Verdict

Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on some lessons we should learn from the cases of two people scheduled to be executed today, July 20, 2023. Professor Sarat points out that the two cases—James Barber and Jemaine Cannon—demonstrate, respectively, that we are not executing “the worst of the worst” and that the execution methods we use are unreliable at best.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf considers the implications of ChatGPT and other generative AI tools in law schools. Professor Dorf observes that for now, smart, well-motivated students will outperform AI in most tasks required of law students, but legal educators will soon have to grapple with the reality that banning AI-based tools will make less and less sense as they become more mainstream various ways in legal practice.

In this second in a series of columns discussing the U.S. transfer of cluster munitions to Ukraine, Illinois Law professor Lesley M. Wexler discusses the domestic issues for the United States and international law issues for Cluster Ban Treaty members. Professor Wexler also addresses arguments about Ukraine losing the moral high ground and weakening the alliance.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on recent comments by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh describing the Justices as respectful and restrained in their criticism of each other, despite written evidence in their opinions to the contrary. Professor Sarat points out the mocking and sometimes disparaging language that some Justices have used in discussing opposing views in the contentious cases of late.

In this three-part series of columns, Illinois Law professor Lesley M. Wexler comments on the recent news that the Biden administration will be providing cluster munitions to Ukraine. In this Part I, Professor Wexler explains what cluster munitions are, why the Biden administration decided to give them to Ukraine, the potential impact on civilian populations, and the international law issues the United States and Ukraine face as a result.

Touro Law professor Laura Dooley comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dupree v. Younger, which held that there is no procedural requirement that a litigant who lost a “purely legal” issue at the summary judgment stage file a post-trial Rule 50 motion to preserve that issue for appeal. Professor Dooley points out that while the procedural issue raised in Dupree is ostensibly technical, it implicates numerous policy and strategy matters at the core of civil litigation in federal courts.

Arbitrator and mediator Barry Winograd comments on the recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coinbase v. Bielski, in which the Court held that a litigation stay is required when an interlocutory appeal permitted by Section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act is taken from a federal district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration. Mr. Winograd summarizes the Coinbase decision, shares several thoughts about its reasoning, and considers the decision’s potential effects on arbitration practice.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat points out the hypocrisy of the Supreme Court in proclaiming the Constitution to be “colorblind” with respect to college admissions but turning a blind eye to blatant discrimination in the case of a Black man sentenced to death in Mississippi. Professor Sarat describes the facts of Clark v. Mississippi and argues that by refusing to act, the Supreme Court tacitly condones Mississippi’s blatant flaunting of the Court’s precedent.

Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut highlights two points about the federal district court’s July 4 decision blocking the Biden administration from communicating with social media companies—points which, Mr. Aftergut argues, underscore the decision’s risk of sowing great mistrust in law. Mr. Aftergut contrasts the apparent “judge shopping” that put the case before a Trump-appointed judge with the even-handed approach of Special Counsel Jack Smith, and he points out the opinion’s glaring omission of an especially relevant precedent.

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, history professor emeritus Frederick E. Hoxie reflects on the juxtaposition of the American Independence Day holiday and the prior week’s handful of Supreme Court decisions that usurp the ideal of self-government. Professor Hoxie argues that only by accepting one another and embracing our task as members of a lively democracy can we adopt effective rules for ourselves.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Harper, in which the Court forcefully repudiated the essence of the so-called “Independent State Legislature” (ISL) theory. Dean Amar describes the apparent evolution of several Justices’ views on ISL theory and explains how that evolution led to the Court’s sound rejection of the theory.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf contrasts the present Supreme Court with the one Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel praised in a Harvard Law Review article in 1961. Unlike the Court Bickel described, which manipulated its docket to strategically avoid difficult and divisive issues, Professor Dorf argues that the present Court manipulates its docket to decide those issues—and often without full briefing or oral argument.

In the spirit of American Independence Day, Amherst professor Austin Sarat suggests that we not only celebrate America’s ideals but also reflect on its failings—failings that include its continued use of capital punishment. Professor Sarat reiterates the problems with capital punishment, such as the ineffective and inhumane methods of execution, racial inequities, time on death row, and the fact that most of those we execute are victims of extensive abuse and neglect from childhood or earlier.

Illinois Law professors Lesley Wexler and Jennifer Robbennolt comment on the recent decision by a judge declining to require an apology from the lawyers who submitted a brief with fictitious cases generated by ChatGPT. Professors Wexler and Robbennolt explain why the judge’s reasoning that “a compelled apology is not a sincere apology” assumes that a compelled apology has no value and fails to consider the other purposes apologies serve, such as acknowledgment to victims and affirmation of violated norms.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone comment on another free-speech controversy related to a student-invited speaker at the University of Pittsburgh. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone describe the demand letter sent to Pitt officials by the Alliance Defending Freedom and explain why some of their arguments are on solid legal ground while one is tenuous at best.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on the most recent off-the-Court behavior by Justice Samuel Alito: preemptively responding to a ProPublica report that the Justice had gone on a $100,000 trip paid for by Republican mega-donor Paul Singer. Professor Sarat argues that this behavior is just the latest demonstration of Alito’s “grievance conservatism” and has no place on the highest court in the land.

University of Chicago law professor emeritus Albert W. Alschuler comments on the split between the Third and Eighth Circuits on the question whether some convicted felons have a constitutional right to bear arms. Professor Alschuler describes the two courts’ decisions, as well as the contradictory language from the U.S. Supreme Court, and suggests that the Court is likely to resolve the question in the coming Term.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone comment on a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit involving the admissions policy at a school in Virginia. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone argue that while it’s not clear whether the U.S. Supreme Court will review this case, the issue the case raises is likely to be one the Court takes up soon.

Former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut comments on the “speaking indictment” of Donald Trump and what it means. Mr. Aftergut argues that the indictment illustrates the principle no one is above the law.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the so-called “unitary executive theory” and explains why it seems to form the basis for the extreme positions of conservative Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Professor Dorf argues that the conservative Justices may prefer to pursue their ideological goal of undercutting regulation via the dubious unitary executive theory rather than originalism, further undercutting the administrative state.