixon presidency.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on the most recent development for the election reform movement known as the National Popular Vote (“NPV”) interstate compact plan—its imminent adoption by Colorado. Amar describes three reasons that Colorado’s adoption of the plan is such a significant step for the movement.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb describes two different narrative lenses through which one could perceive (and interpret) the shooting of an unarmed African American man by a white police officer: the “Blue Lives Matter” narrative and the “Black Lives Matter” narrative. Colb explains how such narratives shape public reactions to such incidents, and she calls upon everyone to pay attention to the facts and feel less wedded to our narratives so that we may be better able to deal with and sometimes even prevent future hardship.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments or a recent controversy arising from immigration rules that place an undue emphasis on biology in determining when a US-citizen-parent can transmit citizenship to a child born abroad. Grossman calls upon the US State Department to revise its Foreign Affairs Manual to align with the statutory scheme it purports to apply.
GW law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that pundits on the anti-Trump right erroneously conflate two different categories of objections, substance and process. Buchanan points out that by attacking the substantive policies supported by Democrats and not distinguishing substance from process, Republicans risk weakening the Constitution’s political processes.
In this third and final column in a series about the legal challenge to Harvard Law Review’s diversity program, Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone consider how much deference courts should give to law reviews when they assert diversity as a basis for considering race and gender. Amar and Mazzone anticipate that even in the unlikely event that this lawsuit reaches the Supreme Court, any fundamental changes to existing affirmative action doctrine would likely require the Court to weigh in on multiple cases over an extended period.