Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Vannoy, in which it held that a prisoner may not invoke the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury as a basis for challenging his criminal conviction when filing a federal habeas corpus petition. Professor Colb explains why, if cost/benefit analysis played a role in determining retroactivity, the Court perhaps should have decided that case the other way.
NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and Hofstra Law professor Julian G. Ku comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nestlé v. Doe, in which the Court held that mere “corporate activity” within the United States is not enough to satisfy the general presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal law. Professor Estreicher and Ku point out that questions about the scope of future ATS claims or corporate liability may never be resolved if the vast majority of ATS claims are dismissed as a result of the Court’s reinvigorated extraterritoriality test.
Marci A. Hamilton, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and CEO of CHILD USA, discusses several decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court this past term that affect children’s rights: Fulton v. Philadelphia, addressing whether a religious social services agency can refuse to place children with same-sex couples; Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., addressing whether a teen could be punished for speech on Snapchat, off school grounds and addressed to her own audience; and NCAA v. Alston, addressing whether the NCAA can deny student-athletes education-related benefits while exploiting their athletic achievements. Professor Hamilton notes that two of these three benefit children, while Fulton, which focuses exclusively on the adults involved and not the children, leaves open the possibility that states can pass neutral laws to meaningfully value the needs of children.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, in which the Court upheld along ideological lines two Arizona voting laws, one of which restricted who could collect mail-in ballots and the other of which invalidated votes mistakenly cast in the wrong district. Professor Dorf argues that even if the bottom line in Brnovich is correct, the legal analysis and the Court’s broad acceptance of Republican talking points about voter fraud portend ill for the future of American democracy.
In honor of the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. United States, known as the “Pentagon Papers” case, Touro Law professor Rodger D. Citron describes the Pentagon Papers litigation and shows how the whirlwind pace contributed to the lack of consensus in the Court’s decision. Professor Citron draws upon books by James C. Goodale and David Rudenstine and reminds us of the challenges and complications attendant to a case that is celebrated by many today as, in the words of Adam Liptak, “a potent vindication of press freedom.”
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court this term holding that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) contains no statute of limitations for rape. Professor Colb argues that the Court stretched the language of the statute to reach a “desirable” decision, demonstrating that judges at all levels can interpret a statute to reach the result they want to reach.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and adjunct professor Zachary Fasman comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision earlier this week in NCAA v. Alston, in which the Court held that the NCAA’s attempt to limit compensation to student athletes to preserve their amateur status is subject to the normal rule of reason analysis applied in antitrust cases. Professors Estreicher and Fasman note that the effect of conflicting and competing state name, image and likeness (NIL) regulation on the consumer market—the market at the core of the Court’s analysis in Alston—remains to be seen.
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week rejecting a third legal challenge to the Affordable Care Act, Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether challengers could bring (and succeed on) a fourth. Professor Dorf explains why subsequent challenges are unlikely to succeed, pointing out that a nonexistent obligation (as the so-called individual mandate now is) cannot be unconstitutional.
UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin comments on the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, in which the Court held that Philadelphia’s refusal to contract with Catholic Social Services for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agreed to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Professor Griffin joins numerous Catholic leaders in urging Catholic believers—a majority of whom support allowing LGBTQ couples to adopt children, contrary to CSS’s position in this case—to tell their leaders to support all families, including gay families.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Caniglia v. Strom, holding that police may not enter a private home to perform a “community caretaking” function without having a search warrant. Professor Colb suggests that by recognizing limits on the authority of law enforcement officers to enter a home without a warrant in these circumstances, the Court may be implicitly adopting the message of “defunding the police” by reallocating a non-police function to better-suited responders, such as social workers or mental health experts.
Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar critiques Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s recent use of stare decisis doctrine and reliance interest in her dissenting opinion last term in Ramos v. Louisiana, and again this term in Edwards v. Vannoy. Dean Amar describes the reliance interest theory and explains why Justice Kagan’s reasoning is unusual and dubious.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether and how the U.S. Supreme Court next term might eliminate or substantially curtail the constitutional right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade. Professor Dorf describes the jurisprudence after that decision and argues that a decision that upholds the Mississippi law while purporting to forestall deciding the ultimate fate of Roe would be brazenly dishonest—albeit somewhat more likely than a clear overruling of Roe.
In this second of a series of columns, Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis Law professor emeritus Alan Brownstein continue their discussion of why the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) approach to the Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment is troubling on a number of levels. Dean Amar and Professor Brownstein point out that an MFN-style approach is virtually guaranteed to cause geographical inequality because it relies upon fortuitous secular analogues.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb responds to an observation made by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence in his concurring opinion in Jones v. Mississippi, noting an ostensible inconsistency in the language liberals use in discussing incarceration, as compared to pregnancy. Professor Colb acknowledges the face value of Justice Thomas’s point—that liberals refer to minors seeking an abortion as “women” and minors facing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) as “children”—but she points out that the difference in terminology reflects a consistent view that minors are not fully developed and should not be forced to do irreversible “adult” things like carry a pregnancy to term or serve a mandatory LWOP sentence.
In this first of a series of columns, Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and UC Davis Law professor emeritus Alan E. Brownstein discuss the U.S. Supreme Court’s apparent adoption of a “most favored nation” approach to protecting religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause. Dean Amar and Professor Brownstein describe some of the problems with this approach and point out that the reason religious exercise receives constitutional recognition and protection is not because the Constitution assigns some heightened value to religious belief and practices over secular interests, but because we do not want the state to interfere with religious choice and the autonomy of religious individuals to associate with a religion of their choice.
UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin and University of Pennsylvania professor Marci A. Hamilton describe how the current Supreme Court is furtively undermining neutral and general laws by embracing a so-called “most favored nation” theory. Professors Griffin and Hamilton explain that under this dangerous approach, otherwise neutral laws that might incidentally burden religious exercise (such as zoning laws or public health regulations) are constitutionally suspect if they create any exceptions for purportedly secular activities, and, they argue, this can result in legal discrimination and harms to groups including LGBTQ+ individuals, children, those with disabilities, and others.
NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and Hofstra Law professor Julian G. Ku comment on a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars claims based on Nazi-era expropriation of Jewish property. Professors Estreicher and Ku argue that the unanimous decision in that case, Germany v. Philipp reflects a now-solid trend of Roberts Court decisions limiting the reach of U.S. law and jurisdiction to stay within the territory of the United States while also avoiding controversial and unsettled interpretations of international law.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone argue that the U.S. Supreme Court correctly denied review last week of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions handed down before the 2020 election. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone explain why the majority denied review and point out that the dissenting opinions unwittingly demonstrate the rightness of the majority.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf describes the ostensibly complex legal issues presented in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., in which the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument earlier this week, and explains how those issues reflect an ideological divide as to other, more accessible matters. Professor Dorf argues that although many conservatives would like to dismantle the modern administrative state, our complex modern society all but requires these government agencies, so conservatives instead seek to make them politically accountable through a Senate-confirmed officer answerable to the president, furthering the so-called unitary-executive theory of Article II.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week to reject an emergency application from the State of Alabama to lift a stay on the execution of Willie B. Smith III. Professor Dorf observes the Court’s unusual alignment of votes in the decision and argues that, particularly as reflected by the recent COVID-19 decisions, the liberal and conservative Justices have essentially swapped places from the seminal 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, which established that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to exceptions from neutral laws of general applicability.