Articles Posted in Criminal Procedure

In Part Two of this two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her examination of Navarette v. California, the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether anonymous tips are sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to support a stop by officers. The case involves the relationship between probable cause and reasonable suspicion, as well as the role of known informants and anonymous informants in helping police meet each of these standards, in turn, to shed light on what is normally required to justify an arrest or stop.

In Part One in a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb considers the Supreme Court case of Navarette v. California, which asks whether police may lawfully stop a vehicle for reckless driving on the basis of an anonymous tip. Colb explains why that question is difficult, for two key reasons.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent federal court decision finding New York City liable for its stop-and-frisk policy. The court found that the City had violated the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee against discrimination. Colb notes that the ruling is significant in that it validates the sense of some New Yorkers, especially those who belong to minority groups, that there has been unsupportable and arbitrary police behavior in this respect. In addition, Colb raises a narrow disagreement with a portion of the court's analysis that may help clarify some of the obstacles we face in detecting discriminatory intent, in this and other contexts where the issue arises. Relatedly, Colb also comments on the use of baselines in decisionmaking.

In light of debate surrounding the recent Zimmerman murder trial and its six-person jury, Justia columnist and attorney David Kemp discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the size of juries in criminal trials. He describes the role of the jury as understood both by our nation’s founders and by the Supreme Court and explains how that understanding has changed over time. Kemp ultimately calls for a return to the traditional twelve-person criminal jury panel to advance both the appearance and reality of justice.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, which concerns the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Court ruled there that a jury, not a judge, must make factual findings that raise the mandatory minimum sentence for an offense. Colb analyzes both the majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, and explains which she finds more persuasive, and why. She also draws on social psychology research in her analysis.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding a Maryland law authorizing the collection of DNA samples from people who are arrested for violent crimes, and Justice Scalia’s dissent to that decision, raising Fourth Amendment concerns. She covers the three main points of the majority’s decision, and the three main points that the dissent raised, examining the logic and persuasiveness of each.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb considers the merits of the Supreme Court’s approach to cases where drunk driving is suspected, as set forth in Missouri v. McNeely. There, the Court held that police must conduct a “totality of the circumstances” exigency analysis to determine whether seeking a warrant prior to performing a blood test would significantly undermine the efficacy of the search in an individual case. Colb considers whether the Court’s ruling makes sense, in light of what generally happens in DWI cases, and discusses an alternative approach that was proposed by the Chief Justice, as well as the approach described in Justice Thomas’s dissent and its witty hypothetical.

Justia columnist and attorney David Kemp discusses Miranda warnings and the proposed reliance on the “public safety” exception in the case of the suspected Boston Marathon bomber. Kemp first describes the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Miranda v. Arizona, as well as the subsequently established public safety exception. Kemp cautions that despite the characterization by some authorities of the exception as a carte blanche to question criminal suspects in blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, the exception should be preserved as an evidentiary rule employed only by impartial courts, not by interrogating officers.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the recent Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case concerning the constitutionality of the police’s conducting a warrantless dog sniff on the front porch of a private house in order to detect drugs. Colb analyzes both the majority and concurring opinions from the High Court, and explains why the drugs that were found by the police were suppressed, so that they could not be admitted into evidence in a criminal case against the defendant, Jardines. She also predicts the result that will follow when a similar, but not identical, Fourth Amendment case arises in the future, as it surely will.

In Part Two of a two-part series of columns on the Supreme Court case of Maryland v. King, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her analysis of the case, which raises questions about the Fourth Amendment significance of DNA collection from arrestees, in light of the government interests and privacy entitlements that are at stake when a person is taken into custody. Part One of this series appeared on March 20, here on Justia’s Verdict.

In Part One in a two-part series of columns relating to the pending Supreme Court case Maryland v. King, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb considers the Fourth Amendment significance of DNA collection from arrestees, in light of the government interests and privacy entitlements that are at stake when a person is taken into custody. Part Two of this series will appear next Wednesday, March 27.

In Part Two of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her commentary on an upcoming Supreme Court case that raises the following question: Does the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of protection against compelled self-incrimination protect a suspect’s “right to remain silent” outside of the custodial setting? That is, does a suspect who has neither received any Miranda warnings nor is currently in custody have a right not to speak? In this series, Colb analyzes the question and suggests possible answers. (Part One of this two-part series appeared here on Justia’s Verdict on Wednesday, February 6.)

In Part One of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on an upcoming Supreme Court case that raises the following question: Does the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of protection against compelled self-incrimination protect a suspect’s “right to remain silent” outside of the custodial setting? That is, does a suspect who has neither received any Miranda warnings nor is currently in custody have a right not to speak? In this series, Colb analyzes the question and suggests possible answers. (Part Two of this two-part series will appear on Justia on Wednesday, February 13th.)

