Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on a federal-court class-action lawsuit against Match.com that had been brought by disgruntled daters who alleged that Match.com engaged in deceptive trade practices, and breached its contract with its users. In particular, users have complained that after they joined the site, they found that it contained numerous profiles that were inactive, and numerous others that were merely spam. After analyzing the site's Terms of Service (ToS), however, Ramasastry concludes, as the court did, that Match.com did not violate its ToS, nor did it engage in deceptive trade practices. Ramasastry therefore warns Internet users who seek to join pay sites, to first look very carefully at what the ToS do—and do not—actually promise, before signing up. Finally, Ramasastry notes some of the guidelines for dating online that the Better Business Bureau (BBB) has developed.
Justia columnist and attorney David Kemp criticizes criminal HIV-transmission laws, arguing that the criminalization of HIV transmission succeeds only in marginalizing people with HIV; deterring sexually active persons from acting responsibly and getting tested; and in some instances, leading to violations of constitutional due process protections. Kemp notes that such laws have led to dramatic injustice, citing, as a case in point, the 25-year sentence that was imposed on a man after his one-time encounter involving protected sex. Though that particular sentence was ultimately commuted to five years of supervised probation, laws that allow strict punishments for consensual sexual contact still remain on the books. Rather than resort to invoking such laws, Kemp argues, states should focus their efforts on (1) seeing that people know their HIV status by getting tested; (2) seeing that people disclose their HIV status to their sexual partners; and (3) urging people to engage in safer behavior via publicly funded campaigns, using billboards or the like, to get the word out.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean comments on current and past efforts by the Republican Party to suppress non-white Americans from voting in Southern states. Dean reports that these kinds of efforts have been escalating since 2010, and that they now encompass some Northern states as well. Dean covers specific, highly credible reports of such tactics being used; notes how voting laws can play into that underhanded effort; charges some Republican judges with being unwilling to enforce the amended Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA); and explains why these dirty tactics are a stain on the history of the Republican Party. Dean also notes his own role, in the Nixon Administration, in conveying Nixon’s decision not to veto a VRA extension that gave 18-year-olds the vote, and explains how that decision ultimately led, indirectly, to 18-year-olds getting the vote. Dean also notes that Mitt Romney could never make the same decision to let 18-year-olds vote today, as so many young people are Democrats or Independents. Finally, Dean cites a number of reasons for which we should all be thankful for the VRA.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton continues her two-part series on the Republican and Democratic Party Platforms. In this column, she comments on the Democratic Party Platform, focusing—as she did with the Republican Party Platform—upon issues relating to religion, women, and children. More specifically, Hamilton discusses issues such as the government's relationship with faith-based organizations; same-sex marriage; contraception and abortion rights; foreign family-planning aid; and human trafficking. Hamilton also decries a key omission from the Democratic Party Platform: It fails to address the important issue of child sex abuse, except insofar as it mentions trafficking.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton begins her two-part series on the two major-party platforms by focusing, first, on the Republican Party Platform. (Her follow-up column on the Democratic Party Platform will appear here on Justia’s Verdict shortly.) Hamilton focuses especially on the following aspects of the Republican Party Platform: the Party’s attempt to paint gay activists—and not their foes—as the real haters; the Party’s extreme views on religion, including areas where the Party would allow one person to impose his or her religious views on another, when it comes to medical care; its embrace of having federal money go to religious organizations, but without their having to follow federal rules; its narrow view of women’s and children’s rights; and finally, its seeking rights for the unborn. Hamilton argues that, overall, women should not only oppose, but actually fear, this Platform.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb takes strong issue with a set of hypothetical scenarios that NYU professor Jonathan Haidt presents in his book, published earlier in 2012, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. While focusing on these moral dilemmas insofar as they affect humans, Colb argues, Haidt exposes his own blind spot with respect to the morality of eating animals. Colb then offers her own, fresh set of hypothetical moral dilemmas, in order to illustrate her contention that Haidt has not isolated all the pertinent questions and issues that his own moral hypotheticals raise. Even while considering the less significant issue of humans doing harmless but disgusting things to animals who are already dead, Colb notes, Haidt fails to consider the much more important issue of humans killing animals.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses two recent cases of workplace harassment, one at a New York Assemblyman’s office, and another at a Chrysler factory. She focuses, especially, on why, in both cases, the harassment was allowed to continue for significant periods of time, despite the fact that the relevant decisionmakers knew about it. Grossman also raises the related question of why the prospect of even whopping punitive damages awards did not seem to make a difference in these two cases, with the harassers still being allowed to continue their bad behavior, even in the face of potentially massive legal sanctions. She also discusses the lessons that other employers should learn, from these cases, so that they, too, do not go astray, and then have to pay handsomely in court.
Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar considers whether one common justification for affirmative action in education—to allow white (and other) students to have a more diverse educational experience—is improperly using, instrumentalizing, and commodifying minority students. The challenge to this justification, Amar notes, has lately been the subject of academic commentary. Amar discusses the Supreme Court’s seminal Bakke case, which concerned affirmative action; the later Supreme Court Grutter and Gratz affirmative action decisions; and the upcoming Fisher case on the same topic. In addition, Amar explains three reasons why he isn't as concerned about the instrumentalization/commodification issue in affirmative action as some other law professors are.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan takes strong issue with Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Paul Ryan’s reputation for being a “serious thinker.” Like Newt Gingrich before him, Buchanan contends, Ryan is being falsely sold to the public as an “idea guy,” when, in truth, he says, Ryan is simply repeating conservative cant. Ryan’s undeserved reputation, Buchanan argues, derives in part from moderates and liberals in the D.C. commentariat who are playing along with the Ryan myth, and in part from the reality that only conservatives play what Buchanan calls “the ideology game.” Buchanan predicts, accordingly, that Ryan—like Gingrich before him—will eventually prove to disappoint even those who once showered him with praise.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry discusses the problem of jurors’ using social media to research—or even communicate with others about—the trials on which they serve. Ramasastry offers statistics and examples regarding the nature and frequency of the problem of juror social-media use, and discusses the new model jury instructions addressing this issue. She also covers some egregious instances of jury misconduct in this area, and considers whether instituting a new rule of peer policing by jurors, of other jurors’ social-media use, will turn out to be a good idea in the end. In particular, Ramasastry expresses considerable concern about the propriety of judges’ mandating peer-to-peer juror policing regarding social-media use, and thus potentially altering natural jury dynamics.
Congressman and Senate candidate Todd Akin’s comments about “legitimate rape,” in which he claimed that a woman who is raped is especially unlikely to get pregnant, are now notorious for being both offensive and factually wrong. In this column, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf contends that—in addition to being highly inaccurate and offending many—Akin’s comments have also harmed the pro-life movement’s ability to present itself as pro-woman. Dorf notes that Akin’s “legitimate rape” phrase harkens back to old stereotypes claiming that women often made false rape claims, when we now know that is untrue. Ultimately, Dorf suggests, Akin’s comments may well have the greatest significance for the abortion debate, and Dorf explains why—examining the pro-life claim that women experience “abortion regret syndrome,” and considering whether the pro-life movement can, or should, be deemed pro-women, given certain facts about the movement.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean comments on the the work of legal scholar Donald Langevoort, a professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, specializing in business organizations and securities regulation, who uses cognitive psychology in his work in order to explain why attorneys at times have ethical lapses. Dean comments on various interesting aspects of Langevoort’s work, such as his explanation as to how lawyers can fail to see a problem that should have been obvious to them, and his work regarding the organizational and psychological factors that may influence lawyers’ perception and judgment. Dean also discusses a list of certain cognitive biases to which lawyers may fall prey.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton comments on Romney running mate Paul Ryan—focusing on Ryan’s influences, such as Ayn Rand and the Catholic Church, and on his views, some of which, she suggests, parallel those of Ronald Reagan. She notes, though, that despite these influences, Ryan is also more than capable of thinking for himself—as he’s been involved in disagreements with the Church, as well. Hamilton praises Ryan’s small-government, balanced-budget views, and compliments him for being smart and well-read, but she also suggests that he is foolish to make his own religious beliefs part of the Romney/Ryan campaign, in light of America’s striking religious diversity.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a fair-use case that one judge on the Ninth Circuit panel compared to a telenovela. When a thief stole wedding and wedding-night photos from two Latin American celebrities that revealed that they were secretly married, and had been for several years, a gossip magazine published the photos. The two celebrities then registered their copyrights in the photos, and went to court to enforce them. The magazine, however, mounted a “fair use” defense, in order to try to avoid liability. Hilden describes and comments on the Ninth Circuit decision in the case, which sparked a dissent. Going through the four key fair-use factors one by one, the majority opinion suggests that the magazine has a steep uphill battle in proving fair use, as Hilden notes. Hilden also takes issue with the panel majority’s view that only “pictorial” photographs and those “factual” photographs that depict events should be protected, in this context. She argues that, to the contrary, even mechanical photo-booth photos ought to be protected in such situations.