Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on the compensation that college athletes receive, and notes that they would probably do worse under a wage-paying system. He also contends that the reason that people often dismiss the idea that college players are paid is that the payment comes in the form of athletic scholarships. The cynical view is that this payment is not real, with players being deprived of the education that schools pretend to offer them. However, Buchanan notes, it turns out that the reality is different than the cynics’ take on it, and much more nuanced.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a case from the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, which involved a public school grammar teacher who—after intercepting a student's note that included rap music lyrics—continued the discussion, which then moved on to the use of the “N Word.” Hilden argues that the teacher should not have been suspended without pay as a result of the “N Word,” the use of which, by a teacher, in context, should not have resulted in the teacher's punishment.

Justia columnist and University of Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on a Southern California school district’s decision to retain a private firm to search the Web and look for public posts, photos, tweets, and other communications made by its students. The district’s stated purpose for retaining the firm is to prevent students from harming others—and, in particular, to stop cyberbullying. But Ramasastry notes that the company that does the monitoring also finds out a lot of other information about students, as well.

Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman, and Justia guest columnist and University of Pittsburgh law professor Deborah Brake comment on the 40th anniversary of Title IX, which transformed athletics for women and girls. Yet, they note, serious problems remain. Grossman and Brake note issues such as the cost of prizing masculinity in sports and the collateral damage of masculinity, including rape, gang-rape, and male-on-male hazing and assault. They also discuss the daunting task of changing sport culture, suggesting that community sports programs, especially in the younger years, should encourage more co-ed play, so that kids learn young to respect all athletes, both male and female, at a young age.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton comments on the investigation that occurred after many months, and many media stories about child sex abuse at the Yeshiva University High School (YUHS) in The Jewish Daily Forward. In the end, Yeshiva University released an “independent investigation” led by Karen Patton Seymour of Sullivan & Cromwell. Hamilton takes strong issue with the report that resulted from the investigation, and explains in detail her sharp criticisms of it, and what she contends that it should have contained, but did not. She also argues that, in this situation, pending litigation is a poor excuse for nondisclosure, especially in light of the statute-of-limitations situation in New York.

Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar offers advice for those who are starting law school this Fall. Amar bases his advice on his own experience as a law student, as a practicing lawyer, and as someone who has taught at four law schools over the past two decades. He offers certain advice that is intuitive but very much worth keeping in mind, and certain advice that is less intuitive and also worth poring over before classes start.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on a Maine Supreme Court case regarding a child who was born male, but identified as a girl (“Susan Doe”). Susan’s school allowed her to use the girls’, rather than the boys’ bathroom, until a student’s grandfather complained, and Susan was required to use a separate, staff-only restroom that no other students used. Colb discusses the arguments—pro and con—for allowing Susan to use the girls’ bathroom at the school, just as other girls would.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton discusses abuse in the world of sports, including school, amateur and professional sports. While child sex abuse has been a problem in this world, physical, emotional, and verbal abuse are far too common, and need to stop as well, Hamilton urges. She cites the example of Rutgers basketball coach Mike Rice, but stresses that Rice is far from alone in his abusive behavior. And, Hamilton notes, it is a problem that athletes looking for—or wanting to continue with—college scholarships feel that they have no other choice but to take the abuse. Hamilton asks us all to imagine sports as it should be: free of bullying and fear, and offers a model code of conduct for sports addressing the various forms of abuse that athletes may suffer, as well as reporting requirements when abuse does occur.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton discusses what the institutions and people who oversee youth and school sports must do in order to avoid child sex abuse, and other types of abuse that can be related to sports, such as verbal abuse. Hamilton begins by noting that we need to clearly define what is abuse, whether sexual, verbal, or otherwise. In addition, she argues that youth athletic organizations need to institute hotlines for reporting abuse, and also to ensure backup support for young athletes if a hotline alone is not enough, as it may not be in some circumstances. In addition, Hamilton discusses the institution of penalties for adults who know of abuse and do nothing, and notes how sports culture can be changed for the better with the help of The Positive Coaching Alliance.

Justia columnist and attorney David Kemp discusses the disparity between legal education and the legal profession. He describes the strengths and shortcomings of a legal education as provided by many law schools today. He then contrasts what law school provides with what is actually demanded of attorneys, finding that there is a sharp discontinuity between the two. He argues that while some measures have been undertaken to fix the problem, such as revised curricula and state certification of limited-license legal technicians, no solution can be adequate without also considering the career advice that students receive prior to deciding on a legal career and applying to law school.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden covers a new North Carolina law, described by the North Carolina ACLU as possibly the first of its kind in the United States, which seeks to protect teachers from students’ (1) building a fake online profile or website of the teacher; (2) posting the teacher’s private, personal, or sexual information; (3) tampering with the teacher’s online networks, data or accounts; (4) signing the teacher up to a pornographic website; or (5) making any statement, whether true or false, that is likely to provoke someone else to stalk or harass the teacher. Violations of any of these five provisions carry criminal penalties. Hilden argues that the law’s genuine concern for protecting teachers is already sufficiently addressed by existing civil and/or criminal law, and that to the extent that the provisions go further than existing law, they may raise serious First Amendment issues—issues that have already left the North Carolina ACLU primed to challenge the statute. Hilden also underlines the point that teachers typically have far greater resources and maturity to deal with bullying than students do, and thus, she argues, teachers need less protection from bullying than students do.

Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar comments on a closely watched affirmative action case that the Supreme Court will very likely resolve. As Amar notes, the case concerns how a state that tries to abolish affirmative-action programs may, in doing so, violate the Constitution. As Amar explains, such programs are never constitutionally required to be initiated, but their abolition may be constitutionally problematic—for instance, if programs that benefit minorities are abolished in a way that leaves all programs that benefit other groups untouched, and that makes reenactment of the programs that minorities prefer especially difficult; or when minorities are subjected to greater political obstacles in the adoption (or re-adoption) of the programs they might support than are other groups.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a federal district court case that was brought after Mississippi teen Taylor Bell was suspended based on the lyrics of a rap song he wrote and posted on Facebook and YouTube, where it was heard by his high school classmates. Hilden explains why the case implicated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines, even if the rap song fell short of constituting a “true threat” under other free speech precedents. Taylor lost before the federal district court, but, as Hilden explains, his attorney has noted a number of key points that will likely help strengthen Taylor’s case in the planned appeal.

Justia columnist Vikram David Amar and Justia guest columnist Alan Brownstein, both U.C., Davis law professors, comment on an interesting lawsuit that involves both the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The suit was brought by a group of public high school cheerleaders against the school district that told them to stop displaying religious-themed banners bearing bible verses and proclaiming things like “If G-d is for us, Who Can Be Against Us?” at football games. Does the Establishment Clause forbid what they are doing? And does the Free Speech Clause come into play? Amar and Brownstein address the complex constitutional issues that the case presents.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a recent school speech case from Missouri in which twin brothers, both high-school juniors, created a blog that derogated fellow students in racist and sexist ways. Hilden argues that it’s no surprise that the brothers were suspended from their school and required to continue their studies elsewhere, given that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist. allows students to be punished when substantial disruption foreseeably results from speech that they directed at their school. She also notes that it is unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court would grant review in a case like this one, and describes the kind of school-speech case that might, conversely, be a good candidate for the Court’s review.

Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton comments on an incident in Pakistan in which a 14-year young woman was shot by the Taliban because she voiced her view that girls should be educated; and an incident here in the U.S. where the American Family Association—which is characterized by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate group—has essentially come out in favor of the bullying of homosexual children on Mix It Up at Lunch Day, which is meant to break up cliques, even if just for one day. Hamilton argues that the first incident shows the need for the international recognition of civil rights, and of the rule of law, and the second incident involves a particularly repellent form of homophobia that has no place in our public schools. Each incident is made all the worse, Hamilton suggests, because children are the victims. Hamilton reminds us, too, that we are fortunate here in the U.S. to have the benefit of the First Amendment's Establishment and Speech Clauses.

Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf explains the origin and meaning of the concept of having a “critical mass” of minority students in the affirmative action context, and the role that this concept played in a recent Supreme Court oral argument relating to affirmative action at the University of Texas. Without a critical mass of minority students, it has been argued, such students will feel isolated in class and on campus, and there may be little diversity within the group of minority students itself. For these reasons, the University of Texas gives such students a special “plus factor” in admissions. Dorf explains how both conservatives and liberals on the Court have come to place what he argues is excessive weight on the “critical mass” concept, when it comes to affirmative action in education. He also summarizes the conservative Justices’ critique of the concept, but contends that that critique is itself flawed.

Justia guest columnist and Cornell Law Visiting Fellow Antonio Haynes comments on a recent controversy in which parents of two public school students did not object to their daughters undergoing corporal punishment (specifically, paddling), but did object to the punishment being carried out by men, rather than women. Haynes points out that, upon closer examination, the issue here is not actually about sex, but about sexual orientation; the parents assumed the males conducting the spankings were straight and thus thought that they might find performing the spankings erotic. Noting that corporal punishment in the schools has not been ruled by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional, and that 19 states still allow it, Haynes suggests that issues like who may administer a spanking tend to distract us from asking deeper questions such as why we still accept corporal punishment in our schools, and why—if we trust school officials to paddle students—we do not also trust them not to harbor erotic motives while doing so.

Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on the recent controversy over a Philadelphia public school geometry teacher's deriding student Samantha Pawlucy for wearing a Romney/Ryan T-shirt. The incident blew up into a full-blown controversy, with Romney personally calling the girl and speaking with her parents. Hilden parallels the incident to the key 1969 Supreme Court student-speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., in which students near Pawlucy's age wore black armbands in school in order to protest the Vietnam War. Hilden also argues that Pawlucy’s is an easy case, and that she would have a much harder First Amendment case, had the incident occurred in a History or Social Studies class. Finally, Hilden questions whether this was a case of teacher/student bullying, and suggests that teachers and students alike should be required to learn basic school-speech First Amendment tenets.

Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on the use of biometrics in school lunch lines and elsewhere in schools. More specifically, she notes, schools are using an infrared scanner that identifies children’s unique palm and hand vein patterns, and converts these patterns into an algorithm through which the child can be recognized quickly and uniquely by a hand scan. Ramasastry raises privacy concerns about this kind of scanning: Could it lead kids to see other compromises of their privacy as commonplace? Will the databases that contain the scans be used for other purposes—even when the kids become adults? Might law enforcement attempt to use the databases of the hand scans? And what about parents with religious objections to schools’ using the hand scans on their children? At the very least, Ramasastry suggests, the scanning system should be “opt in” and not “opt out,” so that parents can think carefully about allowing their children to become part of the scanning system, and thus part of the related database.