Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on VP candidate Paul Ryan’s record. Buchanan argues that, while Ryan is being presented as a numbers maven, in fact Ryan is merely an ideologue with no experience in economics or in budgeting. Buchanan also argues that Romney would have been far wiser to opt for a running mate without so many positions that Romney now must repudiate. Buchanan charges that Ryan, rather than “running the numbers” simply makes them up—as, for example, Ezra Klein’s recent analysis, regarding Ryan’s long-term budget projections, shows. Buchanan also charges that Ryan uses mere assumptions—and unrealistic ones—when facts are needed, as with Ryan’s tax plan. Disagreeing even with Romney’s own economic advisers, Ryan, Buchanan notes, offers ideas and plans that any competent economist would reject. Although the media loves a debate, Buchanan urges them to admit that in this instance, only one side is on track, whereas Ryan is grievously off-base.
In Part Two of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb continues her analysis of two controversial rulings issued at the end of June and the beginning of July, respectively, by two panels of a New York State appeals court (the Appellate Division, First Department). Each ruling concluded that police had violated a suspect’s state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that as a result, the trial judges should have “suppressed” the weapons found on the suspects—that is, held that the weapons could not be introduced against the suspects if and when they became defendants at a criminal trial. Colb explains the logic behind the rulings, which is related to New York’s “Stop and Frisk” laws. She also contrasts New York and federal law in this area, and contends that the differences between them may have contributed to the New York controversy.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on instances of usage-based insurance (UBI), and warns of the risk of using this kind of technology until and unless it is carefully regulated. UBI programs use up-to-the-minute data on drivers, and safe drivers get discounts as a result, but UBI systems may also raise privacy concerns. Ramasastry focuses especially on Progressive Insurance’s “Snapshot” program, which showed that actual driving behavior is the best predictor of all of driver risk. Ramasastry suggests that UBI programs need to be closely regulated in order to ensure that the information they glean about drivers is not put to other uses, to which drivers did not specifically and carefully consent. While Progressive itself does not use GPS, but instead depends on other driving-related information, Ramasastry notes that other companies may well require GPS tracking in the future, or may offer it in exchange for lower rates.
Justia columnist and Hunter College Human Rights Program Director Joanne Mariner comments on presumed Republican vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan’s positions on human rights issues. Reminding readers that even a VP may have great influence on human rights issue, as Dick Cheney certainly did with regard to issues relating to torture, Mariner notes that if Mitt Romney is elected president, Ryan, too, may have considerable sway in this area. Mariner notes first that Ryan sees rights as natural and God-given, and then goes on to note that Ryan is extremely pro-life, even if the pregnant woman’s life is in danger, and extremely anti-gay-rights. Mariner notes that when it comes to foreign policy, Ryan seems more open to certain compromises, and she is troubled, especially, by Ryan’s reportedly enlisting the advice of Elliot Abrams, whose views on human rights issues are, Mariner notes, very disturbing.
Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean concludes his two-part series of columns on how attorneys can avoid making errors when serving as counsel to a person or institution enmeshed in a scandal. With the Freeh Report strongly suggesting a cover-up of Jerry Sandusky’s child sexual abuse, Dean notes that the same question that arose in the Enron and Watergate scandals also arose regarding the Penn State scandal: Where were the lawyers? Dean offers some intriguing answers as to why lawyers may not function as they should in cover-up situations—noting that general counsels, though they are working for an institution, may tend to feel loyalty to the person, or persons, with whom they directly work, instead. Dean also introduces readers to the psychology of cover-ups, and especially the concept of the “loss frame,” drawing on the work of Richard Painter, Richard Kahneman, and Amos Tversky to explain why attorneys may get caught up in cover-ups. Dean also gives advice for those—whether they are attorneys or not—who find themselves in a loss-frame (roughly, a losing) situation, and notes what the ABA’s Model Rules counsel in such situations.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton comments on two recent and somewhat similar controversies: the Chick-fil-A controversy, regarding the head of the company’s comments about gay rights; and the Hercules controversy, regarding that company’s refusal to pay for employees’ contraception due to the owners’ religious beliefs. Hamilton warns that such controversies raise the specter of Balkanization—that is, a society torn asunder by differing religious beliefs and the inability to live harmoniously because of these religious differences. Hamilton also covers a Colorado-based federal district court decision regarding the provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) relating to employer-funded contraception. In addition, she provides examples of what might happen if this slippery slope is allowed to slip further—with individual and corporate business owners alike forcing their own religious beliefs, no matter how unusual or how restrictive, upon employees who reject those beliefs, and refusing to offer health insurance insofar as it supports practices, such as the use of contraception, in which the employers do not believe.
