Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Bowe v. United States, which raises the question of whether limits on successive habeas petitions for state prisoners also apply to federal prisoners and whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear such a case. Professor Dorf argues that while some legal scholars invoke the theory that certain review functions are essential to the Supreme Court’s constitutional role, that argument has limitations, and the Court may instead use the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to uphold its jurisdiction without definitively resolving the scope of its essential functions.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals ruling that Happy, an Asian elephant who has been imprisoned at the Bronx Zoo for nearly her entire half-century of existence—was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Professor Dorf points out the questionable logic and errors that led the court to its conclusion and suggests that, despite the sad ending for Happy, her case might mark a turning point in the legal rights of nonhuman animals, evidenced by the thoughtful and compassionate dissent by two members of that court.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Vannoy, in which it held that a prisoner may not invoke the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury as a basis for challenging his criminal conviction when filing a federal habeas corpus petition. Professor Colb explains why, if cost/benefit analysis played a role in determining retroactivity, the Court perhaps should have decided that case the other way.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf implores the President or Congress to act swiftly and drastically to address the COVID-19 pandemic: lock down the nation and suspend habeas corpus. Dorf explains why this extreme measure is both appropriate and necessary in a situation such as this one.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that presents the issue whether and when a criminal defendant should pay with his life for an error made by his lawyer. Dorf explains the facts behind the case as well as the relevant legal precedents. He argues that Davila, the criminal defendant in this case, might convincingly argue that his first real opportunity to complain about the ineffectiveness of counsel on direct appeal is in a state habeas proceeding.
