Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on a little-known but significant feature of New York abortion law: It defines self-induced (and other) abortion as a crime, when the woman at issue has been pregnant for more than 24 weeks (the estimated time of fetal viability), unless an abortion is necessary to save the woman’s life. This pre-Roe law was applied recently when New York authorities arrested a woman who allegedly had completed a self-induced abortion, using an abortion tea, when she was 25 weeks pregnant. (She was arrested after a building superintendent reportedly found the dead fetus in a trashcan.) In analyzing the New York law at issue, Colb also discusses relevant background regarding the constitutional, legal, and moral status of the right to terminate a pregnancy. Among other points, Colb notes that New York’s law may prove counterproductive, in that it deters women from seeking emergency care related to a post-viability self-induced abortion, for fear that revealing the abortion to healthcare providers will lead to prosecution. She also points out that it is odd that the woman in question is being charged under the anti-self-inducement law in particular, when at the time the abortion occurred, any kind of abortion would have been illegal, unless it was necessary to save the woman’s life. Colb looks to New York’s unique take on abortion—an approach that differs from those of both the pro-life and pro-choice movements—to provide an explanation for its unusual law.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci A. Hamilton comments on the disturbing developments, over the course of 2011, with respect to child sex abuse. From Penn State, to Syracuse, to The Citadel, Hamilton notes, scandals broke out after child sex abuse was credibly alleged. Hamilton suggests ten key lessons we can all take from these events. Among those lessons are that organizations typically cover up the abuse; that cover-ups tend to follow the same pattern; that just one person can make a huge difference by reporting abuse but too often, no one does; that child sex abuse sadly proves to be more prevalent than we would like to think; and that legal reforms can help in important ways. Hamilton also covers the stances of Governors Corbett and Cuomo on this issue.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf takes strong issue with presidential candidate Newt Gingrich’s comments regarding judicial supremacy. In particular, Dorf explains, Gingrich has suggested that federal judges could be summoned—even by force—to explain their decisions before Congress, and that Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges with whose opinions Gingrich disagrees ought to be impeached. Dorf explains that, as Gingrich states, there have indeed been times in American history when judicial supremacy—which holds that all other government actors must act as if bound by the rulings of the Supreme Court—has been controversial. However, Dorf contends, Gingrich—in suggesting that we revert to those times—fails to appreciate how and why the courts’ role has evolved over the course of American history up to the present, and, worse, puts forth a dangerous proposition.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a Portland, Oregon-based federal district judge’s ruling in a case where a key question was when—if ever—a blogger can count as a journalist. The judge, addressing a defamation suit that was brought against the blogger, declined to allow her to invoke two Oregon laws that were meant to protect journalists by (1) requiring potential defamation plaintiffs to give journalists who are potential defamation defendants a chance to correct or retract the allegedly defamatory statements, if the plaintiffs want to recover their full damages; and (2) allowing journalists to protect their confidential sources by keeping them anonymous. In addition, the judge—moving on from Oregon-law issues to federal-law issues—refused to grant bloggers the right to invoke favorable U.S. Supreme Court case law regarding damages unless the bloggers qualified as journalists under the judge’s multi-factor test. Hilden takes issue with both of the judge’s Oregon law rulings, and, to some extent, also with his proposed multi-factor test as to who counts as a journalist.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on an interesting decision, issued this month by a federal judge from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, regarding an indictment alleging the violation of a federal anti-harassment statute. Hilden first provides the factual background of the case—in which federal prosecutors alleged that a well-known Buddhist religious leader was being harassed, in violation of a federal stalking statute that is an amended version of part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). She then discusses some of the key issues the case raises, such as whether blog posts or tweets can count as harassment in violation of the statute, even if it is the alleged victim who opts to view the posts or tweets, rather than merely receiving them. With the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) as an amicus, and the federal government seeking to defend a statute that is meant to protect women from harm, Hilden predicts that we have not heard the last of this dispute. She also notes that, in the age of the search engine, the line between seeking out material and coming across it has been blurred substantially, and in turn, the definition of harassment may also be blurring.

Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar describes and comments on the “Americans Elect” movement. As Amar explains, the movement is striving to put a “nonpartisan” presidential/vice-presidential candidate slate—determined by citizens around the country who will participate in an “online convention” next year—on the ballot in all 50 states before next November’s presidential election. The slate will be “nonpartisan” in that the top online vote-getter, who will be the presidential candidate, must choose a vice-presidential candidate from another party. As Amar notes, nominees can be members of any political party, and indeed could (judging from the organization’s website) presumably be candidates in the Democratic or Republican primary processes. He raises several issues regarding “Americans Elect,” including its potential for its candidate to act as a spoiler by not having enough votes to win, but having enough votes to tip the balance between two major-party candidates—recalling Ralph Nader’s controversial role in Florida in Election 2000. In addition, Amar contends that while Americans Elect’s idea of requiring the top vote-getter to pick an opposite-party running mate is well-intentioned, it seems to rest on some misconceptions about whether mandating lack of party uniformity will turn out to be a good idea.

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan takes strong issue with the claim that “contractionary” policies—such as budget cuts, and tax increases imposed on the non-wealthy—can help the American economy. To the contrary, Buchanan contends that such policies will only shrink the economy, and that the right approach to improving America’s economy is to use government spending and tax cuts aimed at the non-wealthy, who are very likely to spend the extra money that tax cuts free up and thus give a strong boost to the economy. And yet, Buchanan points out, all we have seen from Congress, over the past year, has been a series of contractionary approaches. Buchanan examines the case for invoking “expansionary austerity” in America now, and finds it sorely lacking when tested against the relevant evidence—as found in the recent and past experiences of America and of other nations. He concludes, based on this evidence, that “expansionary austerity” is simply a pipe dream.

Justia columnist and Hunter College Human Rights Program Director Joanne Mariner explains and comments on the highly controversial National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which has passed the House and Senate and is now awaiting President Obama’s signature. As Mariner notes, the NDAA’s provisions on indefinite detention earlier caused President Obama to threaten to veto the bill, but now President Obama appears poised to sign the bill’s current version—based on his claim that it affords the president substantial discretion on how the law will be implemented. But, Mariner points out, numerous human rights groups, civil libertarians, and Members of Congress still find the bill extremely objectionable in this current version. In this two-part series of columns, Mariner provides background on the recent history that is relevant to the bill; describes what the often-mischaracterized provisions of the bill actually say, and whom they affect; and focuses, especially, on the sections that have caused human rights groups the greatest concern.

Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on the possible legal implications of an airline’s “Meet and Seat” program, which allows passengers to find out information about other travelers, and select the person whom they will sit next to on a flight, based on Facebook profiles and LinkedIn accounts. The upside of the program is that fliers can network with each other, or even have a first date while in the air. But the downside, Ramasastry argues, may be considerable, depending on how the details of the program are fleshed out. Ramasastry anticipates possible problems with fictitious profiles, sexual and other types of harassment, discrimination, and even de facto segregation if groups decide to sit together based on race, religion, or the like. Ramasastry also points to group-then-go charters, made easier by smart phone technology, as a less problematic way to employ social networking to ensure that travelers can opt to fly with people who share their interests and destinations.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the Supreme Court’s decision to take up a case involving the controversial Arizona immigration law—another blockbuster in a momentous Term for the Court, which will also resolve cases on the health care legislation and redistricting in Texas. Regarding the Arizona immigration case, Dorf explains the relevance, in the case, of the theory of the “unitary executive,” and notes that there seems to be a common misconception: The question in the Arizona case, he explains, is not whether Congress can preempt state immigration law—it plainly can—but whether Congress did, in fact, preempt Arizona’s immigration law. Dorf also explains the unusual way in which the Justices’ ideological leanings play out in typical federal-preemption cases, and why immigration cases involving federal preemption are atypical in this respect. In addition, he explains why a Court precedent on gun control and federalism may play a large role here.