In Part One of a two-part series of columns, Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb begins her analysis of two controversial rulings issued at the end of June and the beginning of July, respectively, by two panels of a New York State appeals court (the Appellate Division, First Department). Each ruling concluded that police had violated a suspect’s state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that as a result, the trial judges should have “suppressed” the weapons found on the suspects—that is, held that the weapons could not be introduced against the suspects if and when they became defendants at a criminal trial. Colb explains the logic behind the rulings, which is related to New York's “Stop and Frisk” laws. She also contrasts New York and federal law in this area.
Justia columnist and Hofstra law professor Joanna Grossman comments on recent and past developments regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which sought to ignore valid same-sex marriages for federal purposes, such as the receipt of federal benefits. Grossman covers the beginning of DOMA; describes DOMA’s effect, including the legal havoc it wrought; and notes recent developments that she predicts will ultimately spell the death of DOMA. With four federal courts striking down DOMA’s key provision, Section Three, in just the last six months—in decisions that Grossman describes in detail—and the Department of Justice refusing to defend the law, Grossman suggests that the law cannot stand much longer.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on a recent Michigan Supreme Court First Amendment case, regarding a Michigan State University (MSU) ordinance. The ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to disrupt an MSU officer from performing his or her normal activities. In this case, a man whose car has been ticketed went up to the officer whom he believed gave him the ticket, and began shouting at him; a misdemeanor conviction ensued. The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately heard the case, addressing the key question whether a purely verbal interaction could constitutionally count as falling within the ordinance. Relying on a closely parallel Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court held that it could not.
Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar comments on the recent study ranking law schools by scholarly impact that was conducted by University of Chicago professor Brian Leiter, who also contends that the most well-known law-school-ranking system, that of U.S. News & World Report, is seriously flawed. Amar covers ranking methodology; describes what the most recent Leiter rankings show; and explains why the U.S. News rankings tend to differ somewhat from the Leiter rankings. Amar also addresses a key underlying question for any law school ranking: How much should a school’s scholarly productivity count, as opposed to other possible ranking factors?
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan argues that, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act (ACA) decision, states should not opt out of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, as they are allowed to do, and as many Republican governors have suggested that they will do. Buchanan argues—providing many specifics—that the states can easily afford the Medicaid expansion, especially as the states are being offered a generous deal by Congress; and that the federal government can afford it too. Overall, Buchanan concludes that the case for states’ opting for the expansion is overwhelmingly strong. In addition to being the right thing to do with respect to health care for states’ poor and near-poor citizens, he contends, choosing the Medicaid expansion proves to be fiscally responsible as well.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Michael Dorf confronts an interesting question arising from a controversy relating to the Chick-fil-A restaurant chain. The chain’s president has made anti-same-sex-marriage statements. Under the First Amendment, Dorf notes, no government—federal, state, or local—can punish him for those statements alone. But Dorf also notes that the speech of businesses and their representatives can sometimes be a legitimate concern of government. And he cites two central reasons: First, speech manifesting bias may hint at illegal conduct manifesting the same bias, thus arguably justifying special scrutiny for the speaker. And second, in many circumstances, private speech may also implicate the government itself—for instance, when there is a restaurant on a military base. Citing a mix of hypotheticals and real-life examples, Dorf illustrates the difficult constitutional issues that are at play here.
Justia columnist and U. Washington law professor Anita Ramasastry comments on legal issues regarding the “Yes Men”—a group that creates faux websites and events in order to take aim at corporations, and other entities, the actions of which they oppose. While parody is strongly protected under Supreme Court precedent, Ramasastry notes that the Yes Men’s work is somewhat different from traditional parody, which makes the difference between the parody and its target very clear, very quickly. Ramasastry suggests that in the future, the Yes Men’s strategy may be tested, for the Yes Men’s actions may cause more confusion—and for that reason, may not receive, in court, the full protection that clear, non-confusing parodies enjoy. Ramasastry concludes that even if that is the case, this will have little impact on the Yes Men’s strategies—beyond changing the corporate names on their parody sites.
