Cardozo Law professor Marci Hamilton comments on a recent move by the Satanic Temple seeking exemption from coercive informed consent laws citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. Hamilton describes the Catholic bishops’ apprehension toward the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) when it was being considered over twenty years ago and how quickly they got behind it after it passed. Finally, Hamilton describes how clear it is now that RFRA cuts both ways.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Paroline v. United States, in which the Court considered how much restitution a victim of sexual abuse should be able to recover from a single perpetrator. Colb explains the reasoning used by the majority and the two diametrically opposed dissenting opinions, and she extends the discussion to an important narrative the Court’s opinions fail to consider.
Vikram David Amar, a U.C. Davis law professor, continues his discussion of the significance of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.. Amar describes several ways in which Justice Kennedy’s concurrence can be read to limit the breadth of the Court’s holding in that case and suggests that lower courts should pay close attention to his concurring opinion when applying the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in subsequent cases.
John Dean, former counsel to the president, describes former President Richard Nixon’s views of, and influence on, the U.S. Supreme Court. In the process, Dean reveals some tidbits of information about Nixon that he discusses in greater depth in his upcoming book, The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It.
Cardozo Law professor Marci Hamilton comments on a recent statement by the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner that purportedly applies the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. to that state’s law. Hamilton critiques the interpretation as misunderstanding the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and calls upon state courts not only to correctly understand the scope of the Hobby Lobby decision, but to reject the Hobby Lobby majority’s reasoning when interpreting their own state’s laws.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., and the nature of the respondents’ claim that IUDs and morning-after pills are abortifacients. Colb analogizes to the distinction between the culpability of direct violence and failure to rescue in order to illustrate that the respondents’ claims are moral rather than factual in basis.
Professor Vikram David Amar, of U.C. Davis School of Law, explains why Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. deserves heightened attention and weight. In this first of a two-part series of columns, Amar provides background on the roles and types of concurring opinions in 5-4 decisions and provides some historical examples of some key concurrences.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf proposes eight different options for fixing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Dorf suggests that open discussion of what was wrong with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. can inform the public and opinion leaders about how to fix RFRA when the opportunity arises.
Cardozo Law professor Marci Hamilton discusses Wheaton College’s request to receive accommodation under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to avoid providing some reproductive coverage for its female employees. Hamilton draws upon her own personal experience and points out that the recent controversies over RFRA in the U.S. Supreme Court have revealed that law’s true nature.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, in which the Court unanimously invalidated President Obama’s 2012 appointment of three members of the National Labor Relations Board. Dorf discusses the differences between rationales and implications of the five-Justice majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer and those of the four-Justice concurrence authored by Justice Scalia. Dorf argues that the Court’s rejection of political deadlock as a basis for recess appointments could prove to be an important weapon anytime the majority in the Senate is actively hostile to the President.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb discusses a recent case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, Riley v. California, in which the Court nearly unanimously held that police may not examine the digital contents of an arrestee’s cell phone as part of a search incident to arrest. Colb describes the facts behind the two cases consolidated for the Court’s review, explains the precedents the Court relied upon in reaching its decision, and praises the Court for decisively embracing Fourth Amendment protection for digital privacy.
Marci Hamilton, a law professor at Cardozo School of Law, offers a strong critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, in which the Court held that owners of closely held corporations may deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives on the basis of the owners’ own religious beliefs. Hamilton explains why the Court’s interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is problematic and calls for that legislation to be repealed as soon as possible.
Cornell University law professor Sherry Colb comments on a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating Florida’s approach to identifying criminal convicts who are intellectually disabled and therefore constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. Colb describes the facts and issues that brought the case before the Court and infers from the opinion that the Court may have a growing consciousness about those sentenced to death. Acknowledging also the strong arguments presented by the dissent, Colb concludes that essential difference between the majority and the dissent is a disagreement as to what is worse: to execute the wrong person to spare the wrong person from execution.
U.C. Davis law professor Vikram David Amar discusses how three cases on the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket for the 2014-2015 Term illustrate the nuanced principles behind the Court’s selection of cases for review. Amar describes each case and explains why the Supreme Court likely chose it for review.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. United States, handed down earlier this week. In that case, the Court considered whether the federal Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act applies to a Pennsylvania woman’s attempted use of mild toxins to cause a skin rash on a romantic rival. Dorf argues that the Court’s ruling sidesteps an important question about the scope of congressional power to implement treaties but that it also announces a presumption of statutory construction that could have far-reaching implications.
Former counsel to the president John Dean comments on a recent public revelation that the U.S. Supreme Court quietly revises its decisions years after they were issued. Drawing upon a forthcoming article by Harvard Law professor Richard Lazarus, Dean describes the process by which the Court releases its rulings to the public. He predicts that it will not be the errors and mistakes that will place the Court’s institutional integrity at risk in the future, but the secretive and dubious means they now use to change their written and published opinions.
Cornell University law professor Michael Dorf discusses how the lower courts’ consistent rulings in favor of same-sex marriage might influence a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Dorf observes that every single judge to rule on the question has relied on the Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor for the conclusion that SSM bans are unconstitutional. He concludes that while the lower courts’ decisions have no binding effect on the Supreme Court, they might serve as a legal barometer of what is legally plausible and as conduits of public opinion.