Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that abuse of power is a sufficient ground for presidential impeachment, notwithstanding the argument to the contrary by President Trump’s impeachment defense lawyer, Alan Dershowitz. Hamilton explains that abuse of power by the President was the very fear of the Framers of the Constitution, and to reject it as an impeachable offense would subvert the spirit of the Constitution, as evidenced by the Framers’ debates at the Constitutional Convention.
BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel discusses risk and uncertainty to explain people’s decision making as to investments. Frankel points out that people have varying degrees of tolerance for risk and uncertainty, due in part to cultural and individual differences.
UF law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why the Democratic presidential candidates attacking each other over policy differences and other issues rather than unifying to oppose President Trump in the general election. Buchanan argues that, perhaps illogically, the infighting is essential and a healthy part of the process.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb proposes the psychological effects of the “silent treatment” as a possible reason that arrested individuals who understand their Miranda rights nevertheless confess to the police. Rather than seeking to dispute or displace other explanations of the phenomenon, Colb suggests that when police leave a suspect alone in his cell, he may experience their exit as the silent treatment and confess as an attempt to end it.
Joanna L. Grossman, law professor at SMU Dedman School of Law, reviews how disgraced Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein started the #MeToo movement. Grossman details the origins of the #MeToo movement, particularly Weinstein’s role, and describes how Weinstein’s despicable behavior helped to illuminate and begin to address sexual misconduct not only by individuals, but throughout entire industries.
Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone evaluate the suggestion made by some that the votes of senators on President Trump’s impeachment can and should be private. Amar and Mazzone argue that while the text of the Constitution alone does not foreclose secrecy, structural, prudential, and logistical considerations strongly disfavor a secret vote on the matter.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf offers one interpretation of Chief Justice John Roberts’s annual year-end report on the federal judiciary—that the Chief Justice intends to serve as a modest counterbalance to President Trump. Dorf supports his interpretation with text and context of the year-end report but offers his cautious praise to the Chief Justice with a few important caveats as well.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 3L Christopher S. Owens discuss the unique situation of the impeachment of a U.S. President for conduct not alleged to be a crime. Looking to both text and history, Estreicher and Owens argue that commission of a particular, defined crime should be necessary for presidential impeachment for the preservation of the legitimacy and original purpose of that political device, particularly in polarized times such as these.
Marci A. Hamilton, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and CEO of CHILD USA, reviews the 2019 victories of victims of child sex abuse and assault and describes what needs to happen in 2020 to further secure justice for them.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar considers whether a President who has been impeached and acquitted may, if reelected, be retried by a subsequent Senate. Amar acknowledges that it is unclear whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ criminal procedural protections apply to impeachment proceedings, but he offers two key reasons that re-litigation of impeachment allegations after presidential reelection would be improper.
Clinical bioethicist Charles E. Binkley responds to a recent column by Verdict columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb regarding the existence of evil in the world. Using a theological framework, Binkley addresses the central question Colb raised in her column and proposes a corollary question about communal evil.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb considers whether an explanation for the affection dogs express for their humans might be explained by the Stockholm Syndrome, the condition that afflicts many kidnapped people and other abuse victims in which they form an attachment, sometimes called a trauma bond, that manifests as seeking the abuser’s approval and craving closeness rather than trying to escape. Colb argues that even though pet owners might not intend abuse, the unpredictable repetition of house arrest and silent treatment, followed by intermittent returns, might amount to abuse in the minds of these animals we hold as pets.
Rodger D. Citron, the Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and a Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, comments on the late Justice John Paul Stevens’s last book, The Making of a Justice: Reflections on My First 94 Years. Citron laments that, in his view, the memoir is too long yet does not say enough, but he lauds the justice for his outstanding service on the Supreme Court.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb reflects on why, if God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and benevolent, there is still evil in the world. Colb argues that one common answer—free will—does not truly resolve that question.
In this third of a series of columns on a legal challenge to Mississippi’s method of selecting governors, Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone discuss the merits of the challenge, with a particular focus on the plaintiffs’ contention that the method violates the one-person, one-vote principle enshrined in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Amar and Mazzone discuss the relevant precedents and argue that based on those precedents, the challenge has solid legal ground on which to proceed.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a case the U.S. Supreme Court recently agreed to review that presents the question whether a provision of the Delaware Constitution that requires the state’s judiciary be nearly equally balanced between Democrats and Republicans is constitutional. Dorf argues in favor of the provision, explaining that the provision takes into consideration partisan affiliation as means of limiting the role of politics in judicial appointments and judging.
BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel describes two advertisements by Charles Schwab ostensibly praising independent investment advisers, who are fiduciaries. Frankel explains why this development may lead to a separation of advice from execution of trade in a way that offers greater protections to investors.
UF law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan comments on a recent positive development in the economics profession—a move beyond the narrow notion of “Pareto efficiency” that economists have used for decades to support trickle-down economics. Buchanan explains the significance of this development, with the caveat that the change will likely not make much difference in actual economic policies.
Cornell law 3L Jareb Gleckel and professor Sherry F. Colb discuss, in point-counterpoint style, one aspect of the legal issue presented in Altitude Express v. Zarda—in which the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees based on sexual orientation. Gleckel argues that sexual orientation discrimination does not qualify as sex discrimination under the text of Title VII and describes a hypothetical example in support of his argument. In response, Colb first addresses Gleckel’s formalistic argument and then contends, even assuming Gleckel’s premise to be true, that because the policy at issue in Zarda discriminates between men and women both formally and in a manner that inflicts a gender-relevant injury, it violates the text of Title VII.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and 3L Christopher S. Owens analyze, based on the facts presently known to the public, whether President Trump committed the federal crime of battery. After describing the elements required for the offense of bribery, Estreicher and Owens conclude that Trump’s conduct would support a finding of an exchange of official acts (by Trump) for things of value (the public statement sought from Zelensky), as well as the corrupt intent necessary to maintain a bribery charge.