Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, discusses what happens now, after Senate Republicans voted to acquit President Trump. Falvy predicts that (1) President Trump will be emboldened to commit further abuses of power, (2) future presidents will be less constrained by fear of impeachment, and (3) impeachment may become more routine as political practice and significantly less effective as a constitutional remedy.
UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan considers whether there is anything Senate Republicans might have done, instead of outright acquitting President Trump, to maintain the role of Congress as a coequal branch with the Executive. Buchanan proposes that under the text of the impeachment clauses, those Republican senators could have voted for removal—the necessary result of finding wrongdoing—but permitted Trump to run again in the election later this year.
Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker discuss Harvard Law professor Alan Dershowitz’s explanation of why he stands (virtually) alone in his views on impeachment—that all the scholars who disagree with him are biased partisans. Amar and Caminker explain why this claim is so insidious, with effects lasting well beyond the span of the current presidency.
Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that abuse of power is a sufficient ground for presidential impeachment, notwithstanding the argument to the contrary by President Trump’s impeachment defense lawyer, Alan Dershowitz. Hamilton explains that abuse of power by the President was the very fear of the Framers of the Constitution, and to reject it as an impeachable offense would subvert the spirit of the Constitution, as evidenced by the Framers’ debates at the Constitutional Convention.
Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone evaluate the suggestion made by some that the votes of senators on President Trump’s impeachment can and should be private. Amar and Mazzone argue that while the text of the Constitution alone does not foreclose secrecy, structural, prudential, and logistical considerations strongly disfavor a secret vote on the matter.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 3L Christopher S. Owens discuss the unique situation of the impeachment of a U.S. President for conduct not alleged to be a crime. Looking to both text and history, Estreicher and Owens argue that commission of a particular, defined crime should be necessary for presidential impeachment for the preservation of the legitimacy and original purpose of that political device, particularly in polarized times such as these.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar considers whether a President who has been impeached and acquitted may, if reelected, be retried by a subsequent Senate. Amar acknowledges that it is unclear whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ criminal procedural protections apply to impeachment proceedings, but he offers two key reasons that re-litigation of impeachment allegations after presidential reelection would be improper.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 3L Christopher S. Owens analyze, based on the facts presently known to the public, whether President Trump committed the federal crime of battery. After describing the elements required for the offense of bribery, Estreicher and Owens conclude that Trump’s conduct would support a finding of an exchange of official acts (by Trump) for things of value (the public statement sought from Zelensky), as well as the corrupt intent necessary to maintain a bribery charge.
Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, explains why former National Security Advisor John Bolton may hold the key to what happens with the impeachment proceedings of President Trump. Falvy describes Bolton’s background and shows why he may play such a critical and unique role in what happens to the President.
University of Florida Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that Democrats should draft broad articles of impeachment. As Buchanan points out, if the Democrats do not lay out the full case against Trump, everything that is left out will have been validated and will become a precedent for future misdeeds by this or any other President.
Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, discusses the private testimony of U.S. diplomat Bill Taylor regarding President Trump’s interactions with Ukraine. Falvy argues that by meticulously tracking his digital and verbal conservations with other high-level players, Taylor is forcing the implicated officials to engage at a similar level of detail and precluding them from asserting blanket “I do not recall” defenses.
Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that the present allegations against President Trump require representatives and senators to act in the interest of the voters and seek the truth. Hamilton explains that the checks and balances our Constitution’s framers put in place were designed for this very type of situation, and the power to impeach serves a vital role of protecting the people.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf explains why U.S. Supreme Court cases—confusingly, Nixon v. United States and United States v. Nixon—together should foreclose any legal arguments that might have supported President Trump’s strategy to fight impeachment. Dorf explains each of the precedents and their bearing on today’s situation.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on President Trump’s recent tweet suggesting that if the Democrats were to try to impeach him, he would ask the Supreme Court to block the impeachment. Amar argues that while critics of that assertion are correct, the legal matter is more complicated than might appear at first blush.