In Part One of a two-part series regarding attorney-client privilege and the Penn State child-sex-abuse scandal, Justia columnist and former counsel to the president John Dean comments on potentially serious attorney-client privilege confusion relating to the scandal. Louis Freeh—the former judge and FBI director, and the author of the Freeh Report that was commissioned by Penn State regarding the scandal—has raised serious questions about the roles of the University’s General Counsel and its outside counsel, respectively, with respect to the scandal. With the assistance of Thompson Hine partner Jim Robenalt, who answered a series of questions posed by Dean, Dean seeks to illuminate the relevant legal and ethical rules in this oft-misunderstood area. In addition, Dean notes some parallels here to Watergate, during which questions also arose about attorneys’ representation of entities, such as the presidency, rather than persons, such as the president.
Justia columnist and Cardozo law professor Marci Hamilton makes the case that Summer 2012 has marked a key moment in American history with respect to the country’s treatment of child sex abuse. She focuses not only on the recent convictions of Penn State’s notorious Jerry Sandusky, but also the child endangerment conviction of Monsignor Lynn of the Philadelphia Archdiocese. Noting the sea-change in our society with respect to trials about, and punishments for, child sex abuse, Hamilton reflects that we have come a very long way. Commenting on the problems with even the best of internal investigations, such as that which Louis Freed conducted for Penn State, Hamilton argues that internal investigations are no substitute for public trials. In addition, she applauds the state legislatures that are seeking to enact or expand mandatory child-sex-abuse reporting laws.
Justia columnist and Cornell law professor Sherry Colb comments on a German court’s recent ruling banning circumcision under the criminal law. Colb notes that the ruling has caused a great deal of controversy, both domestically and internationally, because child circumcision is central to both the Jewish and Muslim faiths, and because of Germany’s history of bias and of genocide. The court claimed, however, that it was acting to preserve the child’s bodily integrity, and his ability to choose his own religion later in life. Colb covers the facts, the outraged reaction, and the arguments that might be made to the effect that the court was possibly acting out of sympathy for the child, rather than out of bias. She also compares and contrasts religious circumcision with procedures ranging from infant ear piercing, to female genital mutilation, to infant circumcision that is not performed for religious reasons. In addition, Colb raises a disturbing specter of bias based on the reported availability, in Germany, of circumcision based on medical, but not religious, reasons. Especially since child circumcision has medical benefits, she says, governments should continue to allow it regardless of whether it is motivated by religious or secular intent, or both.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on an interesting case regarding educational privacy. The case arose when a Florida college instructor sought to find out the name of the student who had filed a complaint with the college against him. Federal and Florida law regarding student privacy were stumbling blocks, but the instructor ultimately did find out the name of the complaining student. As Hilden explains, precedent indicates that students’ educational privacy rights yield only if a given communication is held to be not directly, but only tangentially, related to a student. Here, that very holding was made—since although the student sent the complaint, the substance of the complaint was about the professor. Hilden questions the court’s reasoning, and questions, more broadly, whether privacy is much needed in the education context in the first place.
Justia columnist and attorney Julie Hilden comments on the Supreme Court’s recent ruling striking down the Stolen Valor Act (SVA), a federal criminal statute that punishes lies about winning medals, including the Congressional Medal of Honor. Hilden covers the majority opinion striking down the SVA, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, and the adamant, fact-filled, and passionate dissent. Hilden contends that this case was not only interesting in its own right—because the SVA permitted criminal consequences simply for a proven lie, and nothing more than that—but also interesting as a political litmus test of sorts: Liberals, she suggests, will tend to worry about imposing harsh criminal penalties on mere bar-room braggadocio, while conservatives will tend to worry about the dilution, by false claims, of the significance of the medals that cost so much, and mean so much, to the recipients and their families.
Justia columnist and U.C., Davis law professor Vikram David Amar comments on an interesting and important issue regarding the power of federal courts. Specifically, Amar addresses the question whether a federal court can issue an injunction against future prosecution: If a district court tells you that the actions you are about to take are immune from prosecution, should you be able to rely on that immunity, even if it turns out that the district judge had provided it based on a flawed legal premise? As Amar points out, the Supreme Court precedent on this question is far from clear, and at least one of the Court’s liberals has suggested that reliance by a party on immunity that is wrongfully accorded to that party by a district court may be foolhardy. Amar also explains how this issue has arisen in a current controversy about Mississippi abortion services.
Justia columnist, George Washington law professor, and economist Neil Buchanan comments on an interesting and little-remarked aspect of the Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding the Affordable Care Act (ACA), also known colloquially as “Obamacare”: the decision’s concept of what constitutes free choice. Buchanan examines the significance of that concept in the ACA case, and notes that—in addition to the decision’s significance for Commerce Clause cases, and taxing power cases—the ACA decision may possibly affect other cases, in other areas of law, that also turn on what counts as the exercise of free will, versus what counts as coercion.