Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a case the U.S. Supreme Court will decide this Term regarding the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Colb argues that the Court may properly see fit to revisit its current approach to hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb explains why an animal rights advocate might choose to protest the Jewish Kaporos ritual and the relative merits of such a position. Colb argues that despite the potential for facilitating hypocrisy or anti-semitism, there are a few potential saving graces for campaigns against the ritual.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb differentiates state bans on incestuous marriages from bans on same-sex marriages by looking at the governmental interests the bans purportedly serve and the harm done to their targets. Colb argues that the U.S. Supreme Court can, if it wishes, use this distinction to strike down bans on same-sex marriages without also having to rule on bans on incestuous marriages.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb considers whether a person should have a right to self-representation in criminal proceedings. Colb describes a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the issue and discusses why such a right might be valuable.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustaining an as-applied constitutional challenge to a Mississippi law requiring “admitting privileges” for physicians who provide abortions. Colb explains the panel majority’s creative, albeit convincing, reasoning and critically analyzes the dissenting opinion.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline v. United States, in which the Court considered how much restitution a victim of sexual abuse should be able to recover from a single perpetrator. Colb explains the reasoning used by the majority and the two diametrically opposed dissenting opinions, and she extends the discussion to an important narrative the Court’s opinions fail to consider.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., and the nature of the respondents’ claim that IUDs and morning-after pills are abortifacients. Colb analogizes to the distinction between the culpability of direct violence and failure to rescue in order to illustrate that the respondents’ claims are moral rather than factual in basis.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Riley v. California, in which the Court nearly unanimously held that police may not examine the digital contents of an arrestee’s cell phone as part of a search incident to arrest. Colb describes the facts behind the two cases consolidated for the Court’s review, explains the precedents the Court relied upon in reaching its decision, and praises the Court for decisively embracing Fourth Amendment protection for digital privacy.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb describes some of the differences between mediation and litigation and how the former might be a better method for resolving human conflict. Colb first looks at the opening statement that mediators give to the parties in mediation, which she argues reveals a fundamental strength of the approach.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating Florida’s approach to identifying criminal convicts who are intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. Colb describes the facts and issues that brought the case before the Court and infers from the opinion that the Court may have a growing consciousness about those sentenced to death. Acknowledging also the strong arguments presented by the dissent, Colb concludes that essential difference between the majority and the dissent is a disagreement as to what is worse: to execute the wrong person to spare the wrong person from execution.
Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses the notion of humane killing in the context of the death penalty and the slaughter of animals. She explores the apparent paradoxes of humane executions of criminals and the humane slaughter of animals. Colb concludes that the only way to truly eliminate the suffering of humans and animals during any intentional killing process is to abolish both executions and slaughters.
In the second of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her discussion of a Fourth Amendment case before the U.S. Supreme Court, Heien v. North Carolina. She explains the history and trajectory of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule and predicts that the Court will apply that exception in this case. However, Colb suggests that even doing so might still narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections as effectively as would deciding the case directly on the substance of the Fourth Amendment.
In the first of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses a Fourth Amendment case in which the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split. In that case, Heien v. North Carolina, the Court is considering whether the Fourth Amendment protects against stops by a police officer who acts on the basis of a reasonable but erroneous interpretation of state law. Colb reviews the facts of Heien, explains what “reasonable seizures” are under the Fourth Amendment, and describes the differences between legal and factual errors. The second column, which will appear on Verdict on May 5, will address the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule and the impact of a ruling on the basis of good faith.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on a recent Minnesota ruling that held that the First Amendment protects encouraging or advising another to commit suicide, and also protects assisting a suicide as long as the assistance consists only of speech alone.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on one manifestation of gender inequity inherent in Orthodox and Conservative Judaism—the “get” requirement for a religiously recognized divorce. Colb explains how this requirement gives the husband the unilateral power to decide whether and for how long the marriage lasts. She suggests that traditional communities should reinterpret divorce in a manner that allows any unhappy partner to successfully exit a marriage.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her analysis, in the third of three columns on the topic, of the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States. There, the Court interpreted the eligibility of a heroin-distributing defendant for a sentencing enhancement under the penalty-enhancement provision of the Controlled Substances Act for selling drugs from the use of which death resulted. Colb explains how a defendant would qualify for the enhancement.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the United States Supreme Court decision in Fernandez v. California, upholding the search of a co-occupied apartment upon the consent of just one of the residents. Colb notes that the case offers a refinement on an earlier decision that had invalidated a search to which one occupant consented, while the second occupant simultaneously objected.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the reasons why the killing of Marius the giraffe, who had lived at the Copenhagen Zoo, has angered so many people around the world. Why did Marius supposedly have to die? According to the zoo, Marius’s genes were too common to be useful for the breeding program there, and thus, in the zookeepers' eyes, there was no alternative. Colb takes up the question of why people were outraged at Marius's killing, and what this outrage could mean for our conduct toward animals more generally.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the logic of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception to the Confrontation Clause and considers whether the distinction between its proper application and its application in the case on which Colb focuses holds up to critical analysis.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the situation of a pregnant 33-year-old woman in Texas whose family has been unable to have her removed from life support, notwithstanding her wishes and those of her family. The obstacle is a Texas law that prohibits the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant patient. Colb contends that while political groups have weighed in—in predictable ways, corresponding to their views regarding abortion—in fact we should analyze the dilemma as in some respects, legally and morally distinct from the situation that confronts us in the abortion context, as she explains.