Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on an interesting case regarding educational privacy. The case arose when a Florida college instructor sought to find out the name of the student who had filed a complaint with the college against him. Federal and Florida law regarding student privacy were stumbling blocks, but the instructor ultimately did find out the name of the complaining student. As Hilden explains, precedent indicates that students’ educational privacy rights yield only if a given communication is held to be not directly, but only tangentially, related to a student. Here, that very holding was made—since although the student sent the complaint, the substance of the complaint was about the professor. Hilden questions the court’s reasoning, and questions, more broadly, whether privacy is much needed in the education context in the first place.
In Part Two of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman continues her discussion of the application of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which effected a ban on sex discrimination by educational institutions that receive federal funding. Grossman focuses especially on the recent case of Student v. Henderson Independent School District (HISD), in which a school district was sanctioned by a federal agency for failing to respond to a complaint of student-to-student sexual assault; and the legal standards that produced that result. Here, Grossman stresses, among other points, that a police investigation of alleged sexual harassment or assault is no substitute for the required school investigation that is mandated.
In Part One of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman discusses the application of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which effected a ban on sex discrimination by educational institutions that receive federal funding. Grossman focuses especially on the recent case of Student v. Henderson Independent School District (HISD), in which a school district was sanctioned by a federal agency for failing to respond to a complaint of student-to-student sexual assault; and the legal standards that produced that result.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on the recent phenomenon of high school students’ using stimulants such as Adderall and Ritalin to attempt to improve their academic performance, often getting the stimulants by faking Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Colb notes that for those who do not have ADHD, the drugs act as a stimulant, allowing the user to better concentrate and focus. Colb compares and contrasts the issues raised by steroids scandals in professional sports to illustrate what, exactly, is wrong with this kind of use of Adderall and Ritalin. Among other points, Colb expresses concern that students’ use of such drugs will become the “new normal”—which is especially worrisome as the drugs carry side effects and serious risks. She also suggests that we, as a society, reconsider the competitive model of high school studying, and instead focus on students’ learning about subjects that interest and inspire them individually.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean does a Q&A with Ross Guberman, the author of the book Point Made: How to Write Like the Nation's Top Advocates (Oxford 2011). The interview covers how Guberman got into the teaching of legal writing and honed his skills in the field, the effect good writing can have on a case, and the methods and techniques that Guberman uses himself, and teaches others. Readers may be especially interested in Guberman's account of three mistakes that lawyers often make in drafting and presenting their arguments. Finally, Guberman previews his next book, which will comment on well-written judicial opinions.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden discusses the types of complaints that libraries have received about the books in the Hunger Games trilogy, and argues that libraries should nevertheless keep the books on the shelves. The complaints that Hilden discusses claim that the books contain sex, are anti-ethnic, are anti-family, contain material that is “occult/satanic,” and are too violent. Except for the claim about violence, Hilden argues, these claims are inaccurate on the facts—they either do not accurately describe the books’ content, or they fail to put material from the books in proper context. Finally, regarding the claim about violence, Hilden notes that a number of classic works that are commonly taught in schools contain violent acts—and even, in cases like Lord of the Flies, acts of violence among children.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan takes strong issue with several arguments that have often been made by Republicans in the run-up to this year’s presidential election. Specifically, Buchanan counters arguments that taxpayers should not help pay for others’ college educations—and perhaps not their K-12 educations, either. He also takes on the two mutually contradictory arguments that (1) college is a waste of time and money, and (2) college education is the only force driving economic inequality. As to the first argument, Buchanan points out that education is a key indicator of economic progress, and that as we stagnate in our population’s educational achievement, other countries eagerly seek out more college education for their own people. As to the second argument, Buchanan argues that it can be rebutted by basic statistics, and that, even if it were true, the logical response would be to broaden American educational attainment.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on the recent Republican attack on American education. Buchanan begins by emphasizing the copious evidence showing that education leads to national prosperity. In addition, he contends that it only makes sense for everyone who benefits from our educational system—meaning all Americans—to together pay for that system, including via student loans. Citing recent comments by candidates Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum, Buchanan critiques and opposes their, and other Republicans’, seeming disdain for education. Buchanan argues that if you focus on the facts, education has been proven, over and over, to be well worth its cost. Other countries clearly know this, Buchanan points out, citing notable examples, and if we forget this truth, he says, we will surely fall behind as a nation.
Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar continues his two-part series of columns on the Supreme Court and affirmative action. In this column, Amar cites ways in which both the liberal and the conservative Justices have seemed to fall short of being truly intellectually honest on affirmative action issues. Amar focuses especially on what methodology the Court should use in affirmative action cases, and whether some affirmative action cases should not have been decided by the Court at all. More specifically, Amar looks at the use of originalist methodology in affirmative action cases, and issues of standing in such cases. Finally, he comments on the Fisher case, which is now before the Court, and involves the University of Texas’s admissions system.
