SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, in which the Court held unconstitutional a federal law imposing different physical presence requirements on mothers as compared to fathers. Grossman argues that the law at issue epitomized sex discrimination and was rooted in archaic generalizations about parents based on gender.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on the heritability of citizenship and explains why the decision might have implications for other immigration issues, such as the “Muslim ban” executive order. Dorf argues that the precedents the Court had to distinguish to reach its conclusion might give some insight into whether and how it might defer to other political branches on immigration issues.
Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on recent actions by state and local governments to oppose federal policies, such as the immigration and the wall along the U.S.–Mexico border. Amar argues that these attempts likely run contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by attempting to interfere with the execution of federal policy.
Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar and UC Davis Law emeritus professor Alan E. Brownstein explain the complexities behind analyzing the motive underlying legislation and executive orders. Specifically, Amar and Brownstein highlight the difficulty in courts’ using perceived motive to strike down President Trump’s executive order regarding entry to the United States.
Chapman University, Fowler School of Law, professor Ronald D. Rotunda explains the legal precedent behind the executive’s power to restrict visas for non-U.S. citizens to enter the United States. Rotunda points out that the recent opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fails to mention almost any of the precedential cases on point when it struck down President Trump’s executive order limiting immigration.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether President Trump’s new executive order on immigration, anticipated to be issued this week, will fare better than Executive Order 13769, which temporarily banned nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries and all refugees from entering the United States. Dorf discusses Trump’s past public statements advocating for a Muslim ban during his presidential campaign and applies the factors courts may use in evaluating whether those statements can be considered evidence of Trump’s motives for his actions as president, should the constitutionality of his executive order be challenged in court again.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and California civil litigator Michael Schaps consider the strength of San Francisco’s lawsuit against the Trump Administration arising out of its identity as a “sanctuary city.” Amar and Schaps discuss both the ripeness of the claim, a threshold procedural matter, and also the merits of San Francisco’s arguments.
Cornell University law professor Joseph Margulies argues that the significance of President Trump’s “Muslim Ban” executive order lies not in the legal issues it presents, but in its symbolism. As Margulies explains, the executive order is a symbol that will be used to mobilize support for competing narratives about American life; what ultimately matters is which narrative prevails.
John W. Dean, former counsel to President Nixon, explains the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal division in the immigration case United States v. Texas, which involved a challenge to the Obama administration’s sweeping immigration policy. Dean argues that the Court is effectively punting the political question of the immigration policy to the winner of the 2016 presidential election.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf evaluates statements made by Donald Trump in response to the mass shooting at a gay nightclub in Orlando this past weekend. Dorf argues that by telling American Muslims that they are all presumed to be terrorists, Trump actually fosters resentment and radicalization in the small portion of the American Muslim community that has the potential for radicalization.
Former counsel to the president John W. Dean analyzes Donald Trump’s proposal to build a wall along the Mexican-United States border. Dean explains why the wall is not only logistically unfeasible, but also why it is simply a bad idea as a matter of policy.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Texas, a case involving a challenge to the Obama Administration’s deferred action immigration policy. Dorf points out that underneath the procedural questions actually before the Court in that case is a crucial unasked question: What is the scope of the president’s prosecutorial discretion not to enforce laws duly enacted by Congress?
Illinois Law dean and law professor Vikram David Amar evaluates three people’s statements regarding America’s treatment of Muslims: President Obama, an Iowa businessman, and a local Muslim cleric (an imam). Amar points out that Donald Trump’s proposal that America ban all Muslims from entering the country is vastly underinclusive (because the great majority of violent acts in this country are perpetrated by non-Muslims), and at the same time very overinclusive (because the overwhelming majority of Muslims who want to enter the United States intend no harm)—two indicators of legal and moral unfairness.
University of Illinois law professor and dean Vikram David Amar comments on a recent decision by a federal district court in Arizona addressing a challenge to two parts of Arizona’s SB 1070 statute, which attempts to deal with immigration stresses in that state. Amar argues that the court’s reasoning on both claims was confused and unpersuasive and that the results should have been inverted. That is, Amar suggests that the court should have upheld the equal protection challenge to the “Show Me Your Papers” provision and rejected the First Amendment challenge to the Day Laborer provisions.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses Donald Trump’s call to end birthright citizenship as part of immigration reform. Dorf argues that birthright citizenship implements widely shared and characteristically American values and that curtailing it would be a huge step backwards.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, released earlier this week, in Kerry v. Din, in which the Court rejected a claim that a U.S. citizen was entitled to a detailed explanation of why the government would not allow her husband a visa to enter the country.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses the Obama Administration’s options in light of the recent decision by a federal district judge to enjoin implementation of deferred action for several million undocumented immigrants.
Chapman University law professor Ronald Rotunda comments on the President’s asserted power to waive U.S. immigration laws.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses the important questions of whether and when a child who is born outside the U.S. can acquire citizenship from a U.S. citizen parent. Grossman focuses especially on the heartbreaking case of U.S. citizen Ellie Lavi, who gave birth to twins in Israel. When Lavi sought U.S. citizenship for the twins, the State Department informed her that the twins would not be deemed U.S. citizens unless Lavi could prove that the donor sperm or egg came from a U.S. citizen. Grossman strongly criticizes the State Department’s decision to, in effect, deem the gamete donors, not Lavi, the babies’ parents for purposes of U.S. citizenship—even though no one disputes that Lavi, a U.S. citizen, gave birth to the twins. Grossman covers the ways in which children can gain U.S. citizenship by descent; describes the more onerous rules for out-of-wedlock children; considers whether treating unwed citizen fathers and unwed citizen mothers differently is discriminatory; and discusses who counts as a “mother” and thus a person able to convey citizenship. Finally, Grossman considers four interesting scenarios regarding the descent of citizenship to children; describes the consequences of non-citizenship; and urges the State Department to deal more fairly and justly with the modern realities of reproductive technology.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the Supreme Court’s decision to take up a case involving the controversial Arizona immigration law—another blockbuster in a momentous Term for the Court, which will also resolve cases on the health care legislation and redistricting in Texas. Regarding the Arizona immigration case, Dorf explains the relevance, in the case, of the theory of the “unitary executive,” and notes that there seems to be a common misconception: The question in the Arizona case, he explains, is not whether Congress can preempt state immigration law—it plainly can—but whether Congress did, in fact, preempt Arizona’s immigration law. Dorf also explains the unusual way in which the Justices’ ideological leanings play out in typical federal-preemption cases, and why immigration cases involving federal preemption are atypical in this respect. In addition, he explains why a Court precedent on gun control and federalism may play a large role here.