Neil H. Buchanan
Neil H. Buchanan

Neil H. Buchanan, an economist and legal scholar, is a visiting professor at the University of Toronto Law school. He is the James J. Freeland Eminent Scholar Chair in Taxation Emeritus at the University of Florida's Levin College of Law. Professor Buchanan blogs at Dorf on Law.

Columns by Neil H. Buchanan
Voluntary Taxes? Why the Attacks on Warren Buffett Betray a Fundamental Misunderstanding of Government’s Role in Society

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan offers a detailed response to an argument that has been in the news frequently: Billionaire investor Warren Buffett has contended that those with annual incomes above one million dollars should pay significantly more in income tax, and that those with annual incomes above ten million dollars per year should pay even more than that. Many commentators, Buchanan points out, have responded to Buffett’s argument by pointing out that Buffett is free to give away his own riches to the government, if he so chooses—for instance, by foregoing tax exemptions that he would be entitled to claim. But Buchanan offers a set of strong responses to this argument, suggesting that the debate should properly focus on Buffett’s proposal, and not on Buffett himself.

Preventing the Next Crisis: What We Must Do to Maintain the Public’s Confidence in the Financial System

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan suggests how, in the future, we can ensure that the debt limit is not, once again, used as a political weapon. He discusses three key solutions: (1) simply eliminating the debt limit via a presidential directive incorporating a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, as The New York Times suggested; (2) and following one of Yale Law professor Jack Balkin’s two suggestions, which are nicknamed “Big Coin” and “Exploding Option.” Buchanan provides background to ensure that readers fully understand each suggestion, and points out a downside to Balkin’s ideas: the public’s confidence in money and the monetary system may turn out to be fragile, if the system is experimented with.

The Roots of the Debt-Limit Crisis: Fear Is a Great Motivator, but Scared People Often Act Rashly and Foolishly

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan continues his commentary on the debt-limit crisis and its resolution. Buchanan contends that there is little to applaud in the resolution of the crisis—for, he says, we have now embarked on a path that will only make a sick economy much sicker, and could even push the country back into recession. In light of these realities, he argues, we need to ask how we got here: How did we reach the point where both parties became committed to an economic strategy that is so detached from reality? Buchanan stresses, especially, that America should have focused on unemployment, not spending reductions.

The Debt Ceiling Law Is Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Tribe

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan responds to a recent New York Times editorial by Laurence Tribe regarding the constitutionality of the federal government's debt ceiling. Tribe contended that the limit is constitutional; Buchanan contends that it is not. In his column, Buchanan summarizes and responds to Tribe's arguments regarding the key constitutional provision at issue, the Public Debt Clause.

The Debt-Limit Crisis: A Problem That Will Keep Coming Back Unless President Obama Takes a Constitutional Stand Now

Justia columnist, George Washington University law professor, and economist Neil H. Buchanan comments on the current situation regarding the federal debt limit, considers how it could be resolved, and notes that President Obama could take a constitutional stand in order to resolve the impasse. Buchanan begins by explaining for readers what the debt limit is and why it is important now; explains why the debt-limit law that set the ceiling was never necessary in the first place; describes the potentially very grave consequences of passing the debt-limit ceiling with that law in place, as it is now; and contends that our current game of political “chicken” regarding the debt limit is dangerous indeed. He then describes a possible constitutional solution that President Obama could opt for, based on arguments that the debt limit is illegitimate and void as a matter of constitutional law. Finally, Buchanan explains why, even if the debt limit were to be removed from the picture, an underlying, related problem with the political process would still remain.