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses two Supreme Court Double Jeopardy cases, Evans v. Michigan and Blueford v. Arkansas, that turn on what ought to happen when a judge makes a mistake about state law and consequently takes a case away from the jury. Since the mistake in Evans helped the defendant, Colb argues that the resolution of Evans will tell us a lot about how principled—or unprincipled—the Court’s application of its Double Jeopardy doctrine will be: Will the Court be consistent about the Double Jeopardy doctrine, even despite the possibility that its ruling might help criminal defendants? Colb also comments on the contrast between Evans and last year’s ruling in Blueford, where the judge also made a mistake, but not, in that case, a mistake that helped the defendant.

In the second in a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her commentary on the constitutional issues raised by dog sniffs, in light of two cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court will address the issue. As Colb explains, one case asks whether a dog sniff is itself a search, for Fourth Amendment purposes; and the other asks what is the evidentiary significance of a dog’s positively alerting after a drug sniff for narcotics. Here, Colb builds on her prior commentary on the cases, and also addresses related precedents. In addition, she discusses the complexities that may arise because dogs have minds of their own—and are able to sniff not only drugs but, for example, cancer and pregnancy. Moreover, dogs can also sense humans’ feelings, and will want to please humans with whom they have bonded. Colb considers these and other factors as they play into the Fourth Amendment analysis. She also predicts the likely outcomes of the cases before the Court, and describes the issues the Justices seemed to find salient at oral argument. She also predicts which Justices will be the “swing votes” in the case.

In the first in a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the constitutional issues raises by dog sniffs, in light of two cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court will address the issue. As Colb explains, one case asks whether a dog sniff is itself a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the other asks what is the evidentiary significance of a dog’s positively alerting after a drug sniff for narcotics. Colb examines some of the main factors that may prove important in the cases, and suggests that the Court’s analysis will be significantly improved if it takes into account the differences between a living, breathing dog and a mere evidence-gathering machine.

In Part Two in a two-part series of columns on an interesting set of Fourth Amendment issues, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues to address the question whether law enforcement may constitutionally, without a warrant or probable cause, use global positioning technology to track a suspect’s whereabouts through his cellular phone. Specifically, here in Part Two, Colb considers the two possible ways in which the Supreme Court uses the phrase “reasonable expectations of privacy” in practice in Fourth Amendment cases. In the phrase, Colb notes, “reasonable” may mean “empirically realistic,” but it also may mean “morally justifiable.” Colb gives examples of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases in which the phrase is used in these two different ways. In addition, she examines the exclusionary rule’s role here—noting that the rule, which forbids evidence from being admitted in court if it was obtained unconstitutionally, may in concrete cases seem to simply help out criminals, but at a more abstract theoretical level, protects us all from police misconduct. Colb also predicts that the Supreme Court will need to revisit these issues sooner, rather than later, to ensure that the law is clear.

In Part One in a two-part series of columns on an interesting set of Fourth Amendment issues, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses the question whether law enforcement may constitutionally, without a warrant or probable cause, use global positioning technology to track a suspect’s whereabouts through his cellular phone. Previously, Colb explains, the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Jones that police need a warrant and probable cause to attach a global positioning device to a vehicle and thereby track a suspect’s whereabouts. But now, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that police may, without a warrant or probable cause, use global positioning technology to track a suspect’s whereabouts through his cellular phone. Colb examines the legal concepts that the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit decisions invoke, including those of trespass, and of privacy, and comments on the court’s analysis.

Justia guest columnist and Loyola Law School professor Paula Mitchell discusses the high costs of the death penalty in California and suggests that life in prison without the possibility of parole is a more expeditious alternative. Mitchell describes the different components contributing to the expense of having the death penalty, including direct appeals and habeas corpus petitions, finding that the total costs far exceed a system where life without the possibility of parole is the maximum sentence. Mitchell then explains the initiative that will appear on the ballot in California in November 2012—Proposition 34—which will give California voters an opportunity to reform the state’s penal system by replacing the costly death penalty with life in prison without the possibility of parole.

In Part Two of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her analysis of two controversial rulings issued at the end of June and the beginning of July, respectively, by two panels of a New York State appeals court (the Appellate Division, First Department). Each ruling concluded that police had violated a suspect’s state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that as a result, the trial judges should have “suppressed” the weapons found on the suspects—that is, held that the weapons could not be introduced against the suspects if and when they became defendants at a criminal trial. Colb explains the logic behind the rulings, which is related to New York’s “Stop and Frisk” laws. She also contrasts New York and federal law in this area, and contends that the differences between them may have contributed to the New York controversy.