Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on the current problem of jurors’ doing Internet searches relating to the trials on which they serve—sometimes, even if the jurors have been directly admonished not to do so. Ramasastry describes an interesting approach to the problem, used by Judge Shira Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York: Judge Scheindlin asks jurors to sign a written pledge not to use the Internet to research the case on which they sit. Ramasastry also describes other judges’ attempted solutions to, and experiences with, the jury-Internet-use problem—which has caused a number of costly mistrials—and the model jury instructions on the topic. She notes, however, that researchers are finding that virtually nothing will stop jurors from doing their own Internet research regarding the cases on which they sit—leading some to suggest that it may be more effective to limit, but not ban, jurors’ Internet research, as a ban will inevitably be ignored.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the potential impact of the resolution of the legal battle over the PPACA, also known by its critics as “Obamacare.” Various PPACA cases have caused a split among federal appellate courts, such that Dorf predicts that the Supreme Court will likely grant review this Term in a PPACA case. The case would raise the question of the constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” which requires individual Americans to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty for not doing so. Dorf argues that in the end, the Court’s PPACA decision—like Bush v. Gore before it—will have little effect as a legal precedent, but a very large political effect, as many Americans will likely see the Court’s decision, depending on how it comes out, as either a vindication or a repudiation of President Obama’s policy, and perhaps even the President himself.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean begins a new series of columns on current Republican political strategies and approaches. Dean describes what is happening now as the return of Nixonian politics, on steroids, and he contends that today, Republican operatives are employing strategies to empower themselves that would never succeed at the ballot box if voters fully understood what was occurring. Dean notes that this attempt to transform our political system is receiving little news coverage, and offer some reasons why, including Americans’ disinterest in “process” issues and the fact that mainstream news organizations are largely controlled by highly profit-driven major corporations, and those companies’ executives often lean toward Republican views. Dean focuses, especially, on the role of the Tea Party, which he describes as “the tip of the conservative iceberg” now, while also contending that the real story is not about the Tea Party, but about other, more mainstream Republicans who are in power today, and their political strategies.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton continues her ongoing series about the 2012 presidential candidates and their views on religion. In this column, Hamilton considers the views of Congresswoman Michele Bachmann. Hamilton contends that a Bachmann presidency would likely be dominated by evangelical Christianity, and notes that Bachmann sees the separation of church and state as “a myth” and would likely nominate to the federal judiciary only those who share her views. Moreover, Hamilton argues that Bachmann’s religious views would, if she were elected, also influence her foreign policy (which she has suggested would be automatically pro-Israel on religious grounds) and her policies on social issues such as abortion, stem-cell research, the HPV vaccine, and gay rights. Hamilton also notes that although Bachmann claims to support states’ rights, in practice she supports federal action if one of the policies that she herself favors is at issue.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on United States v. Jones, a case that the Supreme Court will hear this year, and that The New York Times called “the most important Fourth Amendment case in a decade.” The case raises the question whether police who track a suspect’s movements over time, via a global positioning system (GPS) device, intrude on the suspect’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Colb covers an earlier High Court precedent involving the older police practice of putting a “beeper” in a container before a suspect loads the container into his vehicle, and then following the beeper’s trail, but she explains why that scenario is very different from the use of GPS. Colb also connects the GPS case, Jones, to the interesting concept of “innocent privacy”—that is, the privacy of innocent people, and everyone’s privacy vis-à-vis the innocent but personal parts of their lives. In addition, Colb contrasts the likely Fourth Amendment statuses of GPS location information versus cellphone location information, which is now frequently procured without a warrant.
