UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why it is “efficient” (in one sense of that fraught word) for courts to sometimes act like legislatures—i.e., to legislate from the bench. Professor Buchanan points out that deciding cases too narrowly or incrementally causes unnecessary litigation to try to identify where courts will draw the line, particularly when the judges and justices already know where they want that line to be. He emphasizes, however, that efficiency is not the ultimate goal of the law, and minimizing litigation costs should never supersede the pursuit of justice.
UF law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan comments on a recent positive development in the economics profession—a move beyond the narrow notion of “Pareto efficiency” that economists have used for decades to support trickle-down economics. Buchanan explains the significance of this development, with the caveat that the change will likely not make much difference in actual economic policies.