Texas law professor Jeffrey Abramson explains why the trial judge in the case against the three men who chased and shot to death Ahmaud Arbery should not commit the same mistake that occurred in the Boston Marathon trial—speeding up jury selection to convict obviously guilty defendants, only to have the sentence thrown out on appeal. Professor Abramson argues that while judges may understandably feel frustrated during jury selection in high-profile cases, taking shortcuts during jury selection risks forcing victims, witnesses, and the community to live through traumatic events twice.
Amherst professor Austin Sarat and former federal prosecutor Dennis Aftergut comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s increasing tendency to decide high-profile and far-reaching cases via its “shadow docket”—without oral argument or full briefing. Professor Sarat and Mr. Aftergut point out that recent remarks by Justice Samuel Alito reinforce the view that the Court has a partisan agenda that is increasingly out of step with the beliefs and values of the American people.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses an often overlooked procedural aspect related to Texas’s extreme anti-abortion law that could result in “zombie” laws taking effect in every other red state. Professor Dorf argues that there are several reasons to hope that a state scheme to retroactively enforce zombie abortion laws would fail, even if the Supreme Court curtails or eliminates the abortion right itself, not the least of which is that retroactive application of zombie laws is fundamentally unfair.
Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses a lawsuit in which the government of Mexico is suing U.S. firearms manufacturers in federal court for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent their weapons from ending up in Mexico, profit from the trafficking of U.S.-made guns to Mexico, and in some respects deliberately target the illegal Mexican market. Professor Dorf argues that while the lawsuit presents strong moral and policy grounds for granting the Mexican government the relief it seeks, a 2005 federal statute, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), will likely prevent it from succeeding.
In light of the Presidential Commission holding hearings on Court expansion, Cornell Law professor Michael C. Dorf offers two reforms that build on the observations of others and his own experience. Professor Dorf suggests that the Court spread cases out over the entire year, rather than only between October and June/July, and that the Justices rotate the order of questioning from one argument to the next.
Amherst professor Austin Sarat argues that a People’s Commission—rather than a Presidential Commission—on the U.S. Supreme Court is the only way to ensure that a democratic dialogue that truly represents the interests of the American people. In support of this argument, Professor Sarat draws upon a recent Gallup poll about public confidence in the Court and the highly critical testimony of Yale Law’s Samuel Moyn and Harvard Law’s Nikolas Bowie.
In this second of a series of columns commenting on Republican efforts to challenge the apportionment of Illinois state legislative districts that the General Assembly and the Governor recently enacted, Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone argue that a federal court may not be able to grant the relief the plaintiffs are seeking. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that the Illinois Supreme Court is the proper arbiter of the key legal question whether a commission is required under state law.
In this first of a series of columns, Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone describe a lawsuit in which Republicans are challenging Illinois’s recently adopted redistricting plan. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone identify several obstacles the lawsuit may face, which, in their estimation, make it unlikely to succeed.
Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar critiques Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s recent use of stare decisis doctrine and reliance interest in her dissenting opinion last term in Ramos v. Louisiana, and again this term in Edwards v. Vannoy. Dean Amar describes the reliance interest theory and explains why Justice Kagan’s reasoning is unusual and dubious.
NYU Law professor Samuel Estreicher and appellate lawyers Rex Heinke and Jessica Weisel describe the uncertainty surrounding whether Uber and Lyft drivers are subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. The authors note the split of authority across the nation and note that, depending on the outcome of litigation in the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, the question may soon come before the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve.
Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—describes ways in which states are attempting to normalize errors that occur during the process of lethal injection. Professor Sarat argues that lethal injection is demonstrably far from the painless form of death it once promised to be, and that it should be abolished in the United States.
Illinois Law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone argue that the U.S. Supreme Court correctly denied review last week of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions handed down before the 2020 election. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone explain why the majority denied review and point out that the dissenting opinions unwittingly demonstrate the rightness of the majority.
Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar comments on an unusual move by the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, sending a letter to the U.S. Supreme Court amending the position of the federal government in a case currently pending before the Court challenging the Affordable Care Act. Dean Amar explains why the arrival of a new administration should generally not trigger such position reversals, but he argues that the unusual circumstances—specifically the “exceptional implausibility” of the government’s prior filings—may justify the government’s action in this instance.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf explains why Trump v. Sierra Club, a challenge to President Trump’s border wall currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, exemplifies the needless complexity of federal court gatekeeping law. Professor Dorf lists the various legal doctrines that restrict access to the federal courts and argues that their number and complexity tend to undercut, rather than serve, justice.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher discusses a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit in Fedor v. United Healthcare, in which the court clarified that a court must first find agreement to arbitrate before the severability doctrine comes into play. Professor Estreicher explains the severability doctrine, describes the facts giving rise to the case, and the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning behind its conclusion.
Steven D. Schwinn, a professor of law at the University of Illinois Chicago John Marshall Law School, explains how the Supreme Court’s recent decision allowing the Trump administration to proceed with efforts to exclude undocumented aliens from the census is consistent with the administration’s manipulation of the courts to achieve illegal policy. Professor Schwinn describes why that the Court’s ruling in the census case is an appropriate bookend to the travel ban ruling he received early in his presidency.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf explains the legal concepts of ripeness and laches, which pertain to the timing of filing a lawsuit, and argues that in the context of election lawsuits, it is far better for courts to relax ripeness rules and risk unnecessary adjudications than to discard the doctrine of laches and risk widespread disenfranchisement and the undermining of confidence in fair elections.
Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone describe the increasing importance of courts and lawyers in safeguarding and reinforcing the role of factual truths in our democracy. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that lawyers and judges are steeped in factual investigation and factual determination, and they call upon legal educators (like themselves) to continue instilling in students the commitment to analytical reasoning based in factual evidence, and to absolutely reject the notion that factual truth is just in the mind of the beholder.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers one aspect of the oral argument in California v. Texas, the latest challenge to the Affordable Care Act to come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Specifically, Colb considers the way in which some of the Justices talked during the oral argument about the doctrine of judicial standing, and she calls out those Justices’ hypocrisy as to that issue.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on two particular aspects of a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument last month, Torres v. Madrid. First, Colb discusses the distinction, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between touching someone directly with one’s hands and touching someone indirectly using an inanimate object. Second, she explains the difference between holding and dicta in a court opinion. Using these two points as illustrations, Colb shows how flexible the Constitution can be, lending itself to very different interpretations.