Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the observed phenomenon of mental health clinicians’ empathy varying with the cause of the patient’s disorder, and compares this occurrence with juror empathy.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the differences between the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment with respect to the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” in the context of the recent Sony hack and widescale publication of the private data exposed by the cyber-attack.
Chapman University law professor Ronald Rotunda discusses the problems with eyewitness identification, as illustrated recently by the tragedy in Ferguson, Missouri.
Guest columnist and Cornell University visiting professor of law Joseph Margulies continues his discussion of the American criminal justice system and describes basic principles upon which we could build superior alternatives to the present system.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf comments on the scope and limits of prosecutorial discretion, as it relates both to President Obama’s executive action on immigration and the Michael Brown case.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted review to decide whether a Los Angeles municipal code violates the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Colb argues that, much like general warrants of old, the provision in question empowers police to perform unreasonable searches in blatant violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a case the U.S. Supreme Court will decide this Term regarding the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Colb argues that the Court may properly see fit to revisit its current approach to hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb considers whether a person should have a right to self-representation in criminal proceedings. Colb describes a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the issue and discusses why such a right might be valuable.
In light of recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf weighs the benefits and costs of equipping police officers with wearable cameras to record encounters with citizens. Dorf concludes that while there are some risks inherent in the practice, it would be a good first step toward reducing the frequency of tragedies resulting from police–citizen confrontations.
Guest columnist Courtney Minick comments on a recent decision by a federal district court judge striking down California’s death penalty. Minick describes the court’s reasoning and considers its possible implications.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Riley v. California, in which the Court nearly unanimously held that police may not examine the digital contents of an arrestee’s cell phone as part of a search incident to arrest. Colb describes the facts behind the two cases consolidated for the Court’s review, explains the precedents the Court relied upon in reaching its decision, and praises the Court for decisively embracing Fourth Amendment protection for digital privacy.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating Florida’s approach to identifying criminal convicts who are intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. Colb describes the facts and issues that brought the case before the Court and infers from the opinion that the Court may have a growing consciousness about those sentenced to death. Acknowledging also the strong arguments presented by the dissent, Colb concludes that essential difference between the majority and the dissent is a disagreement as to what is worse: to execute the wrong person to spare the wrong person from execution.
Guest columnist and University of South Carolina law professor Seth Stoughton comments on the shifting marijuana laws throughout the United States and the implications for Fourth Amendment doctrine. Stoughton explains how marijuana laws in the United States have changed over time describes the resulting doctrinal uncertainty. He focuses specifically on the Fourth Amendment’s “automobile exception” in cases involving marijuana calls for legislatures and judges to clarify how police practices should be updated.
In the second of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her discussion of a Fourth Amendment case before the U.S. Supreme Court, Heien v. North Carolina. She explains the history and trajectory of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule and predicts that the Court will apply that exception in this case. However, Colb suggests that even doing so might still narrow the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections as effectively as would deciding the case directly on the substance of the Fourth Amendment.
In the first of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses a Fourth Amendment case in which the U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split. In that case, Heien v. North Carolina, the Court is considering whether the Fourth Amendment protects against stops by a police officer who acts on the basis of a reasonable but erroneous interpretation of state law. Colb reviews the facts of Heien, explains what “reasonable seizures” are under the Fourth Amendment, and describes the differences between legal and factual errors. The second column, which will appear on Verdict on May 5, will address the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule and the impact of a ruling on the basis of good faith.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the United States Supreme Court decision in Fernandez v. California, upholding the search of a co-occupied apartment upon the consent of just one of the residents. Colb notes that the case offers a refinement on an earlier decision that had invalidated a search to which one occupant consented, while the second occupant simultaneously objected.
Justia columnist and Cornell Law professor Michael Dorf discusses an upcoming U.S. Supreme Court case addressing how to determine whether a criminal defendant is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty. Dorf explains the potentially far-reaching implications of the case, Hall v. Florida, and cautions that a ruling for Florida could undermine the uniformity of federal constitutional law.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the logic of the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception to the Confrontation Clause and considers whether the distinction between its proper application and its application in the case on which Colb focuses holds up to critical analysis.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf argues that what the late Justice Harry Blackmun famously called “the machinery of death” still remains deeply flawed. Dorf illustrates his point through two recent, controversial executions that illustrate how the practice of capital punishment continues to defy attempts to civilize it, and suggests that the responsibility is to be placed at the Court's door.
Justia guest columnist and Northwestern law professor Joseph Margulies explains why American criminal justice appears to be coming out of its prior, punitive turn in criminal justice. With even the Attorney General acknowledging that our criminal justice system is, in many ways, broken, Margulies suggests strong evidence that the punitive turn is waning, and may well be superseded with new and better approaches to criminal justice.