UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar discusses two Supreme Court cases involving presidential authority—one concerning tariff powers under the IEEPA and the other regarding limits on the president’s ability to remove FTC commissioners—and highlights a shared constitutional issue: how the structure of presidential veto power creates an imbalance that makes it difficult for Congress to reclaim delegated authority. Professor Amar argues that because of this “retrieval problem,” courts should be wary of upholding broad statutory delegations of power to the president and should consider invalidating entire statutes, rather than only unconstitutional provisions, to preserve the constitutional balance between branches.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and professor emeritus Alan Brownstein explore the constitutional complexities of enacting buffer zones around houses of worship to regulate expressive activity, particularly in light of recent events in New York and longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence. Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that while such buffer zones may be lawful under specific, narrowly tailored conditions, their constitutionality ultimately depends on avoiding viewpoint discrimination and satisfying exacting legal scrutiny, especially given the distinct expressive role of religious institutions in public discourse.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar analyzes a recent federal court ruling that reinstated Preston Damsky, an openly antisemitic law student expelled from the University of Florida, in a case that raises complex legal questions about how public universities navigate First Amendment protections against disruptive or threatening student speech. Professor Amar argues that while Damsky’s speech may be constitutionally protected, the judge’s reasoning was flawed in both legal doctrine and logic, and that the university’s disciplinary decision may ultimately be upheld under free speech standards that take into account educational disruption and reasonable fears of violence.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar critiques a federal district court ruling upholding New York’s Protect Our Courts Act (POCA), which limits civil arrests by ICE near court proceedings, framing it as a significant constitutional conflict between state law and federal immigration enforcement. Professor Amar argues that Judge D’Agostino’s ruling misunderstands basic constitutional principles—especially the Supremacy Clause—and wrongly treats regulation of federal agents as a permissible exercise of state sovereignty, making the decision likely to be overturned on appeal.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone discuss the Illinois Bivens Act, a new state law aiming to provide state-law remedies for constitutional violations by federal officials, particularly in civil immigration enforcement, and situates it as an innovative experiment within the broader tradition of federalism and converse-1983 legal theory. While Professors Amar and Mazzone commend the law as a promising and necessary response to the erosion of federal remedies like Bivens actions, they argue that the Act is flawed in its scope—both too narrow (retaining qualified immunity and limited to immigration) and too broad (imposing liability under the Illinois Constitution and authorizing punitive damages)—and ultimately hope it sparks more refined versions in other states.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Orr, which granted the federal government a stay to allow the use of birth-assigned sex on passports during ongoing litigation, and critiques the broader procedural and substantive patterns the Court exhibits in such interim-relief (“shadow docket”) cases. Professor Amar argues that while the Court majority should provide fuller explanations even in emergency rulings, the liberal dissenters are strategically and analytically misguided in avoiding arguments about the constitutional merits, which are increasingly central to determining outcomes in these cases.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone discuss the procedural and constitutional issues surrounding mootness in the Supreme Court case Little v. Hecox, which challenges Idaho’s law barring transgender women from participating in women’s collegiate sports. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that the district court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff, Lindsay Hecox, to voluntarily dismiss her case after she ceased athletic participation, and they contend that the case is clearly moot under Article III, urging higher courts to recognize this and vacate the Ninth Circuit’s decision accordingly.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone discuss the Supreme Court case Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections, which addresses whether a candidate has Article III standing to challenge state laws on ballot counting. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that a candidate likely has standing to challenge election regulations because they have an inherent interest in the clarity of election rules, even if they cannot prove the regulation would change the election's outcome, and they emphasize that resolving these issues is crucial for electoral legitimacy.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone examine whether the Supreme Court case Little v. Hecox, which challenges Idaho’s law restricting women’s sports teams to biological females, has become moot after plaintiff Lindsay Hecox withdrew from sports participation and sought to dismiss her case with prejudice. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that despite defendants’ claims of litigation gamesmanship, the Court should find the case moot and vacate the lower court’s decision under the Munsingwear doctrine, because Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement cannot be overridden by concerns about strategic behavior when vacatur adequately addresses the risk of an unreviewable precedent remaining in effect.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar discusses California’s new law, SB 627, which bans masked law enforcement, including federal agents like ICE, from covering their faces in public interactions, and evaluates its constitutional viability under the Supremacy Clause. Professor Amar responds to a public commentary by Berkeley Law professor Erwin Chemerinsky and argues that because SB 627 directly regulates federal officers without clear congressional consent, it is unconstitutional, and as such, California cannot enforce it against federal agents like ICE.