Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Court held that disputes over partisan gerrymandering are political questions that are beyond the competence of federal courts to resolve. Amar argues that while state courts may attempt to process partisan gerrymandering claims under state statutes and state constitutional provisions, they would need to do so not under the federal Constitution but under independent and adequate state-law grounds.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb and George R. El-Khoury, JD, comment on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court last month applying the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement to permit the admission in evidence of a blood-alcohol test administered on an unconscious driver. Colb and El-Khoury describe some of the problems with using the exigent circumstances exception to arrive at the result in this case and propose some alternative approaches that might yield the same outcome but for stronger reasons.
SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman describes recently passed anti-discrimination laws in New York that improve protections for victims of sexual harassment and assult. Grossman describes the role of the #MeToo movement in increasing awareness of the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault and praises New York for being a leader in protecting the rights of women.
Marci A. Hamilton, professor at the University of Pennsylvania and CEO of CHILD USA, comments on Jeffrey Epstein and the circumstances and people who allowed him to endanger children for so long. Hamilton describes the ways in which our culture enables men like him to abuse children and get away with it for as long as they do.
BU Law emerita professor Tamar Frankel discusses the dangers of allowing non-government entities—such as Facebook and its affiliates—to issue a “basket” of crypto-currency. Frankel explains the importance of government regulation of currency and cautions that we should seek a clearer understanding of any technology or currency that can potentially destabilize the nation’s economy.
University of Florida Levin College of Law professor Neil H. Buchanan laments the current precarious situation of our constitutional democracy. He argues that a constitutional democracy becomes unsustainable and ultimately dies when a party abuses and changes the system to maintain its power, which he observes Republicans are doing now.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the recent back-and-forth involving the Department of Justice seeking to place a new legal team on the Trump administration’s effort to justify the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census. Dorf points out that whoever ends up representing the administration, this attempted withdrawal may shed light on the merits of the case and the lengths to which the President and those who serve him are willing to go for the citizenship question.
NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding the inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire, arguing that courts should not get involved in determining whether agency action is based on “pretext.” Rather, Estreicher suggests that this particular case was highly unusual and that the Court’s decision should be limited accordingly.
Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies discusses the public dimension of forgiveness and explains why politics are inherent in the act of forgiving. Margulies describes numerous examples of people whose arguably comparable transgressions resulted in society’s vastly different degrees of willingness to forgive them.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on Tyson Foods’ recent entrance into the meat reduction market, selling so-called blended products that contain both meat and plants. Colb discusses some of the possible harms and benefits of Tyson’s decision from the perspective of an ethical vegan consumer.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar reflects on the decisions the U.S. Supreme Court issued at the end of its 2018–19 term. Amar observes three key trends at the Court: its focus on what constitutes improper government motive, concerns over broad congressional delegation to the executive, and tension over the meaning and theory of stare decisis.
In honor of the 100th anniversary of Illinois’ ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar reflects on what it means to be free from discrimination in the right to vote. Amar points out the connection between the right against discrimination in voting and the right discrimination in jury service and calls upon us all to consider what full, equal citizenship means.
Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on a decision the U.S. Supreme Court issued this week invalidating a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibited registration of “immoral” and “scandalous” trademarks. Dorf provides a brief history of the legal protection for profane speech and considers the implications of a more precisely worded statute regulating profanity for trademark registration purposes.
Joanna L. Grossman, SMU Dedman School of Law professor, and Lawrence M. Friedman, a Stanford Law professor, comment on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court last month upholding a provision of Illinois law that prescribed the disposition of fetal remains. Grossman and Friedman focus their discussion on Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion and his discussion of eugenics, which they argue is inapt and a distorted telling of history.
Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies addresses comments made in an op-ed by Atlanta District Attorney John Melvin that opponents of restrictive abortion laws are similar to Nazis or supporters of Jim Crow laws. Margulies explains why the comparison is not only intellectually and morally bankrupt, but also shameful, deserving of the most direct condemnation.
Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars, comments on the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in American Legion v. American Humanist Association, in which the Court upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge a large cross on public land in Maryland. Hamilton argues that in reaching its conclusion, a majority of the Court ignores the purpose of the Establishment Clause—to create a bulwark against the tyranny that results from the joinder of government and religious power to rule.
UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin discusses the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this week upholding the display of a World War I memorial cross on public land. Griffin argues that the majority erroneously and unnecessarily complicated the question asked by the Establishment Clause, effectively forgetting that the United States is not a Christian nation and that the Constitution requires the government not to prefer one religion over any other (or none at all.
In recognition of the bicentennial of Herman Melville’s birth, Touro Law Center professor Rodger Citron discusses the continuing relevance of Melville’s Billy Budd. Citron provides a brief summary of the novel, considers a few conflicting interpretations of it, and explains why it is relevant for legal professionals even today.
Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar contrasts Florida’s recent enactment of one of the strictest measures in the country to prohibit state and local entities from becoming “sanctuary” jurisdictions with California’s pro-sanctuary state laws. Amar explains this autonomy of states to enact such different laws with respect to federal laws as a product of the so-called anti-commandeering doctrine the Supreme Court has applied in three major cases over the past quarter century.
Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb discusses the criminal defenses of self-defense and defense of others and considers what role emotions should and do play in society’s assessment of whether a person’s violent conduct is justified and thus not criminally punishable. Colb argues that fear, rather than anger, most clearly motivates legitimate uses of self-defense or defense of others, but the mere fact of the victim’s anger (which might be present in addition to fear) should not necessarily mean the victim is criminally culpable.