Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent antitrust lawsuit by an animal advocacy organization against a dairy organization. Colb argues that the public message of the suit will likely be detrimental to the interests of dairy cattle rather than raising consciousness in a positive way.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb discusses a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the issue whether a defendant whose conviction has been reversed may be required—without violating due process—to bring a separate civil action to prove her innocence in order to get a refund of the costs and fees imposed from her original conviction. Colb points out that the crux of the issue is whether the money sought to be returned is characterized as a refund or as compensation.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb critiques a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that it was reasonable for police officers to kill two dogs in a home they searched. Colb first explains the facts behind the case and then argues that the police should have asked the dogs’ owner to subdue the dogs prior to the search, and that not doing so was unreasonable and led to the unnecessary killing of the dogs.
Writing from the perspective of a pro-life activist, Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the merits of a Texas rule that would require hospitals and clinics to bury or cremate the remains of embryos and fetuses resulting from terminations or miscarriages that take place in their facilities. From this perspective, Colb acknowledges that the rule might reasonably be interpreted to be consistent with Supreme Court precedent; she writes from her true (pro-choice) perspective in an accompanying blog post.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent situation in which a Tennessee woman was charged with attempted murder for trying unsuccessfully to terminate her pregnancy with a coat hanger at 24 weeks. Colb explains why attempted murder doesn’t seem to be an appropriate charge in this situation, and she explains the role that policies put forth abortion opponents might have played in forcing the woman to attempt an abortion in this manner.
Cornell University professor Sherry F. Colb discusses California’s Proposition 60, a ballot initiative that recently failed in that state that would have required male actors in pornographic movies to wear condoms during performances. Colb considers both a First Amendment challenge to the ballot initiative, as well as a possible response to that challenge, and she argues the law would likely pass muster under the First Amendment.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb addresses the argument that nonhuman animals’ lack of moral agency justifies our denying them the right to live free of our violence. Colb contends that the notion that we owe duties only to those who can repay us actually reflects an impoverished morality.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the idea of a sexual advance directive—a proposed legal device that could provide consent or designate an agent to provide consent in advance of an anticipated persistent period of legal incompetence. Colb explains how a sexual advance directive purports to work, describes some limitations of it, and proposes an alternative solution that addresses those limitations.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the arguments on both sides of a difficult question currently before the Supreme Court—whether a defendant is entitled to use juror testimony to impeach a verdict based on racial bias, notwithstanding a contrary rule of evidence. Colb describes the facts leading up to the case and discusses the jurisprudence that will most likely affect the justices’ ultimate decision.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent decision by the Arizona Supreme Court holding that a state statute properly created an affirmative defense to sexual abuse or child molestation when it placed the burden of proving no sexual motive on the defendant. Colb describes the court’s reasoning and explains why the U.S. Supreme Court should revisit its jurisprudence affirmative defenses to crimes and hold that some conduct may simply not be classified as an affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant in a criminal case.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on a recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Indiana, holding that police violated their suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights by acquiring, without a warrant, the suspect’s cell site information from his cell phone provider. Colb explains the Indiana court’s reasoning and discusses the evolving law regarding people’s privacy expectations in information their cell phones store and transmit.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent decision by New York’s highest court expanding the definition of parental status to include same-sex partners intending to parent. Colb explains the court’s ruling and discusses a U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding the rights of non-parents that might stand in the New York court’s way.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers whether the termination of Zika pregnancies might affect our thinking about abortion. Specifically, Colb asks (1) whether it is right to end a pregnancy because the baby would be severely disabled if brought to term, and (2) whether it is right at all to take the life of a fetus late in pregnancy, given that birth defects caused by Zika are not detectable by ultrasound until late in pregnancy.
In light of a recent decision by the Oregon Supreme Court, Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers whether taking blood from a dog constitutes a search of the dog’s owner for Fourth Amendment purposes. Colb identifies good and bad features of the court’s opinion and expresses what, in her view, would have been the ideal resolution of the case.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on the Indiana abortion law that Donald Trump’s chosen running mate, Mike Pence, signed into law as governor of that state. Colb explains the different reasons that women have for terminating their pregnancies and argues that while some of the reasons women actually choose abortion might be repugnant to some of us, that should not undermine their right to make that choice.
Inspired by a Dan Savage podcast on the topic, Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb considers both the concept of “virtuous pedophiles” and some of its potential implications. Colb explains what this term means and draws several comparisons to other individuals who may be oriented toward a certain action that is either illegal or prohibited to them, ultimately expressing ambivalence toward the notion of the virtuous pedophile.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, in which the Court held that states may criminalize the refusal to take a breathalyzer test but may not criminalize the refusal to take a blood test, absent a warrant, as an ordinary incident of an arrest for driving while impaired. Colb explains why the Court distinguished the two types of tests and argues that the decision effectively balances competing interests in public safety and individual privacy.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Utah v. Strieff, holding that evidence found in that case as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation was not the direct consequence of the violation and was therefore properly admitted into evidence against the defendant under the attenuation doctrine. Colb explains how one throwaway line in the opinion, if taken to its logical conclusion, could potentially spell the death of the exclusionary rule.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the changing meaning of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole. Colb discusses specifically the Court’s decision earlier this year in Montgomery v. Lousiana, which held that Miller must be applied retroactively on state collateral review.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on an Oklahoma abortion restriction law that the governor vetoed last month. Colb argues that this law more authentically reflects the pro-life perspective on abortion than other laws that have passed in other states but explains why it makes more sense to pass legislation that stands a chance of surviving judicial scrutiny, even if it does not authentically capture a proponent’s genuine view of the issue at stake.