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and professor emeritus Alan Brownstein examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s emergency-docket decision in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, which stayed a district court injunction that limited how ICE could use factors like race, language, and occupation when initiating immigration-related stops in California. Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring justification for the decision is flawed, as it underestimates the constitutional harm of race-based enforcement, lacks sufficient concern for protecting innocent individuals, and fails to meaningfully address the broader ethical and legal implications of using ethnicity and language as proxies for immigration status.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone examine President Trump’s executive order instructing the Department of Justice to prioritize prosecuting flag burning under existing content-neutral laws and considers the constitutional implications under First Amendment jurisprudence. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that while the executive order nominally adheres to constitutional constraints, it potentially raises serious free speech concerns by targeting specific expressive conduct—flag desecration—for prosecution based on its political message, and exposes the lack of clarity and consistency in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar explores the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Consumers’ Research, focusing particularly on Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion and its implications for the nondelegation doctrine and the separation of powers. Professor Amar argues that while Kavanaugh makes several insightful points defending executive discretion and the use of “intelligible principles,” his reasoning on independent agencies, Article II implications, and national security exceptions lacks nuance and requires further elaboration to be convincing.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and professor emeritus Alan Brownstein explore the long-standing and increasingly pressing conflict within First Amendment jurisprudence between the Free Exercise Clause, which often justifies special accommodation for religious expression, and the Free Speech Clause, which prohibits viewpoint discrimination by the government. Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that recent federal policies privileging religious expression—particularly in political and workplace contexts—risk violating core free speech principles by distorting democratic processes and creating inequities between religious and secular voices, a dilemma the Supreme Court can no longer avoid addressing.

As most folks paying attention this year appreciate, President Donald Trump has been issuing Executive Orders that, taken as a whole, seem unprecedented in their number, scope, and constitutional aggressiveness. Federal courts, in which the lion’s share of the legal challenges to these Orders have been filed, have been playing catch up in this regulatory-blitzkrieg…

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar examines the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on expedited “shadow docket” cases and preliminary injunction appeals that bypass normal procedural safeguards, focusing particularly on the 2024-25 Term. Professor Amar argues that the Court’s rushed handling of emergency cases produces weaker opinions and undermines judicial legitimacy, and he critically observes that the Court is selectively choosing when to definitively resolve merits in cases with incomplete factual records, as demonstrated by contrasting approaches in cases like United States v. Skrmetti, Mahmoud v. Taylor, and Trump v. CASA.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar comments on the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Trump v. CASA, Inc., in which the Court restricted the use of “universal injunctions” by federal district courts, which have been used to prevent enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws against all people rather than just the specific plaintiffs in a case. Professor Amar argues that initial reactions characterizing this as a major threat to civil rights were overstated, because courts retain alternative tools like class action certification and traditional injunctive relief that can still provide broad protection when necessary to fully protect plaintiffs.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and professor emeritus Alan E. Brownstein discuss the importance of applying constitutional principles consistently across different political contexts, using examples from free speech, federalism, and equal protection cases. Professors Amar and Brownstein argue that constitutional interpretation should follow a “Golden Rule” principle—applying the same legal standards regardless of whether the outcome favors one’s own political preferences—though they acknowledge this is difficult because it requires people to subordinate their substantive desires for the sake of even-handed constitutional application.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone examine the constitutional principles governing federal-state relations in the context of recent immigration enforcement protests in Los Angeles, specifically addressing what states can and cannot do regarding federal immigration operations, and what powers the federal government retains. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that while states cannot be compelled to assist federal immigration enforcement (following the anti-commandeering doctrine), they also cannot discriminate against or obstruct federal operations, and the President has inherent constitutional authority to deploy federal forces to protect federal personnel and property without requiring state permission.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate efforts to end a parole program for migrants from four countries, focusing on legal standards for granting a stay and the broader constitutional and policy implications of executive immigration authority. Professor Amar argues that the federal government does indeed suffer irreparable harm when prevented from enforcing duly enacted laws and policies, and criticizes Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissent for undervaluing these harms and overlooking legal precedent and practical consequences.