Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a recent decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The decision upheld two regulations that were imposed upon sexually oriented businesses in Ohio. The first regulation restricted a business’s hours if it allowed nudity; the second regulation forbade a business’s nude performers from touching each other, and from touching its customers. Hilden explains the Supreme Court nude-dancing decision, Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., that formed the backdrop for this case, and examines two of what she argues are the strongest First Amendment concerns that the Sixth Circuit panel’s decision raises.

Justia columnist Vikram David Amar and Justia guest columnist Alan Brownstein, both U.C. Davis law professors, assess the claim of Texas governor and presidential candidate Rick Perry that the U.S. Constitution’s Seventeenth Amendment—which provides for the direct election of U.S. Senators—was a mistake. Amar and Brownstein explain the original Constitution’s provision for state legislative election of Senators, and the thinking behind it, and the genesis of the Seventeenth Amendment. They also assess the Amendment’s costs, but note that if it were repealed, there would be costs to that decision, as well.

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on recent Republican proposals based on the idea that tax cuts for the rich will help curb the recession. Buchanan argues that there is no support, in either economic theory, or in empirical evidence, to conclude that America’s current tax rates are hurting the economy, or that reducing tax rates for businesses and the wealthy will improve the economy and/or reduce unemployment. All such cuts would do, Buchanan contends, is make the rich richer—while also imperiling vital public services.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on the ongoing controversy over the fate of the U.S. Post Office. Dorf describes the causes of the Post Office’s troubled state; considers the pros and cons of a possible plan by which Congress would subsidize the Post Office; describes what such a plan could look like in practice; and notes the virtues of opting for a stopgap solution now in light of the reality that long-term forecasts show that the end of the Post Office is ultimately inevitable.

Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on a recent controversy in Missouri, concerning a law that would have banned teachers from becoming the “friends” of their under-18 students on Facebook and other social networking sites that allow private messaging. As Ramasastry explains, the law’s apparent concern was to ensure that teachers would not become sexual predators preying on students, but the effect of the law, if enforced, would have been to cut off positive—and even vital—student/teacher communication as well, ranging from students’ seeking homework help, to students’ seeking counsel and support while contemplating suicide. Ramasastry describes the law and the court battle over it, and considers the Missouri legislature’s and the ACLU’s new proposals for regulation in the state in this area.

Justia columnist and Hunter Human Rights Program Director Joanne Mariner suggests an answer to the following question: Ten years after the terrorist attacks that were said to have “changed everything,” what has actually changed in the protection of human rights, and how did these changes take place? Mariner isolates five distinct periods of government policy, as it has evolved over the post-9/11 years: (1) the directly post-9/11 era of unchecked abuses (especially by the CIA), which was sparked by the post-9/11 Bush Administration claim that the U.S. was waging a war on terror; (2) the era of retrenchment and reassertion, when the Bush Administration was put on the defensive; (3) the attempt, during the last years of the Bush Administration, to establish a legal foundation for its “war on terror” actions; (4) the initial, but short-lived, Obama Administration push to reverse the Bush Administration's approaches; and (5) the current Obama Administration policy era—when, Mariner contends, because President Obama has a more liberal image and generally more liberal politics, he can not only adopt certain abusive policies, but he can also normalize them in a way that President Bush never could have done.

Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John W. Dean comments on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, with a special emphasis on the legacy of the attacks for American law. Dean begins by assessing how foreign media sources—whose perspectives, he explains, may be somewhat more detached than Americans’, yet who often interviewed Americans as sources—see the anniversary of 9/11. In addition, Dean contends that, where American law is concerned, the legacy of 9/11 is a baleful one. In support of his claim, Dean points to a post-9/11 proliferation of laws (some with sunset provisions, some without) that, he contends, go beyond all previous limits of constitutional propriety. Dean focuses in particular on the Patriot Act, and the infamous torture memo. All told, Dean concludes, the fallout of the 9/11 attacks has had a highly negative impact on American law.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton looks back to a more innocent time, ten years ago, before the 9/11 attacks shocked and horrified America, and before clergy child-sex-abuse scandals rocked first the Catholic Church and its believers, and then other religious institutions and believers as well. Hamilton contends that the key lessons of these devastating events are that we can never assume that a person’s belief in God, in itself, renders him or her godly; and that faith can too easily provide a pretext for terrible crimes.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on a fascinating criminal procedure case that the U.S. Supreme Court will resolve during this coming term. The case, Perry v. New Hampshire, will answer the following question: If an eyewitness first identifies a perpetrator under highly suggestive circumstances that seriously compromise the reliability of the identification, but the police did not orchestrate those circumstances, should a court then exclude the identification evidence? Or, stated differently, is police misconduct necessary to the successful due process exclusion of unduly suggestive eyewitness identification evidence? Colb explains the reasons why we might—and might not—require police misconduct before this type of constitutional claim may be made, and notes that the issue here is of great importance, as empirical research has now exposed the central role of mistaken eyewitness identifications in wrongful convictions. Colb also makes a case that, in the end, the best resolution here may be to inform jurors of the problems with suggestive identifications, and then simply have them evaluate such identifications accordingly, as they do with other unreliable evidence.

Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which raises a fascinating question stemming from modern reproductive technology: Is a child deemed to be legally related to her biological father if she was conceived after he died? The question proves to be crucial when it comes to Social Security and inheritance benefits. Grossman sets forth the facts of the Eighth Circuit case, which involved Social Security benefits; covers some new complications in the law of parentage; and explains why the Eighth Circuit, in the case before it, ultimately ruled against the child and her mother.