In Part One in a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram Amar comments on the Supreme Court and affirmative action—a timely subject due to the Court's recent grant of review in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas, which involves affirmative action in college admissions. Amar contends that, when it comes to this explosive issue, the two wings of the Court have both engaged in intellectual dishonesty, and he details how the Justices adopted their current distrust: Amar charges the Court's liberals with an unwillingness to apply meaningful strict, or even intermediate, scrutiny to race-based programs; charges its conservatives with the unfair treatment of remedial rationales; and takes issue with some Justices' treatment of history and precedent. Amar's analysis includes some shockingly out-of-context quotes that Justices, over time, have used to try to make their points in this highly controversial area.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on the Supreme Court’s recent decision to review a case involving race-based affirmative action in higher education. As Dorf explains, the Court has not resolved an affirmative-action case since 2003, and thus this new case will be especially closely watched. Dorf discusses the affirmative action precedents that the Court has already handed down, including the famous Bakke case, and the University of Michigan cases, Gratz and Grutter—the impact of which, Dorf explains, has been modest. The new case that the Court will review, Dorf explains, involves the University of Texas's admissions system—which offers admission to all Texas students who rank in the top ten percent of their high school class, and also adds consideration of race as one of a number of factors in admissions decisions. Dorf describes the issues the Texas case raises, and predicts that the Court's opinions—on both sides—will necessarily lack candor, as both liberals and conservatives pay lip service to an ideal of colorblindness, but do not actually hew to that ideal.
George Washington law professor and economist Neil Buchanan comments on the state of the economics profession today, linking it to the frustration many Americans feel when economists seem unable to come up with a clear set of prescriptions as to how the economy can be improved. Buchanan traces the root of the problem to the way in which economists are now trained, and the expectations placed upon PhD candidates. Ideally, Buchanan says, economists would be trained to study important and interesting real-world issues. Instead, he observes, they are not asked to actually try to understand the economy, but rather to master certain technical skills and to gain a command of topics in advanced mathematics that have limited, if any, direct real-world applications. Buchanan notes that some excellent economists do learn to grapple with real-world problems, but he observes that they do so more by happenstance, than as a result of their training. He traces the roots of this longstanding situation, and predicts that it will only change if and when the incentives presented to economics PhD candidates change.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan responds to some of the common criticisms of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, defending such scholarship on the ground that it makes a valuable contribution. He begins by noting how legal scholarship has changed over the years, beginning around the 70’s, from a field that primarily summarized legal developments, to one that primarily describes how the law could and should change. As a result of this evolution, Buchanan argues, it made sense to bring in other academic disciplines to assist law professors who were interested in improving policies, and who wanted to draw from the relevant schools of thought in framing their policy recommendations and developing their ideas. There has been nostalgia on the part of some—and, especially, some judges—for legal scholarship the way it used to be: primarily focused on describing the law, not improving it. But Buchanan argues that this nostalgia, while understandable, is misplaced, for combining legal expertise with expertise in another field can importantly further the debate on important policy matters. Some questions, Buchanan notes, are truly interdisciplinary and for these, interdisciplinary scholarship is not just useful, but vital.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on the state of college football, and how it can be improved. Buchanan argues that what is needed is not a movement toward more professionalism in sports, as some have suggested, but rather measures that would both ensure that college athletes do not face serious physical injury (and are taken care of, physically and financially, if they do), and also guarantee that players truly receive the college education that is supposed to come along with their admission. In addition to putting forward his own proposals, Buchanan also considers Taylor Branch’s analysis of the issue in The Atlantic, and Joe Nocera’s commentary on it in the Sunday New York Times Magazine.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf comments on the evolution and role of the “scholar brief.” A scholar brief is an amicus (friend-of-the-court) brief submitted to a court—usually, the U.S. Supreme Court—by a law professor acting in his or her role as scholar, rather than advocate. Dorf notes that a column in The New York Times recently pointed to Harvard Law Professor Richard Fallon’s article draft questioning the value of scholar briefs, by suggesting that they are very often not particularly scholarly. In this column, Dorf considers why scholars’ amicus briefs have proliferated recently, and what light that proliferation sheds on the evolving relationship between the bench and the legal academy. In particular, Dorf connects the proliferation of scholar briefs to the increasing divide between legal scholarship in the academy, and the more practical work of the courts, including the Supreme Court. And yet, he notes that the academy’s work—contrary to the claims of some—actually does continue to have relevance to courts, in part by showing how disciplines such as economics and psychology can better illuminate the workings of the law.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on a recent controversy in Missouri, concerning a law that would have banned teachers from becoming the “friends” of their under-18 students on Facebook and other social networking sites that allow private messaging. As Ramasastry explains, the law’s apparent concern was to ensure that teachers would not become sexual predators preying on students, but the effect of the law, if enforced, would have been to cut off positive—and even vital—student/teacher communication as well, ranging from students’ seeking homework help, to students’ seeking counsel and support while contemplating suicide. Ramasastry describes the law and the court battle over it, and considers the Missouri legislature’s and the ACLU’s new proposals for regulation in the state in this area.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a case in which a young woman, Avery Doninger, sued her former high school for punishing her when she was a student there based on derogatory comments about school administrators that she posted while at home, on her home computer, after school hours, on a publicly accessible blog. Hilden notes that Doninger is now seeking Supreme Court review, based on a split among the federal circuit courts regarding cases similar to her own. Hilden explains two key Supreme Court precedents on school speech, and contends that the Court would have to truly make new First Amendment law if it were to allow schools to punish students for online comments that, like Doninger’s, were made after school hours, at home, on home computers—even if the subject of the comments relates to other students or to school administrators.