Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut comments on yesterday’s first public hearing of the U.S. House’s January 6 Committee. Mr. Aftergut describes four elements of the committee’s opening and the evidence the committee provided in support of element.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should put the so-called Independent State Legislature (ISL) theory to rest sooner rather than later. Specifically, Dean Amar suggests that Justice Stephen Breyer—who is set to retire but who joined Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter in expressly rejecting ISL in 2000—should be among the voices to condemn the unsupportable theory.
UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that the political posturing about inflation in this country is becoming increasingly ridiculous. Professor Buchanan points out that we have no idea what is an acceptable (or unacceptable) level of inflation and that despite endlessly criticizing Democrats in power for higher rates of inflation, Republicans have proposed no plan for how to reduce inflation.
In light of Justice Samuel Alito’s leaked draft in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., which would overrule Roe v. Wade and its progeny, UChicago Law professor emeritus Albert W. Alschuler and Harvard Law professor emeritus Laurence H. Tribe ask six questions of the apparent five-Justice majority. Professors Alschuler and Tribe point out some of the inconsistencies and illogic of the opinion and call on the Justices to account for these issues.
Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut argues that because the facts are not on their side, Trump supporters’ main ploy in combating the January 6 Committee will be simply to take advantage of media “both-siderism” to confuse Americans. Mr. Aftergut points out that the promulgators of both-siderism are counting on Americans taking recycled disinformation at face value and treating it as equivalent to testimony under oath and documents that don’t lie.
Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on a recent decision by a federal district court judge deferring to the evidence provided by the state in support of its lethal injection procedure, despite significant contradictory evidence. Professor Sarat argues that the trilogy of Supreme Court precedents on lethal injection not only altered the legal standards but tilted the playing field for fact-finding when death row inmates bring lethal injection challenges.
UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why it is “efficient” (in one sense of that fraught word) for courts to sometimes act like legislatures—i.e., to legislate from the bench. Professor Buchanan points out that deciding cases too narrowly or incrementally causes unnecessary litigation to try to identify where courts will draw the line, particularly when the judges and justices already know where they want that line to be. He emphasizes, however, that efficiency is not the ultimate goal of the law, and minimizing litigation costs should never supersede the pursuit of justice.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb explores a suggestion by some pro-choice advocates that a “religious abortion” might serve as a workaround to the apparently imminent demise of the constitutional right to abortion. Professor Colb explains why that workaround is unlikely to prevail: the current Court discounts the Establishment Clause, and its ostensible embrace of the Free Exercise Clause is actually friendliness only to conservative Christianity (and to Judaism and Islam where the traditions happen to be the same).
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that while the Supreme Court’s investigation into who leaked Justice Samuel Alito’s draft opinion overruling Roe v. Wade may be legal, it is also highly hypocritical in at least two respects. Professor Dorf argues that the investigation violates the spirit (and perhaps even the letter) of the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, and it amounts to self-dealing because it focuses on the clerks, but not the Justices or their spouses.
Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut writes a hypothetical speech that, unfortunately, those grieving the suffering and loss of life from the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, will likely never hear from their elected officials. In the speech, Mr. Aftergut rhetorically points out that the speaker’s approach is common sense yet also highly unlikely to be embraced by those with the power to do so.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar describes a few (albeit unlikely) ways in which the Supreme Court could more moderately rule in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., rather than outright striking down Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (which a majority seems poised to do), or upholding them (which three Justices almost certainly support). Dean Amar explains the doctrine of “political reliance” and how it could lead the Court either to “return” the abortion question to the states to legislate (rather than having unenforced pre-Roe statutes to spring back to life), or to “sunset” the abortion right, giving the public time to account for the change in law.
Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut comments on the acquittal of Clinton campaign lawyer Michael Sussman and what it means for former U.S. Attorney John Durham and former Trump Attorney General William Bar. Mr. Aftergut points out that all of Durham’s prosecutions, including another he has set for trial in October, are about facts that post-date the fully legitimate launch of the FBI’s 2016 Trump-Russia investigation, precluding any possibility of showing that investigation was a “hoax.”
In anticipation of the U.S. Supreme Court likely deciding soon to review a case presenting the question of the legitimacy of the “Independent State Legislature” (ISL), Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar explains why the theory necessarily fails unless its proponents make up the meaning of Article II of the Constitution without regard to its words or historical context. Dean Amar argues that the notion of ISL does not work for Article I or Article II, but it certainly does not work for Article II under the textual approach employed by its proponents.