Justia columnist and U.C. Davis law professor Vikram David Amar comments on an affirmative action decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in which the Supreme Court may well grant review. Amar explains why, if the High Court does indeed take the case, its decision may substantially alter constitutional law relating to affirmative action in the context of educational admissions. In addition, Amar notes that this case, if taken up by the Court, may illustrate the very considerable power that Justice Anthony Kennedy now wields. Amar also provides thorough background to allow the reader to put this case, and the issues it raises, in the context of prior precedents relating to affirmative action in admissions, such as Bakke, Hopwood, Grutter, and Gratz.

Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan offers a detailed response to an argument that has been in the news frequently: Billionaire investor Warren Buffett has contended that those with annual incomes above one million dollars should pay significantly more in income tax, and that those with annual incomes above ten million dollars per year should pay even more than that. Many commentators, Buchanan points out, have responded to Buffett’s argument by pointing out that Buffett is free to give away his own riches to the government, if he so chooses—for instance, by foregoing tax exemptions that he would be entitled to claim. But Buchanan offers a set of strong responses to this argument, suggesting that the debate should properly focus on Buffett’s proposal, and not on Buffett himself.

Justia columnist Joanne Mariner, an attorney and the head of Hunter College’s Human Rights Program, comments on the end of Muammar Qaddafi’s rule, and reminds readers that for much of the past decade, the United States actually saw Qaddafi as a friend, rather than an enemy. Mariner points out that during the Bush years, Qaddafi’s human rights violations were not simply overlooked but actually exploited, as Condoleezza Rice, in 2006, encouraged others to see Libya’s leadership as a model to follow. Mariner covers the connection between Libya and the CIA, and Libya and the practice of rendition, and explains how statements, made under torture, from a man who was detained in Libya and elsewhere led to the claim of a relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry explains some of the options for Libya’s transitional government, when it comes to the country’s oil resources. Ramasastry explains both the traditional premise that successor regimes need to honor previously negotiated sovereign agreements, and the new trend for sovereigns to renegotiate deals entered into by previously corrupt officials—and the legal basis for such renegotiation. She also argues that the transitional government, and its future governments, should opt for greater transparency in any new oil concessions that are granted, in order to instill confidence in the new government, especially among Libya’s citizens. In addition, she compares the situation relating to contracts to those that have occurred in Iraq and, especially, Liberia.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf examines the way in which an Alabama immigration law—which would place the state in the role of enforcer of federal immigration laws—illustrates a schism that may be growing between two conservative constituencies: populists and corporatists. Dorf illustrates his point about the schism by reference to the controversies over the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and over immigration, which have split the Republican Party. He also asks if populist conservatives and business conservatives can ever truly get along—and notes ways in which the Supreme Court has been surprisingly supportive of the populists.

Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John W. Dean discusses a set of interesting defamation lawsuits that were filed, earlier this month, in New York federal and state courts, against former New York Attorney General (and, later, New York Governor) Eliot Spitzer. The suits are based on an opinion piece that Spitzer wrote for Slate.com, about a year ago, which concerned past criminal charges that had been brought against employees of insurance/finance powerhouse Marsh & McLennan. Dean covers the background law on public-figure defamation suits; explains why the plaintiffs in the suits against Spitzer may have trouble meeting the basic defamation-law requirement that the statements at issue must be “of and concerning” them; and notes that if New York had a stronger anti-SLAPP statute, Spitzer might have been able to file a countersuit against the two plaintiffs who are suing him.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton continues her series of columns on the 2012 presidential candidates’ views on religion, with an analysis of the views of Rick Santorum, a former U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania. Hamilton critiques Santorum for failing to respect the Constitution’s separation of church and state, and for expressing support for states’ rights while also endorsing federal legislation that would displace state power, when it comes to certain policies he favors.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb discusses the constitutional issues raised by government strip searches, and the relevant Supreme Court precedents. She focuses, as well, on a Supreme Court case that will be decided during this coming Term, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. There, the Court will—for the first time since 1979—consider whether officials in a jail may strip search inmates in the absence of any individualized suspicion. Colb notes that the case will raise a key question for the Court to consider: Does the Constitution extend any protection for privacy to the people who reside in a detention facility?

Guest columnist and Justia editor David S. Kemp comments on a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which permitted two American citizens to sue several U.S. military officials and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for violating their constitutional rights. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that Rumsfeld authorized the officials to detain and torture them for several months in Iraq, and that they were subsequently released without being charged with any crime. Kemp covers the three essential questions that had to be answered before the suit could proceed; explains the nature of Bivens claims, through which a plaintiff can bring suit against federal officials (such as, here, Rumsfeld) by proceeding directly under a particular constitutional provision; and describes the two-part test federal courts use to decide whether a Bivens claim will be recognized.

Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses the evolving law on the rights of a lesbian co-parent—that is, a woman who participates in the planned conception, birth, and/or rearing of her same-sex partner’s biological or adopted child. Grossman focuses, in particular, on a recent Ohio Supreme Court case that took a somewhat unusual approach to defining the rights of lesbian co-parents. In addition, she describes other states’ varying approaches to the issue, and raises the question whether—in lieu of the traditional legal dichotomy between parent and non-parent—there may be some middle ground into which the legal status of a lesbian co-parent may fall.