Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar continues his discussion of why the “Independent State Legislature” theory is incorrect and counter to the original understanding of the Constitution. Dean Amar points to four key errors the Petitioners in Moore v. Harper make in their filings with the Supreme Court and argues that some of their omissions demonstrate just how non-originalist their theory really is.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar explains what Moore v. Harper, the case the U.S. Supreme Court will hear in December involving the so-called “Independent State Legislature” (ISL) theory, tells us about principled originalism. Specifically, Dean Amar argues that to embrace ISL theory would mean flouting George Washington, the first Congress, and the makers of all the early post-ratification state constitutions (to say nothing of the Americans who adopted the Constitution against the backdrop of the Articles of Confederation’s apparent meaning)—indeed the very antithesis of originalism.

Touro Law professors Laura Dooley and Rodger Citron discuss a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of a state statute authorizing the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over corporations registered to do business in the state. Professors Dooley and Citron argue that the Court will almost certainly declare the state statute violates the due process rights of the defendant corporation, and they explore why that outcome is such a foregone conclusion.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s self-professed originalists are acting in bad faith, knowing that professed originalism is no more than a rhetorical envelope they can stuff with their conservative policy views. Professor Dorf explains why the Court’s new test of “text, history, and tradition” is unjust, insincere, and destabilizing.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar rebuts an argument by Professor Will Baude and Michael McConnell regarding the so-called “Independent State Legislature” theory, which is being invoked by Republican elected legislators in North Carolina in a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. Dean Amar explains why the best understanding of the term “legislature” as used in Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution to describe logistics of federal election logistics is “lawmaking system,” rather than a specific entity or body of persons.

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the oral argument in National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) v. Ross, in which the U.S. Supreme Court is considering whether California’s Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Professor Dorf observes that based on their questioning, the Justices are concerned about the case’s implications for other types of regulations based on a state’s moral interests and may seek a procedural “out” to avoid deciding the difficult question.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone comment on recent comments by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan expressing reservations about doctrinal changes attributable to the arrival of new Justices. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone argue that new Justices have played an important and generally positive role in advancing the constitutional landscape.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf explains how Congress can (and argues that it should) protect affirmative action in private colleges and universities in light of the supermajority of the Supreme Court that seems hostile to affirmative action. Professor Dorf points out that even if his suggestion seems far-fetched in the current political climate, urgent calls for action now can effectively arm advocates to effect change when they are better positioned to do so in the future.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on Alabama’s recent aborted execution of Alan Miller. Professor Sarat describes how the U.S. Supreme Court allowed Miller’s execution to go forward despite a serious dispute about whether Miller submitted a form electing an execution method other than lethal injection.

Barry Winograd proposes a four-step plan to restore the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court, which is currently facing a serious public relations problem. Mr. Winograd calls upon the Court itself to act—rather than waiting for the Executive or the Legislative branch—by: (1) providing live and orderly audio transmission of oral arguments, (2) adopting an enforceable code of ethics binding on all Justices, (3) establishing consistent standards limiting use of the Court’s “shadow docket,” and (4) establishing term limits for the Justices.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court involving a challenge by the pork industry to a California law—Proposition 12—that was adopted by referendum in 2018. Professor Dorf explains why Supreme Court should uphold Prop 12 against the plaintiffs’ “dormant” Commerce Clause claims, and he considers the implications of that holding on state power to ban abortion pills from other states.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone respond to a recent column by New York Times columnist David Leonhardt, arguing that neither of the recent high-profile developments after the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision is an example of “defying” the Court or “checking” judicial power. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that while neither the abortion vote in Kansas nor the pending federal marriage-equality proposal may fairly be characterized as “defying” or “checking,” some political reactions to Supreme Court rulings in the past arguably have involved defiance or disobedience of the Court.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the possible significance of the Supreme Court’s decision to divide, rather than consolidate, argument in the affirmative action cases it will be deciding next term. Professor Dorf suggests the decision would allow Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson to participate in one of the cases and could also allow the Court to attend to at least two important factual and legal differences between the two cases.

Illinois Law professor Matthew Finkin comments on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana, pointing out several issues in the Court’s reasoning and conclusion as to the arbitration questions raised in that case. Professor Finkin argues that the decision incites three lines of inquiry—historical, empirical, and doctrinal—and then begs them, ultimately leaving more questions than it resolves.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that Justice Samuel Alito's majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization eliminating the constitutional right to abortion misused pro-choice scholars’ work in an attempt to justify overturning Roe Casey. Professor Dorf observes that by pointing readers to the body of work by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor John Hart Ely, and other pro-choice scholars, Justice Alito effectively calls attention to their robust defense of abortion rights as essential to sex equality and an account of how the current hyper-conservative Court’s rulings are profoundly illegitimate.

Touro Law professor Rodger D. Citron argues that just as Roe v. Wade is the representative case of Justice Harry Blackmun’s tenure on the Supreme Court, so too will Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization become the emblematic decision of its author, Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. Professor Citron analyzes the differences between the two decisions and the Justices who authored them, and what those differences mean about the Court that decided each of those cases.

Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar observes that Justice Brett Kavanaugh is emerging as a centrist perspective in key cases, including one expanding gun rights (New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen) and one repudiating abortion rights (Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization). Dean Amar points out that although Justice Kavanaugh voted with the majority in both cases, he added a narrower gloss via a concurring opinion and was the only Justice to do so in both cases.

In this second of a two-part series of columns on the Supreme Court’s decision in Southwest Airlines v. Saxon, Barry Winograd describes some of the problems posed by the Court’s decision and reasoning. As Mr. Winograd explains, the opinion fails to clarify the governing standard, omits altogether any consideration of the applicable Railway Labor Act, creates confusion as to the classification of supervisors, and does not adequately consider the effects on the “gig” economy.

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision to grant review of a North Carolina partisan gerrymandering dispute involving the Independent State Legislature (ISL) theory, Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar offers yet another reason that the theory is critically flawed. Although Dean Amar has described in numerous publications why ISL theory is illogical and atextual, he newly observes that the Constitution uses another term—“Congress”—to refer at times to the legislative body and other times to the lawmaking process, inclusive of presidential involvement.

In this first of a two-part series of columns on the Supreme Court’s decision in Southwest Airlines v. Saxon, Barry Winograd summarizes the facts leading up to the case and the Court’s decision and reasoning. In particular, Mr. Winograd explains the two prior decisions addressing the FAA’s transportation worker exemption, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, decided in 2001, concluding that the residual clause in Section 1 covers only transportation workers and not workers generally, and New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, applying the exception to an interstate truck driver classified as an independent contractor and not an employee.