Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a statement by Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by Justice Samuel Alito) gratuitously expressing his hostility to the Court’s same-sex marriage decision in Obergefell v. Hodges and his sympathy for Kim Davis, a county clerk in Kentucky who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples even after the Supreme Court’s decision. Although Justice Thomas characterizes Davis and those like her as people who “refus[e] to alter their religious beliefs in the wake of prevailing orthodoxy,” Dorf points out that no one asked Davis to alter her religious beliefs. Rather, the lawsuit against her contends that she must provide services to the public in accordance with their constitutional rights, whatever her religious beliefs.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers the significance in policing “original” meanings of words, such as “meat” and “marriage.” She point out that in both contexts, arguments over the meaning of the word are rooted in strong feelings about status and do not truly reflect a concern with a risk of confusion.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether, in protest of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the constitutional right to same-sex marriage, states can “get out of the marriage business” altogether. Dorf explains that abolishing marriage for everyone likely poses no equal protection issues, and points out some interesting and unique characteristics about marriage as a fundamental right.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a recent decision by the Arizona Supreme Court that correctly applies the US Supreme Court’s reasoning in Obergefell v. Hodges to hold that the marital presumption applies to same-sex couples just as it applies to opposite-sex couples. Grossman provides a brief legal history of same-sex marriage and the attendant obligations and benefits and praises the Arizona court for its clear and well reasoned opinion.
SMU Dedman School of Law professors Joanna L. Grossman and Dale Carpenter comment on a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court in which it refuses to give effect to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, which recognized a constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry. Grossman and Carpenter explain why the Texas court’s decision was clearly wrong and why factors other than merits might have (though they should not have) affected the ruling in that case.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent summary reversal of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s ruling that upheld that state’s attempt to avoid the marriage equality decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Grossman describes the ways in which some states, such as Arkansas in this case, have tried to avoid, subvert, or limit Obergefell’s holding, and she discusses the Supreme Court’s simple yet clear response, as well as the significance of Justice Gorsuch’s dissent from the per curiam opinion.
Hofstra University law professor Joanna Grossman discusses North Carolina’s recent passage of House Bill 2 (HB 2), which purports to take away existing anti-discrimination rights from LGBT people. Grossman explains why the law is unconstitutional and considers whether, in light of the law’s patent unconstitutionality, the law reflects even greater animus by those who passed it.
Hofstra University law professor Joanna Grossman discusses a decision by a New York trial court that illustrates the continuing confusion caused by the civil union, despite its obsolescence in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in favor of marriage equality. Grossman provides a brief history of the civil union and its demise and critiques the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the trial court in this case.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf highlights similarities and differences between the U.S. Supreme Court’s inaction during the Civil Rights Era and presently, with regard to the issue of same-sex marriage.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb differentiates state bans on incestuous marriages from bans on same-sex marriages by looking at the governmental interests the bans purportedly serve and the harm done to their targets. Colb argues that the U.S. Supreme Court can, if it wishes, use this distinction to strike down bans on same-sex marriages without also having to rule on bans on incestuous marriages.
Hofstra University law professor Joanna Grossman discusses a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upholding a lower court’s invalidation of a Utah ban on same-sex marriage. Grossman points out that while state same-sex marriage bans have been invalidated in sixteen different rulings across the country, this decision marks the first time a federal appeals court has so ruled.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses how the lower courts’ consistent rulings in favor of same-sex marriage might influence a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Dorf observes that every single judge to rule on the question has relied on the Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor for the conclusion that SSM bans are unconstitutional. He concludes that while the lower courts’ decisions have no binding effect on the Supreme Court, they might serve as a legal barometer of what is legally plausible and as conduits of public opinion.
Hofstra University law professor Joanna Grossman reflects on the progress of same-sex marriage in the United States over the past decade. She notes that on May 17, 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Grossman describes how the movement gained momentum and how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor contributed substantially to that rapid change. She observes that as of now, 19 states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex marriage, and that number is only going to increase.