SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the abortion cases currently before the U.S. Supreme Court—one challenge a restrictive Texas abortion law and another challenge to a plainly unconstitutional Mississippi law. Professor Grossman argues that safe-haven laws—which Justice Amy Coney Barrett in particular asked about during her line of questioning in oral argument—play no role in the law or policy of abortion.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on last week’s oral argument in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which the Court will consider whether to overturn the right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. Specifically, Professor Dorf analyzes statements and questions by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, particularly in light of statements he made during his confirmation hearing.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat and former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut comment on a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments that gives the Court an opportunity to overturn Roe v. Wade and related cases recognizing a constitutional right to abortion. Sarat and Aftergut point out that if the Court abandons Roe, that will ultimately spell the end of abortion rights in all states.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf explores the meaning of a question Justice Clarence Thomas asked during the oral argument in New. York State Rifle. & Pistol Association v. Bruen about the interpretation of the Second Amendment: “should we look at the founding, or should we look at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which then, of course, applies it to the states?” Professor Dorf argues that the question exposes a weakness of Justice Thomas’s originalist philosophy and affirms what we already know about arguments rooted in original meaning: they typically serve a rhetorical function, and Justices invoke them to justify decisions taken on other, ideological, grounds.

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why Democrats’ proposed tax on billionaires does not violate any part of the Constitution, despite claims to the contrary. Professor Buchanan argues that the U.S. Supreme Court, in normal times, should recognize that there is no constitutional barrier to the proposed tax, but this ultra-conservative majority Court could defy text and logic and create a new law from whole cloth, as it has done before on other issues.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that even the procedural issues presented in the federal government’s challenge to Texas’s restrictive abortion law are high stakes. Professor Dorf argues that the procedural question fundamentally asks whether the U.S. Supreme Court will permit state-sanctioned lawlessness.

Texas Law professor Jeffrey Abramson explains why the U.S. Supreme Court should not reinstate the death penalty for convicted Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, though a majority seemed poised to do just that when it heard oral arguments earlier this week. Professor Abramson argues that even this pro-death-penalty Supreme Court should see that when grievous mistakes are made at trial, as they were in Tsarnaev’s case, the defendant deserves a new death sentence hearing.

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman describes the unique burdens that Texas has imposed on people seeking to exercise their constitutionally protected right to an abortion, as well as those who provide abortions in that state. Professor Grossman focuses on the harmful and widespread effects of the legal limbo created by the enactment of a blatantly unconstitutional law such as Texas SB 8.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat and former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing tendency to decide high-profile and far-reaching cases via its “shadow docket”—without oral argument or full briefing. Professor Sarat and Mr. Aftergut point out that recent remarks by Justice Samuel Alito reinforce the view that the Court has a partisan agenda that is increasingly out of step with the beliefs and values of the American people.

Steven D. Schwinn, a professor of law at the University of Illinois Chicago John Marshall Law School argues that the Supreme Court’s order last week effectively striking down the COVID-19 eviction moratorium issued by the Centers for Disease Control reflects the Court’s highly partisan approach to executive authority. Professor Schwinn points out that only partisanship can explain why Court upheld the Trump administration’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii and struck down the Biden administration’s eviction moratorium.

NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and appellate lawyers Rex Heinke and Jessica Weisel comment on a case the U.S. Supreme Court will hear next term that presents the question what role, if any, federal courts should play in facilitating discovery in foreign arbitrations. The authors argue that while the case seems to turn on a simple matter of statutory interpretation, the case may shed new light on how the current Court approaches traditional interpretive tools.

In light of the Presidential Commission holding hearings on Court expansion, Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf offers two reforms that build on the observations of others and his own experience. Professor Dorf suggests that the Court spread cases out over the entire year, rather than only between October and June/July, and that the Justices rotate the order of questioning from one argument to the next.

Amherst professor Austin Sarat argues that a People’s Commission—rather than a Presidential Commission—on the U.S. Supreme Court is the only way to ensure that a democratic dialogue that truly represents the interests of the American people. In support of this argument, Professor Sarat draws upon a recent Gallup poll about public confidence in the Court and the highly critical testimony of Yale Law’s Samuel Moyn and Harvard Law’s Nikolas Bowie.

Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Vannoy, in which it held that a prisoner may not invoke the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury as a basis for challenging his criminal conviction when filing a federal habeas corpus petition. Professor Colb explains why, if cost/benefit analysis played a role in determining retroactivity, the Court perhaps should have decided that case the other way.

NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and Hofstra Law professor Julian G. Ku comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nestlé v. Doe, in which the Court held that mere “corporate activity” within the United States is not enough to satisfy the general presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal law. Professor Estreicher and Ku point out that questions about the scope of future ATS claims or corporate liability may never be resolved if the vast majority of ATS claims are dismissed as a result of the Court’s reinvigorated extraterritoriality test.

Marci A. Hamilton, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and CEO of CHILD USA, discusses several decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court this past term that affect children’s rights: Fulton v. Philadelphia, addressing whether a religious social services agency can refuse to place children with same-sex couples; Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., addressing whether a teen could be punished for speech on Snapchat, off school grounds and addressed to her own audience; and NCAA v. Alston, addressing whether the NCAA can deny student-athletes education-related benefits while exploiting their athletic achievements. Professor Hamilton notes that two of these three benefit children, while Fulton, which focuses exclusively on the adults involved and not the children, leaves open the possibility that states can pass neutral laws to meaningfully value the needs of children.

Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, in which the Court upheld along ideological lines two Arizona voting laws, one of which restricted who could collect mail-in ballots and the other of which invalidated votes mistakenly cast in the wrong district. Professor Dorf argues that even if the bottom line in Brnovich is correct, the legal analysis and the Court’s broad acceptance of Republican talking points about voter fraud portend ill for the future of American democracy.

In honor of the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. United States, known as the “Pentagon Papers” case, Touro Law professor Rodger D. Citron describes the Pentagon Papers litigation and shows how the whirlwind pace contributed to the lack of consensus in the Court’s decision. Professor Citron draws upon books by James C. Goodale and David Rudenstine and reminds us of the challenges and complications attendant to a case that is celebrated by many today as, in the words of Adam Liptak, “a potent vindication of press freedom.”

Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court this term holding that the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) contains no statute of limitations for rape. Professor Colb argues that the Court stretched the language of the statute to reach a “desirable” decision, demonstrating that judges at all levels can interpret a statute to reach the result they want to reach.

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and adjunct professor Zachary Fasman comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision earlier this week in NCAA v. Alston, in which the Court held that the NCAA’s attempt to limit compensation to student athletes to preserve their amateur status is subject to the normal rule of reason analysis applied in antitrust cases. Professors Estreicher and Fasman note that the effect of conflicting and competing state name, image and likeness (NIL) regulation on the consumer market—the market at the core of the Court’s analysis in Alston—remains to be seen.