Touro Law professor Rodger D. Citron examines five different aspects of presidential pardon power in the context of recent actions by Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump, including traditional uses (family pardons, crony pardons, and criminal justice policy) as well as two novel developments: Trump’s campaign-related pardons for January 6 defendants and Biden’s preemptive pardons to protect individuals from potential political retribution. Professor Citron argues that Trump’s use of pardons as campaign promises and Biden’s responsive use of preemptive pardons represent significant departures from historical norms, highlighting how the pardon power has become increasingly weaponized in contemporary politics.
Amherst professor Austin Sarat discusses President Joe Biden’s issuance of preemptive pardons to various public figures including January 6 Committee members, General Mark Milley, and Dr. Anthony Fauci in anticipation of potential persecution under Donald Trump’s incoming administration. Professor Sarat argues that while these pardons are unprecedented in being used as protection against a successor president, they are legally sound and represent a justified response to genuine threats of political persecution rather than, as some critics suggest, an undermining of democratic norms.
University of Chicago Law School professor emeritus Albert W. Alschuler examines President Joe Biden’s pardon of his son Hunter Biden, analyzing three aspects of the pardon: preventing future prosecution, setting aside convictions, and eliminating potential prison sentences. Professor Alschuler argues that while blocking future prosecution was justified given the threat of political persecution, and limiting Hunter’s sentence could be defended despite breaking a promise, completely erasing his convictions was unjustifiable.
UF Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan explains why it is not only possible and necessary to reform the president’s constitutional pardon power, but why doing so should be a high priority. Professor Buchanan argues that preventing future abuses of the pardon is critical to preventing its use as a tool of autocracy.
UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that the President’s pardon power is not absolute or unreviewable, despite what many have suggested. Professor Buchanan observes that this conventional misreading of the clause is agrammatical because it treats an ambiguous provision as if it were unambiguous, and he points out that even self-styled textualists do not construct comparable provisions of the Constitution so absolutely.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb describes the assumptions inherent in the executive pardon power and explains why the purpose of the presidential pardon forecloses the possibility of a self-pardon. Colb argues that the only person who would dare to try to grant a self-pardon—one who lacks empathy—is the very one who should not be exercising the pardon power at all.
Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—describes how President Trump’s pardons reveal his “superficial and distorted” understanding of American values. Professor Sarat points out that for someone who claims to value the clemency power, President Trump has granted clemency fewer times than any President since William McKinley, who served from 1897 to 1901, and when Trump has granted clemency, he has used it to reward people whose crimes show their contempt for the rule of law.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that if President Trump were to pardon himself, that action itself would not cause a constitutional crisis, but other actions Trump has already taken have already placed us far along a road to a constitutional crisis. Dorf defines a constitutional crisis in terms of three types first articulated by Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin in a 2009 law review article, and Dorf proposes a fourth type characterized by defiance of unwritten norms that are not themselves legal obligations but that undergird the constitutional system as a whole.