In this column, Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman winds up her two-part series on the rights of posthumously conceived children. (Such children are born after their father has passed away, and their mother has used his previously preserved sperm to become pregnant.) With both inheritances and Social Security benefits at issue, there are potentially high stakes in this area of law. In this column, Grossman covers the different answers that various state and federal courts have given to the question whether posthumously conceived children have the same rights to inherit from their fathers, and to receive Social Security “surviving child” benefits as a result of their fathers’ deaths, that other children have. Grossman also notes that not just a number of courts, but also twelve state legislatures, have addressed this issue, and explains the conclusions they have reached.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a recent decision by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The decision upheld two regulations that were imposed upon sexually oriented businesses in Ohio. The first regulation restricted a business’s hours if it allowed nudity; the second regulation forbade a business’s nude performers from touching each other, and from touching its customers. Hilden explains the Supreme Court nude-dancing decision, Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., that formed the backdrop for this case, and examines two of what she argues are the strongest First Amendment concerns that the Sixth Circuit panel’s decision raises.
Justia columnist Vikram David Amar and Justia guest columnist Alan Brownstein, both U.C. Davis law professors, assess the claim of Texas governor and presidential candidate Rick Perry that the U.S. Constitution’s Seventeenth Amendment—which provides for the direct election of U.S. Senators—was a mistake. Amar and Brownstein explain the original Constitution’s provision for state legislative election of Senators, and the thinking behind it, and the genesis of the Seventeenth Amendment. They also assess the Amendment’s costs, but note that if it were repealed, there would be costs to that decision, as well.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on recent Republican proposals based on the idea that tax cuts for the rich will help curb the recession. Buchanan argues that there is no support, in either economic theory, or in empirical evidence, to conclude that America’s current tax rates are hurting the economy, or that reducing tax rates for businesses and the wealthy will improve the economy and/or reduce unemployment. All such cuts would do, Buchanan contends, is make the rich richer—while also imperiling vital public services.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on the ongoing controversy over the fate of the U.S. Post Office. Dorf describes the causes of the Post Office’s troubled state; considers the pros and cons of a possible plan by which Congress would subsidize the Post Office; describes what such a plan could look like in practice; and notes the virtues of opting for a stopgap solution now in light of the reality that long-term forecasts show that the end of the Post Office is ultimately inevitable.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on a recent controversy in Missouri, concerning a law that would have banned teachers from becoming the “friends” of their under-18 students on Facebook and other social networking sites that allow private messaging. As Ramasastry explains, the law’s apparent concern was to ensure that teachers would not become sexual predators preying on students, but the effect of the law, if enforced, would have been to cut off positive—and even vital—student/teacher communication as well, ranging from students’ seeking homework help, to students’ seeking counsel and support while contemplating suicide. Ramasastry describes the law and the court battle over it, and considers the Missouri legislature’s and the ACLU’s new proposals for regulation in the state in this area.
Justia columnist and Hunter Human Rights Program Director Joanne Mariner suggests an answer to the following question: Ten years after the terrorist attacks that were said to have “changed everything,” what has actually changed in the protection of human rights, and how did these changes take place? Mariner isolates five distinct periods of government policy, as it has evolved over the post-9/11 years: (1) the directly post-9/11 era of unchecked abuses (especially by the CIA), which was sparked by the post-9/11 Bush Administration claim that the U.S. was waging a war on terror; (2) the era of retrenchment and reassertion, when the Bush Administration was put on the defensive; (3) the attempt, during the last years of the Bush Administration, to establish a legal foundation for its “war on terror” actions; (4) the initial, but short-lived, Obama Administration push to reverse the Bush Administration's approaches; and (5) the current Obama Administration policy era—when, Mariner contends, because President Obama has a more liberal image and generally more liberal politics, he can not only adopt certain abusive policies, but he can also normalize them in a way that President Bush never could have done.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John W. Dean comments on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, with a special emphasis on the legacy of the attacks for American law. Dean begins by assessing how foreign media sources—whose perspectives, he explains, may be somewhat more detached than Americans’, yet who often interviewed Americans as sources—see the anniversary of 9/11. In addition, Dean contends that, where American law is concerned, the legacy of 9/11 is a baleful one. In support of his claim, Dean points to a post-9/11 proliferation of laws (some with sunset provisions, some without) that, he contends, go beyond all previous limits of constitutional propriety. Dean focuses in particular on the Patriot Act, and the infamous torture memo. All told, Dean concludes, the fallout of the 9/11 attacks has had a highly negative impact on American law.