UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar discusses three unexpected aspects of the Supreme Court’s end-of-term decisions from its 2025-26 term, focusing on the late-arriving ballots ruling in Watson v. Republican National Committee, the Court's departure from constitutional avoidance in three separate cases, and its mootness ruling in Little v. Hecox. Professor Amar argues that the Watson outcome was correctly decided despite media mispredictions based on oral argument, that bypassing narrower statutory grounds was justified in the birthright citizenship and Federal Reserve cases given their pressing national importance, but that the Court’s refusal to dismiss Hecox as moot—despite the plaintiff's dismissal with prejudice—was legally unjustified and appeared driven by suspicion of strategic litigant behavior rather than sound doctrine.
University of Kentucky, Rosenberg College of Law professor emeritus Alvin Goldman examines the constitutional authority over the tenure and independence of federal administrative agency officials, arguing that it lies with Congress rather than the President, despite modern claims rooted in the unitary executive theory. Professor Goldman argues that the Constitution’s text, structure, and underlying principles support congressional control to prevent presidential overreach, and warns that a Supreme Court shift in favor of increased executive power could endanger the legitimacy and stability of the administrative state.
UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar discusses two Supreme Court cases involving presidential authority—one concerning tariff powers under the IEEPA and the other regarding limits on the president’s ability to remove FTC commissioners—and highlights a shared constitutional issue: how the structure of presidential veto power creates an imbalance that makes it difficult for Congress to reclaim delegated authority. Professor Amar argues that because of this “retrieval problem,” courts should be wary of upholding broad statutory delegations of power to the president and should consider invalidating entire statutes, rather than only unconstitutional provisions, to preserve the constitutional balance between branches.
Akshai Vikram, a JD candidate at Columbia Law School, examines how President Donald Trump’s second administration has expanded executive power in controversial ways, prompting growing bipartisan concern and calls for Congress to reclaim authority and protect civil liberties. Mr. Vikram argues that Congress must not only roll back specific statutes that enable executive overreach but also strengthen judicial remedies for rights violations and reform doctrines like qualified immunity, state secrets, and judicial injunctions to restore constitutional balance.
Steven D. Schwinn, a professor of law at the University of Illinois Chicago John Marshall Law School argues that the Supreme Court’s order last week effectively striking down the COVID-19 eviction moratorium issued by the Centers for Disease Control reflects the Court’s highly partisan approach to executive authority. Professor Schwinn points out that only partisanship can explain why Court upheld the Trump administration’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii and struck down the Biden administration’s eviction moratorium.
