Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the constitutional and policy dimensions of Trump v. Barbara, the Supreme Court case challenging Trump’s executive order restricting birthright citizenship, examining both the legal merits and the broader arguments for and against jus soli citizenship. Professor Dorf argues that the executive order is clearly unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, that the policy case for restricting birthright citizenship is empirically weak and practically disruptive, and that the real motivation driving the effort is racist “replacement” ideology rather than any legitimate demographic or governance concern.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone discuss the scope and original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, particularly in response to a recent executive order issued by President Trump that seeks to limit birthright citizenship. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that the executive order (and the few legal scholars who endorse its legal basis) misinterprets the Constitution by imposing parental status requirements that are not present in the text, and they explain that both historical and legal precedent overwhelmingly support the conventional interpretation that all persons born on U.S. soil and subject to its laws are citizens.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat discusses President Donald Trump’s disregard for legal and constitutional constraints during his first week in office, marked by actions such as attempting to alter birthright citizenship and dismissing inspectors general unlawfully. Professor Sarat argues that these lawless actions are a deliberate strategy to test the checks and balances of the U.S. constitutional system, warning that a lack of pushback from other branches of government could pave the way for authoritarianism.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson, where the Court ruled that Donald Trump could not be disqualified from appearing on the ballot under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, emphasizing the decision’s implications for the Court’s prestige and internal consensus. Professor Sarat argues that the decision, while appearing unanimous, reveals deep divisions within the Court and suggests a failure by Chief Justice John Roberts to foster genuine unanimity or to protect the Court’s reputation, further criticizing the decision’s approach and its broader implications for the Court’s impartiality.