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton looks back to a more innocent time, ten years ago, before the 9/11 attacks shocked and horrified America, and before clergy child-sex-abuse scandals rocked first the Catholic Church and its believers, and then other religious institutions and believers as well. Hamilton contends that the key lessons of these devastating events are that we can never assume that a person’s belief in God, in itself, renders him or her godly; and that faith can too easily provide a pretext for terrible crimes.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on a fascinating criminal procedure case that the U.S. Supreme Court will resolve during this coming term. The case, Perry v. New Hampshire, will answer the following question: If an eyewitness first identifies a perpetrator under highly suggestive circumstances that seriously compromise the reliability of the identification, but the police did not orchestrate those circumstances, should a court then exclude the identification evidence? Or, stated differently, is police misconduct necessary to the successful due process exclusion of unduly suggestive eyewitness identification evidence? Colb explains the reasons why we might—and might not—require police misconduct before this type of constitutional claim may be made, and notes that the issue here is of great importance, as empirical research has now exposed the central role of mistaken eyewitness identifications in wrongful convictions. Colb also makes a case that, in the end, the best resolution here may be to inform jurors of the problems with suggestive identifications, and then simply have them evaluate such identifications accordingly, as they do with other unreliable evidence.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which raises a fascinating question stemming from modern reproductive technology: Is a child deemed to be legally related to her biological father if she was conceived after he died? The question proves to be crucial when it comes to Social Security and inheritance benefits. Grossman sets forth the facts of the Eighth Circuit case, which involved Social Security benefits; covers some new complications in the law of parentage; and explains why the Eighth Circuit, in the case before it, ultimately ruled against the child and her mother.
Justia columnist and U.C. Davis law professor Vikram David Amar comments on an affirmative action decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in which the Supreme Court may well grant review. Amar explains why, if the High Court does indeed take the case, its decision may substantially alter constitutional law relating to affirmative action in the context of educational admissions. In addition, Amar notes that this case, if taken up by the Court, may illustrate the very considerable power that Justice Anthony Kennedy now wields. Amar also provides thorough background to allow the reader to put this case, and the issues it raises, in the context of prior precedents relating to affirmative action in admissions, such as Bakke, Hopwood, Grutter, and Gratz.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan offers a detailed response to an argument that has been in the news frequently: Billionaire investor Warren Buffett has contended that those with annual incomes above one million dollars should pay significantly more in income tax, and that those with annual incomes above ten million dollars per year should pay even more than that. Many commentators, Buchanan points out, have responded to Buffett’s argument by pointing out that Buffett is free to give away his own riches to the government, if he so chooses—for instance, by foregoing tax exemptions that he would be entitled to claim. But Buchanan offers a set of strong responses to this argument, suggesting that the debate should properly focus on Buffett’s proposal, and not on Buffett himself.
Justia columnist Joanne Mariner, an attorney and the head of Hunter College’s Human Rights Program, comments on the end of Muammar Qaddafi’s rule, and reminds readers that for much of the past decade, the United States actually saw Qaddafi as a friend, rather than an enemy. Mariner points out that during the Bush years, Qaddafi’s human rights violations were not simply overlooked but actually exploited, as Condoleezza Rice, in 2006, encouraged others to see Libya’s leadership as a model to follow. Mariner covers the connection between Libya and the CIA, and Libya and the practice of rendition, and explains how statements, made under torture, from a man who was detained in Libya and elsewhere led to the claim of a relationship between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry explains some of the options for Libya’s transitional government, when it comes to the country’s oil resources. Ramasastry explains both the traditional premise that successor regimes need to honor previously negotiated sovereign agreements, and the new trend for sovereigns to renegotiate deals entered into by previously corrupt officials—and the legal basis for such renegotiation. She also argues that the transitional government, and its future governments, should opt for greater transparency in any new oil concessions that are granted, in order to instill confidence in the new government, especially among Libya’s citizens. In addition, she compares the situation relating to contracts to those that have occurred in Iraq and, especially, Liberia.