Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the claim that IQ scores of minorities should be upwardly adjusted for the purpose of eligibility for the death penalty. Drawing upon an article on the issue by Robert Sanger, Colb argues that even if the practice of adjusting IQ scores were scientifically supported (which it is not), doing so for death penalty purposes constitutes invidious race discrimination in violation of the federal Constitution.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb considers whether it is morally consistent for a person to be an ethical vegan and also to be pro-choice with respect to abortion.
Sherry Colb, a law professor at Cornell Law School, discusses the moral status of perpetrating violence to express opposition to abortion and to animal killing and cruelty. Colb argues there are nonviolent means of furthering pro-life and pro-animal rights movements, violence for these purposes is an unnecessary and thus immoral option.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb considers why pro-life advocates often do not champion contraception. Colb looks at two philosophical approaches to morality—deontology and consequentialism—to better understand this observed phenomenon.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the sexism Donald Trump displayed during the night of the second Republican presidential debate. Colb points out that Trump’s words reveal his hateful and exploitative attitude toward women and is hopeful that people are prepared to vote accordingly.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses an Ohio bill currently under consideration that would ban abortions motivated by the presentation of Down syndrome by an embryo or fetus. Colb argues that a woman’s right to make decisions over her bodily integrity includes the right to make a decision on a basis that some or most people might find offensive.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses possible implications a ruling by the Court of Arbitration for Sport that a woman’s having a naturally high level of testosterone in her body is insufficient grounds for barring her from competing in women’s athletics.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb analyzes a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that when a person with a cellphone inadvertently calls a third party, thereby exposing personal communications, the caller retains no reasonable expectation of privacy in the matters disclosed for purposes of the federal Wiretap Act.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb draws upon the outrage many people felt in response to a video allegedly showing Planned Parenthood officials discussing the sale of fetal body parts and tissue from abortions (video that was subsequently revealed to be edited so as to be intentionally misleading) in order to discuss a different area in which tissue and parts are bought and sold without evoking such broad outrage.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a proposal by Adam Benforado, author of Unfair: The New Science of Criminal Justice, that one way to improve the criminal justice system would be to conduct and record trials outside of the jury’s presence, then to show edited versions of the recordings to juries after all of the evidence has been presented. Colb explains how this proposal could potentially improve the system and addresses some potential obstacles to its implementation.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, in which the Court held facially unconstitutional a statute requiring hotel operators to record, keep, and disclose upon demand by law enforcement certain information about their guests. Colb argues that the Court’s reliance on Planned Parenthood v. Casey to find the statute unconstitutional reinforces the link between substantive and procedural privacy.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb considers arguments for and against a moral duty by transgender individuals disclose their transgender status to potential sexual partners before having relations.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the potential downsides of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding earlier this year in Heien v. North Carolina, in which the Court held that a police officer could, consistent with the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures, stop a driver for a behavior that the officer mistakenly but reasonably believes is illegal.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses actual versus perceived cruelty in the administration of capital punishment, as raised recently during oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in Glossip v. Gross.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a question Justice Samuel Alito asked during oral argument last week in the same-sex marriage cases—whether non-romantic couples should have the right to marry.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the competing values at issue when an ultra-Orthodox Jewish man on an airplane requests not to be seated next to a woman who is not his wife.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent criminal case out of Indiana, in which a woman was convicted and sentenced for feticide. Colb argues that while the situation as a whole is a tragedy, it also highlights a failure of the State of Indiana to have empathy for women in pain whose circumstances call for mercy rather than a pure retributive impulse.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb compares medical screening tests with dog sniffs for narcotics with respect to their propensity to yield Type I errors—also known as false positives. In particular, Colb references Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Illinois v. Caballes, in which he opined that the possibility that dogs would incorrectly indicate the presence of narcotics and lead to an invasive search meant that such dog sniffs constitute searches for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses how a pro-choice position on the issue of abortion might be reconciled with the position that a mother may rightfully grieve over a miscarriage.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a Michigan pediatrician’s decision not to see as a patient the infant child of a lesbian couple.