Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb considers what it means for many of today’s anti-abortion advocates to criminalize not only abortion providers but the person seeking to obtain an abortion as well. Professor Colb argues that this latest iteration of the anti-abortion movement is about turning women into public property subject to rape and then to reproductive servitude for the community.
Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on the clemency petition filed by Oklahoma death-row inmate James Coddington. Professor Sarat argues that, though unlikely to succeed based on Oklahoma’s history, Coddington’s petition offers the state the chance to revive a tradition of recognizing rehabilitation and redemption for people on death row.
NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and rising 3L Zachary G. Garrett propose two measures to improve the safety of public transportation in New York City. Specifically, Professor Estreicher and Mr. Garrett suggest that (1) stationing at least one police officer at each turnstile (or set of turnstiles), around the clock, and (2) installing weapons screeners at every subway station would reduce violence and crime.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on Twitter’s lawsuit against Elon Musk over Musk’s announcement that he was terminating his April agreement to purchase the company for $44 billion. Professor Dorf describes how Musk’s bully-like behavior is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s and describes the possible (and likely) remedies the Delaware court might deem appropriate.
Middle Tennessee State University professor John R. Vile explains what the Supreme Court’s decision this term in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization implies about the Court’s view of its prior decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Professor Vile argues that it was unlikely a doctrine such as substantive due process could ever adequately resolve such a contentious issue as abortion and predicts that rigid state legislation that makes no exception for cases of rape, incest, and the life of the mother will face similar backlash.
Cornell Law professor Sherry F. Colb explores the history and understanding of the word “impregnable,” particularly the gendered nature of the word and what it says about our perception of pregnancy. Professor Colb suggests ways in which our society could make women “impregnable” and thus more equal to men, who are quite literally impregnable.
Amherst professor Austin Sarat comments on the controversy over whether death-row inmates should be permitted to donate their organs before or after their executions. Professor Sarat argues that to prohibit inmates from donating their organs is a further mark of their subjugation and that for many, organ donation is a way of giving life even as the state takes theirs.
Illinois Law professor Matthew Finkin comments on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Viking River Cruises v. Moriana, pointing out several issues in the Court’s reasoning and conclusion as to the arbitration questions raised in that case. Professor Finkin argues that the decision incites three lines of inquiry—historical, empirical, and doctrinal—and then begs them, ultimately leaving more questions than it resolves.
Illinois Law professor Lesley M. Wexler comments on a decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirming Harvard’s ownership over slave daguerreotypes, but allowing causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and for reckless inflection of emotional distress to move forward. Professor Wexler explains how the majority opinion and each of the two concurrences—one of which invites future plaintiffs to submit novel claims to seek ownership and the other which proposes a cause of action for descendants of slaves to receive ownership of wrongfully attained property—might fit within transitional justice.
In this second of a series of columns on the Supreme Court’s decision that eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman and Stanford Law professor Lawrence M. Friedman describe how abortion law arose alongside the eugenics movement. As Professor Grossman and Friedman explain, early abortion restrictions were, in part, an effort to encourage the “right” people to have babies (positive eugenics), used in conjunction with negative eugenics, which involved forced sterilization of people deemed “unfit.”
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf argues that Justice Samuel Alito's majority opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization eliminating the constitutional right to abortion misused pro-choice scholars’ work in an attempt to justify overturning Roe Casey. Professor Dorf observes that by pointing readers to the body of work by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor John Hart Ely, and other pro-choice scholars, Justice Alito effectively calls attention to their robust defense of abortion rights as essential to sex equality and an account of how the current hyper-conservative Court’s rulings are profoundly illegitimate.
Touro Law professor Rodger D. Citron argues that just as Roe v. Wade is the representative case of Justice Harry Blackmun’s tenure on the Supreme Court, so too will Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization become the emblematic decision of its author, Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. Professor Citron analyzes the differences between the two decisions and the Justices who authored them, and what those differences mean about the Court that decided each of those cases.
Cornell Law professor Joseph Margulies responds to an angry reader’s email response to his previous column, observing that anger can be a productive and healthy emotion but can also be all-consuming and destructive. Professor Margulies suggests that arguing over whose anger is righteous and whose is not is not productive; instead, we need something that strides above the arguments, a set of ideals against which we can measure whether a particular species of anger is one that society should honor and encourage.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar observes that Justice Brett Kavanaugh is emerging as a centrist perspective in key cases, including one expanding gun rights (New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen) and one repudiating abortion rights (Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization). Dean Amar points out that although Justice Kavanaugh voted with the majority in both cases, he added a narrower gloss via a concurring opinion and was the only Justice to do so in both cases.
In light of 2022 marking the tenth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, Amherst professor Austin Sarat points out how important that decision was and how much still remains to be done to stop juvenile life without parole (LWOP) sentences. Professor Sarat points out that with the scientific recognition that the development of the human brain is not complete until a person is in their 20s, it does not make sense to treat child offenders the same way we treat adult offenders.
In this second of a two-part series of columns on the Supreme Court’s decision in Southwest Airlines v. Saxon, Barry Winograd describes some of the problems posed by the Court’s decision and reasoning. As Mr. Winograd explains, the opinion fails to clarify the governing standard, omits altogether any consideration of the applicable Railway Labor Act, creates confusion as to the classification of supervisors, and does not adequately consider the effects on the “gig” economy.