In the first of a series of columns focusing on cyberbullying, Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean takes very strong issue with those who engage in this kind of online intimidation on Twitter—and, particularly, those who do so anonymously or pseudonymously. Drawing on academic studies, Dean begins by specifically describing the nature of bullying and bullies. Carefully distinguishing bullying from genuine and valid criticism, Dean notes that true bullies are often troubled personalities and considers the influences (including biological influences) and choices that play a role in the making of a bully—noting that some of the underlying conditions that influence bullying are actually treatable. He terms the cyberbully who proceeds anonymously or pseudonymously the “uber coward” among bullies, contrasting the cyberbully with the schoolyard or workplace bully. Finally, Dean invites American lawyers to share with him their legal anti-cyberbully strategies.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton reports on the court proceedings that occurred this Tuesday, December 13, in the Jerry Sandusky child molestation case. Hamilton notes that Sandusky waived his right to a preliminary hearing, which would have allowed him to see some of the prosecution’s evidence against him. She explains, however, that Sandusky already had a great deal of notice as to the prosecution's evidence from the grand jury report that has been issued; and that, by choosing to waive his right to a preliminary hearing, Sandusky avoided having ten alleged victims get on the stand to tell their stories. Hamilton expresses regret that, in this way, the alleged victims were silenced once again. She also explains—based on a press conference at the courthouse, held by Sandusky's attorney—what the defense will claim: that the alleged victims are only in this for the money. But as Hamilton notes, that theory seems very weak, since none of the alleged victims has filed a civil suit. In addition, Hamilton covers a defamation case that is related to the allegations of sexual abuse by Syracuse men’s basketball coach Jim Boeheim’s longtime assistant, Bernie Fine, and the congressional hearings on sex-abuse reporting.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on regulations regarding the “morning after pill,” a form of emergency contraception that is only available by prescription to girls under seventeen—despite a recent recommendation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that it be made available over the counter (OTC) to girls of that age. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Kathleen Sebelius, overruled the recommendation, but was she right to do so? Colb explains how the morning after pill works; explains how the brains of young girls differ from those of older girls and women; offers a hypothetical to illustrate what may happen if young girls cannot access the OTC morning after pill; considers whether parents’ interests should come into play here; discusses the argument that this kind of OTC contraception is a form of abortion and its relevance or lack thereof; and expresses deep disappointment if this decision by the Obama Administration was at base a political choice.

In this two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman draws on an unusual source, the reality television show Teen Mom, to illuminate a number of family law issues. Here, in Part Two, Grossman covers issues that have arisen on Teen Mom relating to legal fatherhood, parental rights, child custody, domestic violence, and open adoption. Using the situations of the young women on Teen Mom as examples, Grossman answers interesting family law questions like these: Does legal fatherhood matter? How are disagreements over custody and visitation resolved, and what kind of disagreements are likely to arise? How and why might custody over a child be relinquished? Do grandparents have visitation rights, and in what circumstances? How does open adoption work, and what problems might occur with open adoption? Finally, what happens when there is family violence? By illustrating instances where these questions arise, Grossman notes, Teen Mom ends up being surprisingly educational for a reality television series.

In this two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman draws on an unusual source, the reality television show Teen Mom, to illuminate a number of family law issues. Here, in Part One, Grossman begins by contrasting the precursor show, 16 and Pregnant, which raised few legal issues, with Teen Mom, which raises a plethora of them. She explains why teen pregnancy raises few legal issues, whereas the birth of a child to a teenage mother often, as Teen Mom illustrates, triggers legal conflicts. Specifically, Grossman covers abortion rights for minors and the very limited rights of putative unwed fathers, prior to birth. She also quickly previews the nature of the many post-childbirth legal disputes that she will discuss in Part Two of the series.