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses an interesting legal issue: If a person enters into a civil union with one person, and then later enters into a marriage with another, is he or she guilty of bigamy? The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said yes, ruling that for this purpose, a civil union is tantamount to a marriage. Grossman sets out the background regarding the advent of civil unions in a number of states, and then explores the bigamy issue. She also notes that because the civil union is still a relatively a novel legal status, unforeseen problems have sprung up, such as the difficulty of getting courts to dissolve such unions—which has led some couples to be stuck in unhappy civil unions without recourse, and thus to simply walk away, with no legal termination of the union. When a member of such a couple then sought to marry, Grossman notes, the bigamy issue posed another thorny legal conundrum for the courts. To make things even more complicated, too, Grossman observes, some states do not recognize other states’ civil unions, and others do.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. As Dorf explains, the decision upheld a provision of a South Dakota law mandating that women seeking an abortion be informed that, with the abortion procedure, comes “an increased risk of suicidal ideation and suicide.” Although the medical literature shows only a correlation, and not a causal relationship, between abortion and suicide, and although that correlation likely stems entirely from some of the underlying factors that lead women to seek abortions in the first place, the Eighth Circuit still upheld the law at issue. Although the Eighth Circuit’s decision was quite plainly the wrong one, Dorf notes, he also predicts that it’s very unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will take the case. He then explains why the Court is likely to decline review and why, if it does grant review, it might uphold the law, even though it ought to be struck down.
Justia columnist Vikram Amar and Justia guest columnist Alan Brownstein, both U.C., Davis law professors, discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez. As they explain, the case concerned the Stolen Valor Act, which imposes criminal penalties on those who falsely claimed to have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor or another medal granted by the United States. The Court had to decide whether the Act violated the First Amendment. Amar and Brownstein offer a subtle analysis of the various doctrinal moves that were made, in the case, by the Justices who joined the plurality opinion, the concurrence, and the dissent in the case, respectively. They focus especially on a search for a limiting principle that goes just far enough, but not too far, in the case, and target their analysis especially toward law professors who seek to teach the case, and students who seek to better understand it.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on VP candidate Paul Ryan’s record. Buchanan argues that, while Ryan is being presented as a numbers maven, in fact Ryan is merely an ideologue with no experience in economics or in budgeting. Buchanan also argues that Romney would have been far wiser to opt for a running mate without so many positions that Romney now must repudiate. Buchanan charges that Ryan, rather than “running the numbers” simply makes them up—as, for example, Ezra Klein’s recent analysis, regarding Ryan’s long-term budget projections, shows. Buchanan also charges that Ryan uses mere assumptions—and unrealistic ones—when facts are needed, as with Ryan’s tax plan. Disagreeing even with Romney’s own economic advisers, Ryan, Buchanan notes, offers ideas and plans that any competent economist would reject. Although the media loves a debate, Buchanan urges them to admit that in this instance, only one side is on track, whereas Ryan is grievously off-base.
In Part Two of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her analysis of two controversial rulings issued at the end of June and the beginning of July, respectively, by two panels of a New York State appeals court (the Appellate Division, First Department). Each ruling concluded that police had violated a suspect’s state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that as a result, the trial judges should have “suppressed” the weapons found on the suspects—that is, held that the weapons could not be introduced against the suspects if and when they became defendants at a criminal trial. Colb explains the logic behind the rulings, which is related to New York’s “Stop and Frisk” laws. She also contrasts New York and federal law in this area, and contends that the differences between them may have contributed to the New York controversy.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on instances of usage-based insurance (UBI), and warns of the risk of using this kind of technology until and unless it is carefully regulated. UBI programs use up-to-the-minute data on drivers, and safe drivers get discounts as a result, but UBI systems may also raise privacy concerns. Ramasastry focuses especially on Progressive Insurance’s “Snapshot” program, which showed that actual driving behavior is the best predictor of all of driver risk. Ramasastry suggests that UBI programs need to be closely regulated in order to ensure that the information they glean about drivers is not put to other uses, to which drivers did not specifically and carefully consent. While Progressive itself does not use GPS, but instead depends on other driving-related information, Ramasastry notes that other companies may well require GPS tracking in the future, or may offer it in exchange for lower rates.