Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses an often overlooked procedural aspect related to Texas’s extreme anti-abortion law that could result in “zombie” laws taking effect in every other red state. Professor Dorf argues that there are several reasons to hope that a state scheme to retroactively enforce zombie abortion laws would fail, even if the Supreme Court curtails or eliminates the abortion right itself, not the least of which is that retroactive application of zombie laws is fundamentally unfair.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a blatantly unconstitutional Texas anti-abortion law that the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined to enjoin, pointing out the unusual structure of the legislation and the hypocrisy of “conservatives” who support it. Noting from the outset that the so-called heartbeat to which the legislation refers is not from an actual heart, but pulsing, undifferentiated cells, Professor Colb highlights the hypocrisy of so-called conservatives who favor insulating most civil defendants from suit while inviting nearly anyone to sue for “aiding and abetting” performance of an abortion.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone analyze some of the issues presented by a new Texas anti-abortion statute that is to be enforced entirely by private plaintiffs. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone explore the unusual characteristics of the law and describe some approaches opponents might take—and indeed Whole Woman’s Health (WWH) has already filed a lawsuit in federal court that seems to follow an approach the authors describe.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether and how the U.S. Supreme Court next term might eliminate or substantially curtail the constitutional right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade. Professor Dorf describes the jurisprudence after that decision and argues that a decision that upholds the Mississippi law while purporting to forestall deciding the ultimate fate of Roe would be brazenly dishonest—albeit somewhat more likely than a clear overruling of Roe.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb responds to an observation made by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence in his concurring opinion in Jones v. Mississippi, noting an ostensible inconsistency in the language liberals use in discussing incarceration, as compared to pregnancy. Professor Colb acknowledges the face value of Justice Thomas’s point—that liberals refer to minors seeking an abortion as “women” and minors facing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) as “children”—but she points out that the difference in terminology reflects a consistent view that minors are not fully developed and should not be forced to do irreversible “adult” things like carry a pregnancy to term or serve a mandatory LWOP sentence.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a “father knows best” bill that the Tennessee state legislature is currently considering, which would allow the father of a pregnancy to obtain an injunction against the mother’s having an abortion. Professor Colb notes that while requiring consent of the pregnancy’s father might make intuitive sense and most abortion decisions do include the father, she points out that “father knows best” (and father notification) laws disregard the interests of the embryo/fetus (by giving a father a say in whether to proceed with an abortion) and redistribute control of reproduction from women to men. Professor Colb argues that for these reasons, the Tennessee bill is even more objectionable than an outright ban on the procedure would have been.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on an executive order the Biden administration issued last week revoking the so-called Mexico City policy, which provided that foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who received U.S. international family planning assistance could not offer abortion services, even if the services were funded with non-U.S. money. Grossman hails the decision as a good start but argues that more is needed to meaningfully undo the harmful policies of the Trump administration because of its implementation of a “domestic gag rule” in addition to the global one.
In light of recent news that Pfizer and Moderna have apparently created safe and effective vaccines against COVID-19, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether the government can mandate vaccination for people who lack a valid medical reason not to get vaccinated. Dorf briefly addresses issues of federalism and religious objections to vaccination and then addresses the question whether mandatory vaccination might be inconsistent with a right to abortion.
In honor of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, University of Pennsylvania professor Marci A. Hamilton and former clerk to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, reflects on our country’s first two female Supreme Court Justices and their similarities and differences. Hamilton points out that a majority of Americans support a woman’s right to choose abortion in at least some circumstances and the right to contraception and warns the President and the Senate to think long and hard before they replace Ginsburg on the fly with a someone who is a threat to abortion and contraception.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman debunks a tweet by Texas Senator Ted Cruz about childbirth and abortion. Grossman describes how, contrary to Cruz’s claims, pregnancy is dangerous, Mifeprex has only minor potential side effects, and the risk of dying from childbirth is many times greater than the risk of dying from an abortion.
University of Pennsylvania professor Marci A. Hamilton draws upon a strategy used by anti-abortion advocates in suggesting a way to encourage (or coerce) more people into wearing masks to avoid the spread of COVID-19. Hamilton proposes requiring persons who opt not to wear a mask in public (1) to watch, on a large screen, an adult's beating heart for 30 seconds, and (2) to be read a statement about how their decision unreasonably endangers others.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in June Medical Services v. Russo, in which a 5-4 majority of the Court struck down a Louisiana law regulating abortion providers. Grossman describes the history of abortion decisions that got us to this place today and explains why the core right to seek a previability abortion without undue burden from the government remains intact.
Jareb Gleckel assesses what Chief Justice John Roberts’s concurrence in the June Medical decision might tell us about the future of abortion in the United States. Gleckel suggests that the concurrence suggests that the Chief Justice will not vote to overrule Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey but cautions that the test the Chief Justice embraces could provide a roadmap for anti-abortion states going forward.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the revelation that before she died, Norma McCorvey—the woman who was the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade and who had subsequently become a prominent spokesperson for overturning the decision—said she was never really pro-life after all. Using this example, Dorf explains why, in some ways, the individual plaintiff’s identity does not matter for the purpose of deciding an important legal issue, yet in other ways, the plaintiff’s underlying story can be very important for other reasons.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Florida State University law professor Mary Ziegler discuss the abortion bans implemented in several states in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Grossman and Ziegler explain why the bans are unconstitutional and comment on the connection between the legal challenges to those bans and the broader fight over abortion rights.
Joanna L. Grossman, SMU Dedman School of Law professor, and Lawrence M. Friedman, a Stanford Law professor, comment on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court last month upholding a provision of Illinois law that prescribed the disposition of fetal remains. Grossman and Friedman focus their discussion on Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion and his discussion of eugenics, which they argue is inapt and a distorted telling of history.
Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies addresses comments made in an op-ed by Atlanta District Attorney John Melvin that opponents of restrictive abortion laws are similar to Nazis or supporters of Jim Crow laws. Margulies explains why the comparison is not only intellectually and morally bankrupt, but also shameful, deserving of the most direct condemnation.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb describes some ideological inconsistencies with the abortion law recently passed in Alabama, which prohibits all abortions except those necessary to protect against a serious health risk to the pregnant woman. Colb points out if an embryo or fetus and the woman carrying it are equally entitled to exist, then the exception for the serious health risk to the woman is inconsistent with that perceived equality. Colb also argues that the decision of Alabama lawmakers to penalize the abortion provider but not the abortion seeker similarly requires accepting on some level that a woman and her embryo or fetus are not co-equal occupants, which is inconsistent with the pro-life vision behind Alabama’s law.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the recent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court recognizing a state constitutional right to abortion. Grossman explains the historical backdrop of the dispute and describes the reasoning behind the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a bill under consideration by the Texas legislature that would require appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent an unborn child during a judicial bypass proceeding for an abortion for a pregnant minor. Grossman describes the legal background and explains why the bill is both unconstitutional and unwise.