Vikram David Amar

Vikram David Amar

Vikram David Amar is the Dean and Iwan Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Illinois College of Law. Immediately prior to taking the position at Illinois, Amar served as the Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and a Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis School of Law, whose faculty he rejoined in 2007 after teaching at UC Hastings for a decade. He has also taught regularly as a visiting professor at UC Berkeley School of Law and at UCLA School of Law.

He received a bachelor's degree in history from UC Berkeley and his J.D. from Yale, where he served as an articles editor for the Yale Law Journal. Upon graduating from law school in 1988, Professor Amar clerked for Judge William A. Norris of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and then for Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the United States Supreme Court. After that he spent a few years at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, devoting half of his time to federal white-collar criminal defense and the other half to complex civil litigation.

Professor Amar writes, teaches and consults in the public law fields, especially constitutional law, civil procedure, and remedies. He is a co-author (along with William Cohen and Jonathan Varat) of Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 2005), and is a co-author on a number of volumes of the Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure Treatise (West Publishing Co.). In addition, he has published in a variety of journals, including the Yale Law Journal, the Stanford Law Review, the Cornell Law Review, the Virginia Law Review, the Vanderbilt Law Review, the California Law Review, the William and Mary Law Review, the Hastings Law Journal, Constitutional Commentary, the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, and the Green Bag Journal.

Columns by Vikram David Amar

How Should Courts Evaluate a Treatment Decision by a Government Doctor That Takes into Account the Patient’s Race? The Ninth Circuit Doesn’t Quite Get Things Right

Vikram David Amar, law professor and dean at Illinois Law, and Michael Schaps, a California civil litigation attorney, critique a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considering whether and when a government physician can take into account a patient’s race. Amar and Schaps argue that the court’s analysis is internally consistent and legally flawed, as well.

A Specific Proposal That Helps Give Us a Sense of What Getting Rid of Citizens United Might Entail

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar examines California’s Proposition 49—which seeks the voters’ approval for the California legislature to ratify an amendment to the federal Constitution to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC—in order to shine light on what might be required to overturn the decision on a federal level. Amar argues that Proposition 49 highlights just how difficult it would be to craft a workable constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United.

The Grave Risks of the Senate Republicans’ Stated Refusal to Process any Supreme Court Nominee President Obama Sends Them

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar describes some of the risks Senate Republicans will face if they refuse to process any Supreme Court nominee that President Obama sends them, as they have claimed they would. Among these risks, Amar argues, are the possibility that a President Hillary Clinton might appoint Obama to the Supreme Court, that the Democrats could take over the Senate and approve a nominee that a Republican-controlled Senate would not have approved, or even that Justices Breyer and Ginsburg could retire under a Democrat-controlled Senate, giving President Obama three places on the Court to fill with liberal justices.

Sticking Up (Kind of) for a(n Idaho) State Court Slapped Down by the U.S. Supremes

Vikram David Amar—dean and law professor at the University of Illinois College of Law—comments on a summary reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court of a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. While Amar agrees with the Court that the Idaho court erred in reaching its decision, but he argues that the Idaho jurists were not guilty of the particular stupidity or defiance the Supreme Court imputed to them.

Homespun Wisdom (and Wrongheadedness) in Iowa on the Treatment of Muslims

Illinois Law dean and law professor Vikram David Amar evaluates three people’s statements regarding America’s treatment of Muslims: President Obama, an Iowa businessman, and a local Muslim cleric (an imam). Amar points out that Donald Trump’s proposal that America ban all Muslims from entering the country is vastly underinclusive (because the great majority of violent acts in this country are perpetrated by non-Muslims), and at the same time very overinclusive (because the overwhelming majority of Muslims who want to enter the United States intend no harm)—two indicators of legal and moral unfairness.

How One Might Have Answered Justice Scalia’s Questions (About the Mismatch Theory) at Oral Argument in the Fisher Case

Vikram David Amar, law professor and dean at Illinois Law, and Michael Schaps, a California civil litigation attorney, discuss Justice Scalia’s provocative comments during last week’s oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas. Amar and Schaps point out that viewed in the most charitable light, Justice Scalia’s comments are actually an attempt to articulate an academic theory—known as mismatch theory—not simply bare racism. Though the authors are not persuaded of mismatch theory, they critique Scalia’s assumption that truth of the theory would compel the abolition of affirmative action altogether.

The Return of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) before the Supreme Court: The Harris v. AIRC Case Argued Next Week

University of Illinois College of Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar discusses a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments next week—Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. As Amar points out, that case lies at the intersection of many contentious aspects of 21st century American democracy, including dissatisfaction with elected officials, partisan zeal, racial equality, and federal–state relations.

When Does Congress’s Recognition of an Injury Count to the Supreme Court? Standing and the Spokeo v. Robins Case

Vikram David Amar, law professor and dean at Illinois Law, and Michael Schaps, a California civil litigation attorney, discuss Spokeo v. Robins, in which the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the nature of injury required for a plaintiff to avail herself of the federal court system. Specifically, Amar and Schaps describe the justices’ various perspectives on the issue and the possible origins and significance of these perspectives.

Why the Challenges to California’s Reproductive Fact Act Are Likely Unpersuasive

Vikram David Amar, dean and law professor at the University of Illinois College of Law, and Alan Brownstein, professor at UC Davis School of Law, examine a court challenge brought against a recently enacted California law regulating family planning clinics. Amar and Brownstein argue that the law should survive these constitutional challenges.

Arizona’s SB 1070 Immigration Law Is Back in Play in the Federal Courts

University of Illinois law professor and dean Vikram David Amar comments on a recent decision by a federal district court in Arizona addressing a challenge to two parts of Arizona’s SB 1070 statute, which attempts to deal with immigration stresses in that state. Amar argues that the court’s reasoning on both claims was confused and unpersuasive and that the results should have been inverted. That is, Amar suggests that the court should have upheld the equal protection challenge to the “Show Me Your Papers” provision and rejected the First Amendment challenge to the Day Laborer provisions.

Locating the Problem of Race-Based Peremptory Challenges in a Broader Context: The Possibilities Raised by the Foster Case on the Court’s Docket

University of Illinois law professor and dean Vikram David Amar describes the problem of race-based peremptory challenges and argues that peremptory challenges be eliminated altogether on the grounds that we should not allow a person to be denied the right to serve on a jury for any reason that would not also suffice as a reason to deny that person the right to vote in an election.