University of Toronto visiting law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan discusses a constitutional interpretation regarding the requirements for winning the U.S. presidency through the Electoral College, specifically addressing scenarios where some state electors are not appointed. Following up on an argument he has made with Professors Michael Dorf and Laurence Tribe, Professor Buchanan argues that, contrary to popular belief (the “House-decides error”), under the Twelfth Amendment, a candidate does not need 270 electoral votes to win the presidency but only a majority of actually appointed electors. Professor Buchanan points out this means that successfully blocking some state electors, as Donald Trump likely will try to do, would not automatically force the decision to the House of Representatives unless there is an actual tie or a third-party candidate prevents either major candidate from achieving a majority of appointed electors.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar discusses how the decentralized nature of the U.S. presidential election system allows individual states to have varying rules that can significantly impact the overall outcome, as illustrated by recent examples from Ohio, Nebraska, and the Supreme Court case Texas v. Pennsylvania. Professor Amar argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson, which emphasized the need for uniformity in presidential candidate ballot access across states, was not adequately defended by the Justices, as it failed to address why the Constitution permits such consequential disuniformity in election administration among states.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar expresses concern over the quality of the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Trump v. Anderson, suggesting that the Justices’ questions failed to adequately address the complexities of the case and the constitutional principles at stake, particularly regarding the electoral college and interstate federalism. Professor Amar critiques the Court’s understanding of the electoral college system, arguing that the Justices’ apprehensions about the potential consequences of their decision overlook the inherent flexibility states have in appointing electors—a flexibility underscored by originalist constitutional interpretations and past precedents.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that Democrats should expressly reject (rather than implicitly accept) Republicans’ erroneous interpretation of the Twelfth Amendment, on the off chance it matters in the next coup attempt. Professor Buchanan explains why the Twelfth Amendment’s fallback provision applies only when the Electoral College vote is a tie.

Amherst College Associate Provost Austin Sarat and attorney Daniel B. Edelman explain the important role of Democratic governors in preventing Republican state legislatures from stealing the election. Sarat and Edelman describe a “nightmare scenario” in which Republican legislatures may try to strip the electoral votes of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada, leaving Biden with 232 electoral votes compared to Trump’s 306. The authors call upon the governors of those states to defend the integrity of their states’ election results, insist that there have been no “election failures,” and, if necessary, submit to Congress their own elector lists.

In this second of a two-part series of columns about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in the “faithless elector cases, Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar describes some good news that we may glean from those cases. Specifically, Amar points out that states have many ways of reducing elector faithlessness, and he lists three ways in which the Court’s decision paves the way for advances in the National Popular Vote (NPV) Interstate Compact movement.

In this first of a two-part series of columns about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in the “faithless elector” cases, Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar expresses disappointment that the majority opinion—authored by Justice Elena Kagan—and concurring opinion—by Justice Clarence Thomas—are not as well reasoned or careful as they could be. Amar points out some of the ways in which the opinions fall short, noting some of the arguments that merited more discussion, or at least more thorough consideration.

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether a possible Supreme Court ruling in a “faithless elector” case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could end the National Popular Vote (NPV) movement, which attempts to circumvent the Electoral College by interstate compact. Dorf provides a short background of NPV and the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and he explains why a decision by the Court decides to affirm the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning would threaten NPV.

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on a lawsuit recently filed in Texas challenging the winner-take-all method by which Texas (and other states) administer presidential elections. Amar explains the benefits and drawbacks of the method and why the lawsuit is unlikely to elicit changes in Texas or elsewhere.

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar argues that the presidential electors should not elect anyone besides Donald Trump when they cast their ballots on December 19. Amar points out that while there are better way to elect a president than the electoral college, it would be unwise to switch rules after the end of the election and allow independent, unaccountable electors to make decisions based on what they think America wants.

Chapman University, Fowler School of Law, professor Ronald D. Rotunda explains the basis for the electoral college and argues that it continues to serve the very purpose it was created to serve, namely to promote efficiency and protect against “tyranny by the majority.”