SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna Grossman argues that the decision by the Trump Administration to roll back protections for transgender students is mean-spirited and serves no legitimate purpose. Grossman briefly describes the history of the recognition of transgender rights under federal statutes and explains why protections for transgender students make far greater legal sense than denying those protections.
Chapman University, Fowler School of Law, professor Ronald D. Rotunda explains the legal precedent behind the executive’s power to restrict visas for non-U.S. citizens to enter the United States. Rotunda points out that the recent opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fails to mention almost any of the precedential cases on point when it struck down President Trump’s executive order limiting immigration.
University of Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar provides answers to some common questions about the Trump Administration from a constitutional perspective. Specifically, Amar addresses what is a constitutional crisis and whether we are approaching one, what the worst-case constitutional scenario might look like, how state and local governments can resist federal government overreach, to what extent executive criticism of the judiciary has a chilling effect, and what topics are fair game in the confirmation hearings of Judge Neil Gorsuch.
Marci Hamilton, a Fox Distinguished Scholar in the Fox Leadership Program at the University of Pennsylvania and leading church/state scholar, outlines what the United States must do to restore true religious liberty under the First Amendment, rather than go down the path of extreme religious liberty supported by right-wing Christian lobbyists. Hamilton argues that President Trump needs to remove Steve Bannon, unhinge himself from the extreme religious right, and open his eyes to the plain discrimination directly in front of him.
Guest columnist Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law and attorney with an international business practice, explains how Congress might be able to use the 25th Amendment to remove President Donald Trump. Falvy explains the difficulties in involuntarily removing a president under the 25th Amendment and describes how Congress might get around these difficulties.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf considers whether President Trump’s new executive order on immigration, anticipated to be issued this week, will fare better than Executive Order 13769, which temporarily banned nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries and all refugees from entering the United States. Dorf discusses Trump’s past public statements advocating for a Muslim ban during his presidential campaign and applies the factors courts may use in evaluating whether those statements can be considered evidence of Trump’s motives for his actions as president, should the constitutionality of his executive order be challenged in court again.
Chapman University, Fowler School of Law, professor Ronald D. Rotunda comments on the proper handling of classified information and expresses concern over Hillary Clinton’s apparent departure from protocol.
John W. Dean, former counsel to President Richard Nixon, discusses President Trump’s recent comments regarding information leaks, one of which led to the resignation of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn. While Dean explains that there is no official law in the United States that makes it a crime to leak information to the news media or others, many former U.S. presidents have made attempts to prosecute those who leaked information during their presidencies, with varying degrees of success. This, Dean notes, may lend credence to President Trump's threat of legal consequences, should the individuals responsible for these most recent leaks be identified.
George Washington law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan considers where resistance may arise during Donald Trump’s presidency. Specifically, Buchanan considers the three branches of government and identifies where in each branch resistance to Trump is strongest, as well as where it needs to be augmented.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a recent antitrust lawsuit by an animal advocacy organization against a dairy organization. Colb argues that the public message of the suit will likely be detrimental to the interests of dairy cattle rather than raising consciousness in a positive way.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman discusses the grave risks to women’s health under the Trump Administration, both within the United States and worldwide. Grossman explains the unprecedented breadth of President Trump’s executive order reinstating what is known as the “global gag rule” and vastly expanding its scope.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and California civil litigator Michael Schaps consider the strength of San Francisco’s lawsuit against the Trump Administration arising out of its identity as a “sanctuary city.” Amar and Schaps discuss both the ripeness of the claim, a threshold procedural matter, and also the merits of San Francisco’s arguments.
Marci A. Hamilton, a Fox Distinguished Scholar in the Fox Leadership Program at the University of Pennsylvania, describes how extremely broad President Trump’s draft executive order on religious liberty, explaining how its breadth could have huge negative effects on children, LGBTQ individuals, and many others. Hamilton argues that the executive order is even broader than RFRA and that it poses both known and unknown risks to children.
Cornell University law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the distinctive position taken by Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch with respect to the so-called Chevron doctrine, under which courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous federal statutes. Dorf explains why Judge Gorsuch’s quest to end judicial deference to agencies not only contrasts with Justice Scalia’s position on the issue, but it is also erroneous and based on a misconception of how Chevron works.
University of Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on recent legislation in France recognizing a “right to disconnect” to help workers establish work–life balance. Ramasastry argues that while laudable in its attempt to address changing social behaviors, legislation might not be the best way to address this growing problem, and it almost certainly would not work in the United States.
Cornell University law professor Joseph Margulies argues that the significance of President Trump’s “Muslim Ban” executive order lies not in the legal issues it presents, but in its symbolism. As Margulies explains, the executive order is a symbol that will be used to mobilize support for competing narratives about American life; what ultimately matters is which narrative prevails.
John W. Dean, former counsel to President Nixon, converses with author David Dorsen about whether President Trump’s pick for the U.S. Supreme Court, Judge Neil Gorsuch, is going to be ideologically consistent with the late Justice Antonin Scalia, whose seat Gorsuch would fill. Led by Dean’s questions, Dorsen explains that Scalia was not as across-the-board conservative as many thought him to be, and Gorsuch may not be either, at least not on topics such as trial by jury and double jeopardy.
George Washington law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan discusses how anti-Trump voters should (and should not) talk to those who supported Trump. Buchanan argues that if economic issues are not the primary concern, then anti-Trump voters should focus instead on directly (yet respectfully) discussing social issues and identity politics.
Guest columnist Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law and attorney with an international business practice, examines four ways in which Donald Trump’s presidency might not last for the full four-year term. In addition to describing each of the four ways, Falvy offers a prediction as to the likelihood Trump’s presidency will end in that manner.
Cornell University law professor Sherry F. Colb discusses a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that raises the issue whether a defendant whose conviction has been reversed may be required—without violating due process—to bring a separate civil action to prove her innocence in order to get a refund of the costs and fees imposed from her original conviction. Colb points out that the crux of the issue is whether the money sought to be returned is characterized as a refund or as compensation.