Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan discusses the potential outcomes of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, focusing on Joe Biden’s performance in a recent “non-debate” event and the broader implications for the Democratic Party and American democracy. Professor Buchanan argues that even if Biden is replaced as the Democratic nominee, Republican efforts to manipulate the electoral system and a heavily biased Supreme Court make a Trump presidency likely regardless of the election results, but he emphasizes that Democrats should still strive to win legitimately to strengthen future resistance against autocratic rule.

Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan discusses the conventional wisdom that delays in Donald Trump’s legal cases benefit him politically, as Trump hopes to win the 2024 election before facing legal consequences. However, Professor Buchanan argues that these delays actually help President Joe Biden and the Democrats, and that convictions prior to the election would not significantly harm Trump’s political chances, making the delays the best realistic outcome for those who oppose Trump.

Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that Democratic primary voters were not adamantly opposed to Joe Biden but preferred other candidates, and while his presidential nomination was initially disappointing for some, his decency and surprising policy actions have been a positive aspect of his presidency. Professor Buchanan draws an analogy between Biden’s empathetic support of his son’s struggles and his approach to foreign policy, especially in relation to Israel, suggesting that Biden’s personal experiences with empathy and loss have informed his measured, empathetic foreign policy stance, despite some critics wishing for a firmer response to Israeli actions.

Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that mainstream media’s self-reckoning after the 2016 U.S. presidential election led to an overcompensation, which gave platforms to conservative “outside voices” that did not authentically represent the “Real America” they claimed to understand. Professor Buchanan criticizes this overcompensation for leading to an uncritical amplification of narratives like Gary Abernathy’s, which justify and perpetuate the divisive and false beliefs held by Trump supporters, while failing to meaningfully engage with the deeper issues.

Professor Neil H. Buchanan—an economist and legal scholar who is a visiting professor at both Osgoode Hall Law School and the University of Toronto Law, and who has accepted a research sabbatical and retirement offer from the University of Florida—discusses the erosion of academic freedom and tenure in universities, specifically focusing on recent legislative changes in Florida that undermine intellectual freedom. Professor Buchanan argues that the political climate has made it nearly impossible to challenge these changes effectively, leading him to conclude that sometimes a strategic retreat is necessary when facing an unyielding and empowered opposition.

Professor Neil H. Buchanan, a professor who has accepted a research sabbatical and retirement offer from the University of Florida, explains his decision to leave. He cites Florida’s increasingly hostile stance towards professors and higher education, driven by the state’s Republican Party, as the main cause for his departure, expressing concern over the state’s attacks on tenure, academic freedom, and its enactment of vaguely written laws that could compromise educational integrity, leading to a “brain drain” from the state.

In this second of a series of columns conducting a postmortem on the debt ceiling crisis, UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf explain why the temporary resolution of the debt ceiling crisis may result in an even higher cost when the issue arises again on January 2, 2025. Professors Buchanan and Dorf argue that the debt ceiling statute can only ever operate as a source of leverage for extortionists or, if neither side blinks, as the means of inflicting terrible damage to the country.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan suggests a sliver of a possibility that Republicans’ attempt to impose one-party rule on the United States might fail. Professor Buchanan’ points out that Republican presidential hopeful Ron DeSantis’s argument that he, unlike Donald Trump, could hold the presidency for eight years might be the best reason for Republicans in Congress to allow him to lose.

In this first of a series of columns conducting a postmortem on the debt ceiling crisis, UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf point out that President Biden’s debt ceiling resolution appears to have won the politics of 2023 and 2024 and sidestepped another huge crisis. However, Professors Buchanan and Dorf consider whether these short-term victories will have longer-term costs that prove even more extreme.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan points out that, if we reach the drop-dead date of the debt ceiling, both options available to President Joe Biden will be unprecedented, destabilizing, and risky. Professor Buchanan argues that Biden’s least bad choice in that situation is to continue to pay the nation’s bills and that doing anything else for the sake of seeming “normal” is more dangerous for the economy and the country.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf explain the options currently available to President Biden for handling the impending debt ceiling crisis. Professors Buchanan and Dorf argue that while the best option would have been to announce from the outset that the debt ceiling is unconstitutional, the President’s current least bad option is, if the drop-dead date arrives, to continue to pay the nation’s debts notwithstanding the debt ceiling.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan responds to a recent New York Times op-ed by Professor Michael McConnell that purports to defend congressional Republicans’ posture regarding the debt ceiling. Professor Buchanan argues that Professor McConnell’s entire argument is a strawman, fails to engage with the key points it purports to counter, and provides at most only the most inadequate fig leaf for Republicans’ willingness to endanger people’s livelihoods for political gain.

UF Levin College of Law Professor Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law Professor Michael C. Dorf point out that if Republicans insist on using the debt ceiling to hold the economy hostage, President Joe Biden will be the one to decide which debts to prioritize. Professors Buchanan and Dorf argue that although the decision of which debts to prioritize should not belong to the President, Republicans give President Biden—or his less virtuous alter-ego “Dark Brandon”—no choice but to decide which debts to pay first, at their own risk.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf respond to two types of pushback from proponents of schemes to circumvent the debt ceiling. Though dubious about any such proposal, Professors Buchanan and Dorf express hope that a court would disagree and find an option—such as fallback bonds—permissible, allowing the country to avoid financial catastrophe and a constitutional crisis.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf continue their discussion of the assortment of illegal options President Joe Biden has available to him if Republicans refuse to raise the debt ceiling. Professors Buchanan and Dorf argue that because there are no loopholes or escape hatches in the debt ceiling statute, if put into that untenable position, President Biden should minimize the damage and simply issue normal Treasury securities—the “least unconstitutional” option.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf provide yet another reason against the proposal that the government should mint a multi-trillion-dollar platinum coin to avoid the impending debt ceiling crisis. Professors Buchanan and Dorf point out that if trillion-dollar platinum coins are legal to avoid a debt-ceiling crisis, that would lead to the absurd result that they would always be legal as a means of substituting modern monetary theory (MMT) for the entire apparatus of public finance.

Continuing his discussion of the incident at Stanford Law School, UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan explains the essential difference between disagreeable speech and intimidation and threats of physical violence. Professor Buchanan reminds us that the consequences of being disfavored and vulnerable are not a matter being socially unpopular, but matters of life and death.

In this second of a series of columns in response to a recent controversy at Stanford Law School, UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan considers how universities should respond to organized efforts to stir up politically useful controversy on campus. Professor Buchanan argues that it is a recipe for disaster to fail to see through the schemes of individuals or organizations who are acting in bad faith and that other universities should not play along.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan and Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf explain why the so-called platinum coin option to address the looming debt ceiling crisis is not only a bad idea but also illegal. Professors Buchanan and Dorf argue that the least unconstitutional option, if Republicans insist on crashing the economy via the debt ceiling, is for the Treasury Department to do what it always does: go into the financial markets and raise funds from willing lenders.

UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan assumes the role of president of a fictional university writing in response to the recent “shouting down” incident at Stanford Law School. Specifically, Professor Buchanan takes on the claim some have advanced that the law student protesters were acting like children, and he argues that in fact, the (adult) federal judge behaved in the most juvenile manner.