Antonio G. Sepulveda

Antonio G. Sepulveda

Antonio Sepulveda is Professor of Law at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and at the Fluminense Federal University. Before that, he clerked at the Regional Labor Court of Rio de Janeiro. He is a researcher at the Theoretical and Analytical Studies on Institutional Behavior Lab and a Brazilian Internal Revenue Service officer. He is author of several articles in various law reviews and newspapers. He is also a member of the Journal of Institutional Studies (Revista de Estudos Institucionais), a Brazilian peer-reviewed publication of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro Law School.

Columns by Antonio G. Sepulveda

Balancing Teachers’ Liberty Against Students’ Right to Unbiased Education

Antonio G. Sepulveda, Carlos Bolonha, and Igor De Lazari comment on a law recently passed by the house of representatives of the Brazilian state of Alagoas—over the governor’s veto—that places certain restrictions on teachers’ autonomy in the classroom. Sepulveda, Bolonha, and De Lazari discuss the purpose of the law and the criticism leveled against it and draw upon United States federal case law as a basis for analysis.

Two Courts, Two Interpretations

Igor De Lazari, Antonio Sepulveda, and Carlos Bolonha discuss a recent decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court affecting presidential impeachment procedures. The authors point out that the United States and Brazil have similar constitutional origins of impeachment proceedings but that the two countries diverge in interpreting and applying those provisions.

Deciding Strategically: Lessons From a Brazilian Supreme Court Decision

Guest columnists Igor De Lazari, Antonio Sepulveda, and Henrique Rangel comment on a recent ruling by the Brazilian Supreme Court that criminal sentences may be enforced after a challengeable appellate court decision—a ruling the authors argue departs from the clear meaning of article 5, section LVII of the Brazilian Constitution. De Lazari, Sepulveda, and Rangel suggest that the ruling was based on strategic motivations by the justices, rather than purely on interpretations of the law.