UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar, professor emeritus Alan Brownstein, and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone analyze the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Umphress v. Hall, a case involving a Texas judge who challenged potential disciplinary action for conducting only opposite-sex weddings based on religious beliefs. In this first of a two-part series of columns on that case, the authors focus on the threshold justiciability matters presented in the case, arguing that it serves as a valuable teaching tool for understanding overlapping legal doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and abstention. The authors critique the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning on enforcement threat assessments and point out doctrinal confusion surrounding facial versus as-applied constitutional challenges.
Harvard Law professor emeritus Laurence H. Tribe comments on a decision by a federal judge in Texas vacating the Biden administration’s loan forgiveness program. Professor Tribe argues that Judge Mark Pittman, a Trump appointee, incorrectly concluded that the court had jurisdiction to review the challenge to the debt relief program and explains why judicial restraint is such a critical part of a constitutional republic.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers one aspect of the oral argument in California v. Texas, the latest challenge to the Affordable Care Act to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Specifically, Colb considers the way in which some of the Justices talked during the oral argument about the doctrine of judicial standing, and she calls out those Justices’ hypocrisy as to that issue.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, in which the Court unremarkably affirmed its position that a plaintiff in federal court must have suffered (or be in danger of imminently suffering) a “concrete and particularized injury.” Dorf explains why, in cases such as Spokeo that involve one private party suing another, the Court should abandon the concreteness requirement of judicial standing.
