Samuel Estreicher, G. Roger King, and David S. Sherwyn examine the likely Supreme Court reversal of Humphrey’s Executor, which protects independent agencies from presidential removal, and they propose restructuring the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as a purely adjudicatory “Labor Court” to survive this constitutional challenge. The authors suggest converting the NLRB into a six-member tribunal (two Democrats, two Republicans, and two Independents) with only judicial functions, while transferring all executive and enforcement powers to the General Counsel who would remain removable at-will by the President, thereby preserving the agency's core functions while satisfying constitutional concerns about presidential control.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf examines the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Skrmetti upholding Tennessee’s SB1 law banning gender-affirming care for transgender minors. Professor Dorf analyzes the Court’s rejection of arguments that the law discriminates based on sex or transgender status and argues that while the Court’s opinion avoided overtly offensive rhetoric, it problematically sanitized anti-transgender legislation by treating it as legitimate medical regulation rather than acknowledging the discriminatory animus behind laws that explicitly aim to make minors “appreciate their sex” assigned at birth.

NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher examines how recent Supreme Court decisions expanding presidential removal power threaten the constitutional structure of the National Labor Relations Board, tracing the evolution from Humphrey’s Executor (which upheld independent agencies) through Morrison v. Olson, Free Enterprise Fund, and Seila Law. Professor Estreicher argues that while the NLRB’s current structure faces serious constitutional challenges under the Court’s “unitary executive” jurisprudence, the agency might survive either through judicial recognition that it does not exercise “substantial executive power” or through congressional restructuring to separate its adjudicatory functions from its enforcement powers.

Touro University, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center professor Rodger D. Citron examines the evolving relationship between President Donald Trump and the federal judiciary, particularly Chief Justice John Roberts, focusing on initial conflicts over executive orders and judicial authority followed by recent accommodation through Supreme Court emergency docket rulings. Professor Citron argues that while a temporary détente has emerged with the Supreme Court largely supporting Trump’s initiatives through emergency orders, this fragile peace masks an ongoing institutional challenge that could threaten the Court’s legitimacy if it fails to check executive overreach in future cases.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar and Illinois Law professor Jason Mazzone examine the constitutional principles governing federal-state relations in the context of recent immigration enforcement protests in Los Angeles, specifically addressing what states can and cannot do regarding federal immigration operations, and what powers the federal government retains. Professors Amar and Mazzone argue that while states cannot be compelled to assist federal immigration enforcement (following the anti-commandeering doctrine), they also cannot discriminate against or obstruct federal operations, and the President has inherent constitutional authority to deploy federal forces to protect federal personnel and property without requiring state permission.

Arbitrator and mediator Barry Winograd examines the Trump administration’s sweeping efforts during its second term to dismantle labor law protections and eliminate collective bargaining agreements for over a million federal employees, actions that have triggered multiple lawsuits by federal employee unions asserting constitutional and statutory violations. Mr. Winograd argues that these actions are not only legally flawed but also represent a retaliatory campaign against unions for exercising First Amendment rights, emphasizing the importance of judicial scrutiny and the potential critical role of the Supreme Court in upholding constitutional protections for public sector unions.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat discusses Tennessee’s new policy of imposing a two-week isolation period and a 12-hour communication blackout on death row inmates prior to execution, framing it within broader concerns about the harsh conditions of death row in the U.S. Professor Sarat argues that these practices are unnecessarily cruel, serve no legitimate purpose, and should be ended either by state action or judicial intervention.

Illinois Law professor Matthew W. Finkin draws a detailed historical comparison between Donald Trump’s 2025 actions as U.S. president and key elements of the Nazi regime’s early consolidation of power, highlighting parallels in civil service purges, governmental structure, legal subordination, and ideological control. Professor Finkin argues that Trump’s efforts to reshape American institutions through loyalty tests, executive overreach, and propaganda echo dangerous authoritarian patterns, raising concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the potential for a similar “seizure of power” unless checked by the judiciary and public resistance.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat explores the challenges and responsibilities of academic scholarship on the death penalty, particularly when such research offers nuanced or unpopular views within the abolitionist movement. Professor Sarat argues that scholars must pursue truthful and critical inquiry—even if it unsettles allies—because their ultimate contribution lies in illuminating the harsh realities of capital punishment, not in conforming to political or moral orthodoxy.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision to allow the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate efforts to end a parole program for migrants from four countries, focusing on legal standards for granting a stay and the broader constitutional and policy implications of executive immigration authority. Professor Amar argues that the federal government does indeed suffer irreparable harm when prevented from enforcing duly enacted laws and policies, and criticizes Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissent for undervaluing these harms and overlooking legal precedent and practical consequences.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat critiques Vice President J.D. Vance’s recent comments dismissing the judiciary’s role in checking executive power, situating the discussion within the broader context of constitutional law education at Yale Law School. Professor Sarat argues that Vance’s remarks reflect not legal ignorance but a deliberate rejection of established constitutional principles, particularly judicial oversight, in favor of a nationalist ideology concerned with limiting immigration based on cultural and racial preferences.