Amherst professor Austin Sarat expresses deep concern about the current U.S. Supreme Court’s potential effects on the country, arguing that the Court appears to be moving in a decisively conservative direction on issues like religious freedom, abortion, and affirmative action. Professor Sarat also raises questions about the ethics and legitimacy of the Court, citing public approval ratings and noting upcoming cases on racial gerrymandering, gun regulation, and administrative authority that could have significant societal consequences.

Touro University, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, professors Rodger D. Citron and Laura A. Dooley discuss the U.S. Supreme Court’s unexpectedly divided decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. case, which addressed whether a corporation can be sued in a state where it has registered to do business but is not a citizen. Professors Citron and Dooley argue that the case is notable for the alignment of ideologically diverse justices and its potential to significantly alter the landscape regarding where plaintiffs can sue corporations, shedding light on the current Court’s approach to originalism and federalism in the context of personal jurisdiction.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that while the recent departure of Stanford’s associate dean for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) is noteworthy, the broader issue is the legal status of diversity initiatives following the recent Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. Professor Dorf contends that despite the Court’s skepticism towards race-based affirmative action, DEI offices still have a legitimate role, albeit one that may need to adjust its approaches to promoting diversity and inclusion.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf responds to a recent Wall Street Journal “puff piece” on U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, arguing that, contrary to the op-ed authors’ assertion, Justice Alito’s purported commitment to textualism is disingenuous and that he finds ways (atextually, if needed) to vote consistently for ideologically conservative outcomes. Professor Dorf refutes Justice Alito’s claim that Congress lacks the authority to impose ethical standards on the Supreme Court, pointing out Congress’s historical role in shaping the Court and the existing ethics regulations that apply to the Justices.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat critiques U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas for his close relationships with conservative billionaires and the luxurious gifts and perks he’s received from them without proper disclosure, as recently reported by ProPublica. Drawing parallels to the case of Justice Abe Fortas, who resigned in the 1960s after a series of ethical missteps, Professor Sarat suggests that the current divisive political climate enables and even rewards ethically questionable behavior among leaders, as long as it aligns with tribal loyalties and partisan allegiances.

UC Davis Law professor Vikram David Amar comments on the Loper Bright case the U.S. Supreme Court will be hearing next term, which provides the opportunity for the Court to revisit (and potentially eliminate) the Chevron deference doctrine. Professor Amar points out and analyzes some of the constitutional issues raised by the doctrine.

Cornell professor Joseph Margulies comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 303 Creative v. Elenis, in which the Court ostensibly held that a Colorado public accommodations law was unconstitutional as applied to website designer Lorie Smith because it compelled her to create artistic content in violation of her religious beliefs. Professor Margulies argues that the decision has potentially far-reaching implications that could return us to the days of Jim Crow—all because the stipulated facts in that case seemed (to some Justices) to lead to an inescapable result.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on recent comments by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh describing the Justices as respectful and restrained in their criticism of each other, despite written evidence in their opinions to the contrary. Professor Sarat points out the mocking and sometimes disparaging language that some Justices have used in discussing opposing views in the contentious cases of late.

Touro Law professor Laura Dooley comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dupree v. Younger, which held that there is no procedural requirement that a litigant who lost a “purely legal” issue at the summary judgment stage file a post-trial Rule 50 motion to preserve that issue for appeal. Professor Dooley points out that while the procedural issue raised in Dupree is ostensibly technical, it implicates numerous policy and strategy matters at the core of civil litigation in federal courts.

Arbitrator and mediator Barry Winograd comments on the recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coinbase v. Bielski, in which the Court held that a litigation stay is required when an interlocutory appeal permitted by Section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act is taken from a federal district court order denying a motion to compel arbitration. Mr. Winograd summarizes the Coinbase decision, shares several thoughts about its reasoning, and considers the decision’s potential effects on arbitration practice.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat points out the hypocrisy of the Supreme Court in proclaiming the Constitution to be “colorblind” with respect to college admissions but turning a blind eye to blatant discrimination in the case of a Black man sentenced to death in Mississippi. Professor Sarat describes the facts of Clark v. Mississippi and argues that by refusing to act, the Supreme Court tacitly condones Mississippi’s blatant flaunting of the Court’s precedent.

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, history professor emeritus Frederick E. Hoxie reflects on the juxtaposition of the American Independence Day holiday and the prior week’s handful of Supreme Court decisions that usurp the ideal of self-government. Professor Hoxie argues that only by accepting one another and embracing our task as members of a lively democracy can we adopt effective rules for ourselves.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Harper, in which the Court forcefully repudiated the essence of the so-called “Independent State Legislature” (ISL) theory. Dean Amar describes the apparent evolution of several Justices’ views on ISL theory and explains how that evolution led to the Court’s sound rejection of the theory.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf contrasts the present Supreme Court with the one Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel praised in a Harvard Law Review article in 1961. Unlike the Court Bickel described, which manipulated its docket to strategically avoid difficult and divisive issues, Professor Dorf argues that the present Court manipulates its docket to decide those issues—and often without full briefing or oral argument.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Milligan, in which Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for a 5-4 majority of the Court, reaffirming a key precedent that allows Voting Rights Act (VRA) plaintiffs to sue to block legislative redistricting maps that have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Professor Dorf expresses optimism that this decision might signal that the Chief Justice and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the only Republican-appointed Justice who joined the majority, are not moving ideologically to the right as radically as their other colleagues on the Court.

Cornell Law Professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week in National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) v. Ross, in which the Court rejected a challenge by a pork industry trade group to a California law that bans in-state sale of pork unless the pigs were raised in accordance with certain minimum standards for “humane” treatment. Professor Dorf points out that it is unusual for the Supreme Court to acknowledge, as Justice Neil Gorsuch’s lead opinion does, animal welfare as a legitimate moral interest and expresses hope that the decision might pave the way to more substantial reforms of animal cruelty laws and changes in personal consumption choices.

Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar comments on the latest developments in Moore v. Harper, the pending Supreme Court case involving the “Independent State Legislature” (ISL) theory of Articles I and II of the Constitution. Dean Amar explains how we might interpret the Moore parties’ offer (and the Justices’ acceptance) of supplemental briefing on the effect of the ruling by the North Carolina Supreme Court last week and explores the significance of newly reported information about Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s apparent abandonment of ISL theory during the deliberations in the 2000 Bush v. Gore case.

Penn professor Marci Hamilton and UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin explain how six conservative Catholics were able to be on the U.S. Supreme Court at the same time. Professors Hamilton and Griffin describe how 1970s and 1980s laid the groundwork for today’s conservative Catholic Court and argue that this group is making extraordinary progress toward making the United States a Catholic theocracy.

Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar and Professor Jason Mazzone argue that, in light of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s “switcheroo” regarding partisan gerrymandering, the U.S. Supreme Court should immediately grant certiorari in Huffman v. Neiman to resolve the question of “Independent State Legislature (ISL) theory. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that the intense litigation pressure of today’s presidential elections and the shaky stature of the present Supreme Court together strongly support the Court acting quickly to resolve this pressing issue.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent Supreme Court oral argument in Counterman v. Colorado, which raises the question of what may constitute a “true threat,” which is outside the scope of First Amendment protection. Professor Dorf argues that, notwithstanding the present case about stalking, the Court’s rulings gutting the Voting Rights Act, greenlighting extreme political gerrymandering, and expanding the scope of the Second Amendment are the true threat to democracy.