Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on what may happen if the debt-ceiling deal that President Obama announced on Sunday, August 31, is somehow derailed—or if (as is almost certain to be the case) future Presidents face constitutional-law issues that are philosophically similar to the one President Obama may have narrowly avoided here. In discussing the debt-ceiling issue and its constitutional dimensions, Dorf describes the trilemma the President may face; raises the question whether the constitutionality of a measure must be an either/or proposition or if there are intermediate options of a measure's being, say, “very unconstitutional” or “a little unconstitutional”; and describes America’s historic hostility to balancing different constitutional values against one another.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf weighs in on the debate over whether Senator Mitch McConnell’s plan to prevent the federal government from defaulting on its obligations is constitutional. Dorf explains McConnell’s plan and analyzes three possible constitutional objections to it, concluding that none of these objections is, in the end, persuasive. Indeed, Dorf suggests that the more closely one looks at the plan, the more clear it is that it should be a first choice among possible solutions.

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan responds to a recent New York Times editorial by Laurence Tribe regarding the constitutionality of the federal government's debt ceiling. Tribe contended that the limit is constitutional; Buchanan contends that it is not. In his column, Buchanan summarizes and responds to Tribe's arguments regarding the key constitutional provision at issue, the Public Debt Clause.

Justia columnist, George Washington University law professor, and economist Neil H. Buchanan comments on the current situation regarding the federal debt limit, considers how it could be resolved, and notes that President Obama could take a constitutional stand in order to resolve the impasse. Buchanan begins by explaining for readers what the debt limit is and why it is important now; explains why the debt-limit law that set the ceiling was never necessary in the first place; describes the potentially very grave consequences of passing the debt-limit ceiling with that law in place, as it is now; and contends that our current game of political “chicken” regarding the debt limit is dangerous indeed. He then describes a possible constitutional solution that President Obama could opt for, based on arguments that the debt limit is illegitimate and void as a matter of constitutional law. Finally, Buchanan explains why, even if the debt limit were to be removed from the picture, an underlying, related problem with the political process would still remain.