Justia columnist and Hunter College Human Rights Program Director Joanne Mariner describes a schism between human rights scholars, on one hand, and human rights professionals, on the other. On the good side, Mariner notes, both scholarship and practice in human rights have thrived over the last two decades—and yet, she contends, there is a troubling disconnect between the two. Mariner’s own survey found that human rights professionals see a wide—even, to some, “enormous”—gap between theory and practice, and rarely read academic articles on human rights. The professionals complained, among other points, that the academics were encouraged to come up with counterintuitive theories, when often the intuitive ones were far closer to the mark. In turn, Mariner notes, the academics might rightly charge that the professionals fear that too much analysis of a problem will impede or delay effective action, as in “Hamlet,” when in fact sustained thought about a human rights issue could bear significant fruit. She thus calls on the two groups to engage more deeply with each other’s work, to the benefit of both. Finally, Mariner offers some specific suggestions as to how such engagement could effectively occur.

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan discusses the issues raised by the candidacy of Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Warren, who is running for a Massachusetts Senate seat. Buchanan’s thesis is that Warren is more truly a capitalist than her opponent, Republican Scott Brown, or the voters and commentators who oppose her. In particular, Buchanan notes that Warren—an advocate of transparency in financial transactions; an architect of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; and an advisor to President Obama on financial industry issues—is a true advocate of free markets. The reason her opponents claim otherwise, Buchanan argues, is that they are confusing being pro-free market with being blindly pro-business, no matter what evils business interests may perpetrate. Being truly in favor of the free market, he contends, means that one ought to endorse—as Warren does—the principle that both sides need to be well-informed when they transact business. That kind of free-market thinking, he points out, might have stemmed or prevented the mortgage loan crisis.

Justia columnist and Hunter College Human Rights Program Director Joanne Mariner comments on the aggressive new War on Terror bills currently pending in Congress. With Osama Bin Laden dead and all the living alleged 9/11 perpetrators in custody awaiting trial, Mariner notes that the bills’ timing seems odd. She also contrasts the long-lasting War on Terror with the events of the post-World-War-Two period in American history. If the bills that are pending pass, she explains, they will go significantly beyond prior War on Terror policies, which were already broad to begin with. Mariner describes the bills as dangerous and irresponsible, and points to the irony that Congress can make bipartisan compromises in the fraught area of counterterrorism, but not when it comes to sorely needed economic measures. If the bills pass, Mariner reports, they will essentially make Guantanamo permanent, embrace detention without trial—which had previously been seen as un-American—and make the military the presumptive detaining and prosecuting authority in certain categories of cases. Mariner points out that even the Bush Administration tried and convicted many terrorism suspects in federal court, rather than resorting to military justice. Finally, she expresses hope that President Obama will veto the bills, as he has threatened to do.

Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on the recent controversy over doctors (and other healthcare providers) who require their patients to sign contracts stating that they will not post reviews of the doctor (or other healthcare provider) on review-and-rating websites, such as Yelp.com and the like. In addition, Ramasastry explains, a clause contained in the contracts at issue purports to transfer the patients’ copyright in any such reviews to the doctor—presumably so that the doctor can have such reviews quickly and directly taken down after they are posted. Ramasastry describes the class action lawsuit that is pending with respect to such contracts, and the allegations of a plaintiff in the suit. She also explains other kinds of challenges to this type of contract that are being made in other venues, and describes several useful websites that seek to inform patients of their rights and options when they are required by their doctor or other health-care provider to sign such a contract.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf, and Justia guest columnist and Duke law and political science professor Neil S. Siegel comment on an interesting but less often discussed aspect of the controversial 2010 federal health care law. As Dorf and Siegel explain, before the Supreme Court reaches the merits of the case involving the health care law, it must first consider the federal Anti-Injunction Act, which became law in 1867. Dorf and Siegel note that the Anti-Injunction Act requires taxpayers who object to the federal government’s assessment or collection of a tax to first pay up, and only then sue for a refund. With respect to the federal health care law, Dorf and Siegel explain, that would delay even the very beginning of federal litigation until 2015. Yet both the law's fans and its detractors want a decision from the Supreme Court much earlier than that. Some would opt to simply ignore the Anti-Injunction Act, but as Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit commented, “There is no ‘early-bird special’ exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.” Fortunately, Dorf and Siegel offer an ingenious solution to this dilemma that combines a reasonable interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act with the passage of a new federal stature.