UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar analyzes Judge Aileen Cannon’s dismissal of the improper-documents-handling indictment against former President Donald Trump, focusing on Judge Cannon’s interpretation of the Appointments Clause and its implications for Special Counsel Jack Smith’s appointment. In this second in a series of columns, Professor Amar argues that Judge Cannon’s ruling is flawed because it fails to consider the broader constitutional context and ignores that the current arrangement with Smith does not meaningfully differ from alternative setups that would be unquestionably constitutional, thus suggesting a need for a more flexible interpretation of the relevant statutes.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar analyzes Judge Aileen Cannon’s decision to dismiss the Mar-a-Lago document handling indictment against former President Donald Trump, focusing on the judge’s reasoning regarding Special Counsel Jack Smith’s appointment. Professor Amar argues that Judge Cannon’s ruling is flawed due to her failure to respect the proper role of a district court judge in relation to higher court precedents, particularly the Supreme Court’s Nixon tapes case, and her misunderstanding of the larger constitutional context surrounding special counsel appointments.

Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut highlights two points about the federal district court’s July 4 decision blocking the Biden administration from communicating with social media companies—points which, Mr. Aftergut argues, underscore the decision’s risk of sowing great mistrust in law. Mr. Aftergut contrasts the apparent “judge shopping” that put the case before a Trump-appointed judge with the even-handed approach of Special Counsel Jack Smith, and he points out the opinion’s glaring omission of an especially relevant precedent.

Cornell University law professor Joseph Margulies expands upon a prior column in which he argued that all of President Donald Trump’s attacks thus far on Special Counsel Mueller are not actually a threat to the rule of law. Margulies considers two other scenarios: delegating the task of firing the special counsel, which Margulies argues does threaten the rule of law, and pardoning those convicted by the special counsel, which he argues does not.